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Abstract 
This thesis aims to study the causes and effects of military expenditure on economic growth 
in India. Three aspects of this subject are concentrated which link well with the core stylised 
facts of the Indian defence effort and its developmental problems: the ‘security dilemma’ in 
terms of its relationship with its neighbour, Pakistan; the core factors that motivate the 
demand for defence; the economic impact of militarization and the effect of defence on 
development. 
 
First, the arms race between India and Pakistan is analyzed by using a Richardson action-
reaction model and cointegration techniques. The empirical results provide robust evidence to 
support the existence of an enduring arms race between India and Pakistan, even after taking 
into account a structural break. Second, the results indicate that India’s military expenditure is 
mainly determined by income, political status, the perceived threat from Pakistan and the 
external wars both in the long-run and in the short-run. Third, the relationship between 
military expenditure and economic growth is studied in India and in a broader context, i.e. in a 
cross-sectional and panel data study of 36 developing countries. The significant and negative 
effect of defence on economic growth is confirmed in both cases.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
According to SIPRI Yearbook 2009, India’s military expenditure in 2008 was US$ 24,716 
million, in constant 2005 price which ranks among the top 10 in the world. However, it is still 
among the poorest countries and the per capita PPP-adjusted gross national income for India 
was international $ 2,960 which is 155th among 210 countries (World Development Indicator 
Database, 2009) in the world in the same year. Thus on the one hand, India is still facing 
many problems such as poverty, poor I nfrastructure and poor health status, even though it has 
been one of the fastest-growing economies since the 1990s. On the other hand, India does 
spend a huge amount on military expenditure which might use scarce resources and crowd out 
growth-leading expenditures such as health and education expenditures and also might 
stimulate economic growth by spin-off effects. In particular since the trade-off takes place 
first and primarily at the government budgetary level, military spending may crowd out other 
types of government expenditure which has direct and bigger productivity effects. Thus, there 
is a potential problem and trade-off between military security and human security.  
 
Of course, it is simplistic to claim that the impact of military spending in the case of India is 
always negative. There is a large literature since the work of Emile Benoit in the early 1970s 
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which shows that there are positive effects of higher defence spending on economic growth 
particularly in developing countries. We review this literature later and check whether these 
positive channels are strong enough to compensate for the negative (crowding-out) effects. In 
addition, national security and protection of property rights are the sine qua non of economic 
development and without them no institutions can transform a poor country into a developed 
one. Another point is worth mentioning; this is derived from the recent literature on the 
success of ‘large’ economies in achieving high rates of growth in the era of globalisation. 
Alesina and Spolare (2008) claim the following: “There are economies of scale in the 
production of public goods. The per capita cost of many public goods is lower in larger 
countries, where taxpayers pay for them.” Think, for instance, of defence: a larger country 
(both in terms of population and national product) is less subject to foreign aggression. Thus, 
safety is a public good that increases with country size. Also, and related to the size of 
government argument above, smaller countries may have to spend proportionately more for 
defence than larger countries given economies of scale in defence spending. Thus, according 
to these authors a large country may derive economies of scale from expenditures which 
protects itself and provides security. This may be one explanatory factor behind the recent 
growth successes of large developing countries (often termed BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa). Yet, India seems to have suffered due to high military expenditures 
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which have been a substantial part of overall government spending which in turn has depleted 
resources from government spending on health, education and infrastructure. 
 
Most important, we need to understand the causes of military expenditure i.e. ask and answer 
the question as to what are the factors behind the demand for defence spending in countries 
like India. Stylised facts tell us that there is a long-standing arms race between the India and 
its neighbour Pakistan and therefore we should be able to identify the parameters of this 
relationship. On the other hand, defence spending is also affected in the short run by various 
temporary economic and political factors. How the long run and short run relations are related 
to each other is an obvious issue for discussion. Arms races are often a product of a ‘security 
dilemma’ as discussed in the international relations literature. On the other hand, the adverse 
impact of defence spending is analysed as a ‘developmental failure’. We, therefore, need to 
understand India’s defence expenditure issues as trying to reconcile the twin claims of 
security and development.  
 
The motivations that drive India’s military expenditure are not only the security 
considerations but also the constraints, which are imposed by economic factors such as per 
capita income and balance of payment. All these facts make India a very important and 
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interesting case study as an example for investigating the broader question of military 
expenditure and economic growth in developing countries.  
 
1.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
This study investigates the causes and effects of military expenditure in India. The three core 
research questions are as following: 
 
1. In there an enduring arms race between India and Pakistan?   
Since the creation as separate states in 1947, India began its rivalry relationship with its 
neighbouring country Pakistan. Over the last six decades, India and Pakistan have been in 
conflict with each other constantly and have at least four major wars and many small scale 
armed conflicts. Their conflicts mainly due to internal religious differences and the ongoing 
external political hostility lead to an arms race. The arms race implies that India’s military 
expenditure is determined in an action-reaction framework with Pakistan’s military 
expenditure in the long run. Hence, the first hypothesis is that there is a long-run arms race 
between India and Pakistan.   
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2. What factors drive India’s military expenditure?  
The complexity of India’s economic, political and security environments determines that there 
are many factors would determine military expenditure of India. Those determinant factors 
include economic variables (such as income, population, central government expenditure, and 
trade balance), external and internal security considerations (such as defence burden of 
Pakistan, average defence burden of countries in India’s security web, domestic riots and 
external wars) and the political environment (such as democracy and autocracy). Thus, the 
second hypothesis is that economic, security and political variables are all driving India’s 
military expenditure.  
 
3.  What is the effect of military expenditure on economic growth in India?  
Military expenditure would have both positive and negative effects on economic growth in 
developing countries. Those effects could be direct and indirect. For example, military 
expenditure might stimulate India’s economic growth directly by the spin-off from defence to 
other sectors in the economy. India’s military expenditure also might reduce economic growth 
indirectly by depressing the saving ratio. Some major problems of India’s economic 
development such as a low saving ratio, severe balance of payment deficits and lack of public 
expenditures on health might be deteriorated by the high military expenditure. So the third 
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hypothesis is that India’s military expenditure has a net negative effect on economic growth 
by taking both direct and indirect effects together. 
 
Furthermore, as a complementary study for single-country analysis, the effect of military 
expenditure on economic growth in developing countries is explored in both cross-section and 
panel data frameworks. After adding military expenditure variable into the Augmented Solow 
growth model, it is predicated that a decrease in military expenditure would stimulate 
economic growth in developing countries. We also hypothesize the existence of a peace 
dividend in developing countries.  
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 examines the arms race between India and Pakistan during the period 1960-2007. 
The existing literature on theoretical arms race model and on empirical studies of India-
Pakistan arms race is reviewed. Then based on literature review and analysis of India’s 
military expenditure and its conflict history with Pakistan, the Richardson arms race model is 
employed to investigate the relationship between India and Pakistan’s military expenditures. 
The focus of Chapter 2 is not the specific arms race model but the empirical analysis of the 
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long-run relationship between India and Pakistan’s real military expenditure. Thus, different 
empirical methodologies on unit root tests and cointegration tests are assessed and applied in 
this chapter.  
 
Chapter 3 explores the demand for military expenditure in India between 1960 and 2006. This 
chapter starts by reviewing the literature on theoretical models of the demand for military 
expenditure. Then empirical studies of the determinants of military expenditure in developing 
countries are reviewed. Those determinants are grouped into the following categories: 
military activities, economic and geo-strategic factors, the political environment and other 
related factors (e.g. population and the lagged military expenditure). After investigating 
India’s military expenditure history and its security considerations both internal and external, 
the demand model for India’s military expenditure is specified and estimated by employing a 
recent econometric method, the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to 
cointegration. Chapter 3 argues that the demand for India’s military is determined by 
economic, political and security variables.  
 
Chapter 4 aims to investigate the defence-growth nexus and to provide evidence to support 
the existence of a peace dividend in developing countries. Firstly, it provides an explicit 
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literature review on the theoretical models and empirical studies on the defence-growth 
relationship. The reviewed literature is divided into seven groups: Benoit (1978)’s work, 
demand side models, supply side models, Deger-type models, Barro models, Solow models 
and Granger causality analysis. Then Chapter 4 gives a single country study of the effects of 
military expenditure on economic growth in India for the period 1970-2003. Whilst Chapter 4 
examines the long-run and short-run impact of military expenditure on economic growth 
based on cross-sectional and panel analyses for 36 developing countries during 1975-2004.  
 
Finally, Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks and some possible directions for further 
research.  
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Chapter 2 Military Expenditure and Arms Race: the Case of India and Pakistan 
2.1 Introduction 
Arms race, by definition, is the competitive, resource-constrained, dynamic process of 
interaction between two states or coalitions of states in their acquisition of weapons (Brito and 
Intriligator, 1995). After the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union’s arms race no 
longer dominates the whole world politics and regional antagonisms become the focus. For 
example, arms races exist between Greece and Turkey, Iran and Iraq, North and South Korean, 
India and Pakistan. 
 
In the case of the arms race between India and Pakistan, it is well known that India and 
Pakistan’s rivalry relationship began at the same time as their creation as separate states in 
August 1947. Now more than 60 years after their independence, India and Pakistan have 
made significant economic, social and political developments. But they have been in conflict 
with each other constantly and have had at least four major wars and many small scale armed 
conflicts. We believe the conflicts which mainly due to internal religious differences and the 
ongoing external political hostility led to an arms race, although both governments deny that.  
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India and Pakistan are still two of the poorest countries in the world based on GDP per capita 
PPP. In 2008, the per capita PPP-adjusted gross national income for India (international 
$ 2,960) was the 155th among 210 countries in the world and it was the 156th for Pakistan 
(international $ 2,700). But they both devote a substantial portion of their resources to defend 
against each other. While military expenditure declined in most of industrial countries after 
the Cold War (for the period 1990-2005), military expenditure in India and Pakistan has 
increased significantly. Thus, the problem of limitation of resources available for 
development is worsening.  So the question of the existence of an arms race between India 
and Pakistan which might hinder the economic development of both countries is still 
important and worrying 
 
This chapter aims to find out whether or not there is an arms race between India and Pakistan. 
A Richardson type action-reaction model and a vector autoregressive method are employed 
for the time period 1960-2007. Furthermore, we examine the existence of unit root, structural 
breaks and a cointegrating relationship for real military expenditure in India and Pakistan. 
Due to the importance of these empirical analyses, the related econometric issues are 
presented carefully and critically. The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 lays 
out a brief literature review of theoretical models of the arms race; empirical studies on the 
11 
 
India-Pakistan arms race are also reviewed. Section 2.3 outlines the conflict history of India 
and Pakistan. Section 2.4 provides the framework of the Richardson arms race model. Section 
2.5 gives data description and empirical methodologies. The empirical results are presented in 
section 2.6 and section 2.7 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Theoretical Models of the Arms Race
1
 
There are various arms models. In this section, key elements of some representations are 
discussed to provide a brief review of arms race models. The starting point of arms race 
models is the analysis of the arms race phenomenon put forward by Richardson (1960). Based 
on this model, extensions have been developed in many subsequent studies. However, the 
Richardson arms race model and its variants tend to treat the arms race as a simply action-
reaction process and the rival’s military expenditures are the main determinant of a nation’s 
military expenditure. Other models suggest that arms races are influenced by various internal 
and external factors which are very complex and might interact with each other. Therefore, 
we present a brief survey of diverse arms race models in this section, which include the 
                                                           
1 This section leans on Sandler and Hartley (1995, Chapter 4) and Isard and Anderton (1988). 
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classic Richardson arms race model and its variants, the Intriligator and Brito Strategic 
Deterrence-Attack Model and other related arms race models.   
 
2.2.1.1 The Richardson Model and Its Variants 
Lewis F. Richardson presents a mathematical model of an arms race in his seminal study in 
1960 which became one of the most influential models of the arms race. In this classical 
Richardson model, two opposing countries, labelled 1 and 2, are involved in a dynamic 
process of interaction with each other in their acquisitions of weapons. Each country is treated 
as a single unified actor and there is a single homogeneous weapon. The model can be 
summarized by two differential equations: 
     	 
 , , 	  0 (2.1)  
      
 , ,   0 (2.2)  
where , i=1,2, denotes the stock of military weapons or military expenditure of country i. k 
and l are reaction coefficients, α and β are fatigue coefficients and g and h are grievance terms.  
 
In the Equations (2.1) and (2.2), the change in military stock or expenditure of one country is 
linearly related to its rival’s military stock or expenditure, its own accumulation of weapons 
or military expenditure and a grievance term. k and l are positive where the accumulation of 
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weapons or military expenditure is influenced positively by the military stock or expenditure 
of the rival.  α and β are positive where the accumulation of weapons or military expenditure 
is influenced negatively by one’s own military stock or expenditure. The fatigue effects are 
caused by the economic and administrative burden of the arms race. g and h could be negative 
or positive, which reflect amicable relations and hostility between the two countries, 
respectively.  
 
Based on the Richardson model, Wolfson (1968) introduce the emulative model of the arms 
race in which the rivals aim to emulate one another’s military stock or expenditure. The 
model can be written as: 
     	 
  (2.3)  
      
  (2.4)  
In Equations (2.3) and (2.4), the change in military stock or expenditure is dependent on the 
difference between own military stock or expenditure and that of the rival, a fatigue and a 
grievance term. The emulation assumption is based on achieving parity rather than dominance 
and thus the terms,  and  could serve as additional fatigue factors. 
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Wolfson (1968, 1990) formulates another arms race model which is called the rivalry model. 
The model considers the characteristics of the United States (country 1) and the Soviet Union 
(country 2) during the Cold War period. In this model, country 2 is winning the arms race and 
its success is measured by the difference between the two country’s military stocks in the 
previous period. The equations in discrete form are: 
     1    1 
 	  1 
  ′  1 (2.5)  
     1    1 
   1 
 ′  1 (2.6)  
The United States and the Soviet Union are not treated symmetrically where the Soviet Union 
is seen as trying to dominate the United States while the United States is trying to resist the 
Soviet Union.  There are no grievance terms in the rivalry model and neither assured stability.  
 
Another variant of the Richardson model is the submissiveness model (Isard and Anderton, 
1988) in which the equation for country 1 is: 
   1     	 
  (2.7)  
If    where country 2 has the advantage, the difference between  and  will have a 
negative effect on the change in . The larger is  relative to , the greater the negative 
effect on  ⁄ , also the larger the value of w, the greater this effect. This model highlights 
the asymmetries between the two countries and how these asymmetries can promote stability 
by decreasing the value of reaction terms. But if country 1 has the advantage, that difference 
15 
 
will have a positive effect on the change in   and country 1 will be more aggressive than in 
the classical model. When      ,    0,  the equation is equivalent to the 
Richardson equation. α and g denote the fatigue and grievance terms, respectively. An 
equation for country 2 will be analogous.  
 
Rattinger (1975) develops a model to incorporate the bureaucratic influences in a country’s 
military establishment. The bureaucratic model provides an equation as follows: 
     ′  1    1 
  (2.8)  
where  ,   1,2, is the desired defence budget in country i and ,   1,2, is the actual 
defence budget. The difference between a country’s actual and desired defence budget in the 
current period (t) is dependent on the difference between the rival’s actual and desired 
defence budget in the previous period (t-1). g is the grievance term. A similar expression can 
be applied to country 2.  
 
Public choice and opinion also influence a country’s military spending decisions. Hartley and 
Russett (1992) apply a model which bases defence spending decisions on public opinion. In 
that model, the changes in public opinion have a lagged effect on policy-making. An increase 
in the public’s support for military expenditure is expected to be followed by an increase in 
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the national defence budget. While if the public’s opposition increases, the defence budget 
will tend to decrease.  
 
McGuire (1965) introduces the utility-maximization assumption, resource constraints and 
strategic considerations (deterrence and retaliatory threat) into arms race models. In his study, 
each country is motivated to maximize its citizens’ social welfare, W, which is taken to 
depend on its security and civilian consumption (resources allocated to the production of 
civilian goods and services). It is noted that the resource allocation is static in McGuire’s 
model. Welfare is maximized subject to a linear resource constraint.  Security is a function of 
!  and !  , where: 
!= the minimum (assured) number of country 1’s missiles from its stockpile,  , that 
survives an attack by country 2; 
!= the maximum (assured) number of country 2’s missiles from its stockpile, , that is not 
destroyed during an attack by country 1. 
Here, “assured” refers to an acceptable probability (percent of total stockpile). !  and 
!represent country 1’s and country 2’s deterrence potential, respectively. At the same time, 
! and ! are themselves a function of missile stocks and other strategic factors. Civilian 
output is " ,   1,2. Thus, social welfare in country 1 is: 
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 #  #!,,!,, " (2.9)  
 
Subject to the resource constraint, social welfare is maximized when marginal cost of  
equals the sum of two marginal benefits which are derived from   . The two marginal 
benefits are from the increase in country 1’s deterrence and from the decrease in the 
retaliatory threat from abroad. However, the McGuire’s model does not have an adequate 
measure of national welfare or an appropriate way of proceeding from individual preferences 
to social preferences (Isard and Anderton, 1988).  
 
In Richardson type models, the reaction factor could apply not only to the level of military 
expenditure but also to military stocks.  These two representations are assumed to be 
interchangeable. For example, Isard and Anderton (1988) write the military stock in the form: 
 $  /&  '$ (2.10)  
where $ denotes current military stock in country 1,  is military expenditure and '$ is  
depreciation of military stock in that period. p is in terms of dollars per unit stock. So p 
translates dollar expenditure,  , into military stock and could be seen as the cost of a 
“composite” unit of stock. Then the basic behavioural equation for country 1 ( may be 
taken to replace ( ) can be written as: 
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   $  	 
  (2.11)  
In Equation (2.11), the level of country 1’s military expenditure is related to the opponent’s 
stock, a fatigue and a grievance factor. Hence, by substitution of the value  from Equation 
(2.11) to Equation (2.10), it is obtained: $ ⁄  $  	 
  &⁄   '$. A similar 
expression can be applied to country 2. 
 
Additionally, levels of military stocks or expenditure in ratio form (i.e. / or $/$) and 
their inverses could be used in arms race models. The use of ratio form permits the 
establishment of ratio goals (Wallace and Wilson, 1978). If the fatigue and grievance terms 
are absent, the model could be related to the rivalry model. Furthermore, alternative lag 
structures could be employed in variants of the Richardson model. In those models, one 
country reacts to the rival country’s military stocks or expenditure in one or more previous 
time periods. Because the reaction is to the previous military expenditure and the armaments 
produced by the expenditure are properly depreciated, this reaction could be seen as a reaction 
to the accumulated stocks of its rival country (Isard and Anderton, 1988). 
 
The Richardson model and some representative models of its variants which are reviewed in 
this section are presented in Table 2.1. The key elements of the variants include emulation, 
rivalry, submissiveness, bureaucracy, public opinion and social welfare maximization. We 
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also consider stock variables, ratio forms and lag structures which could be applied in arms 
race models as well.  
 
It is well known that the classical Richardson model has some problems. There are no explicit 
objectives, no decision-making process, no explicit economic constraints and no strategic 
considerations. The Richardson model does not include other important variables such as 
foreign aid and social factors (e.g. the political system). The model is static and does not 
allow the coefficients to change with time or experience (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). 
Furthermore, the assumption of positive reaction coefficients is invalid and they could indeed 
be negative. When the action-reaction process is absent between two countries, one country 
might decrease its military expenditure regardless of the increase of its opponent’s armaments. 
Hence, the variants reviewed above attempt to extend and amend the Richardson model and 
make contributions by adding related factors, using accumulation variables, and applying 
resource constraints and maximizing behaviour. However, most of these models still do not 
have an explicit framework and do not overcome the limitations of the classical Richardson 
model.  
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Table 2. 1 the Richardson Arms Race Model and its Variants 
Authors Models 
Richardson (1960) Classical Richardson Model 
Wolfson (1968) Emulative Model 
Wolfson (1968, 1990) Rivalry Model 
Isard and Anderton (1988) Submissiveness Model 
Rattinger (1975) Bureaucratic Model 
Hartley and Russett (1992) Public Opinion Model 
McGuire (1965) Social Welfare Maximization Model 
 
2.2.1.2 Intriligator and Brito Strategic Deterrence-Attack Model  
In this section, we will review the Strategic Deterrence-Attack Model which is developed by 
Intriligator and Brito (1976, 1984). Different with the Richardson-type arms race model, the 
Strategic Deterrence-Attack Model focuses on the potential of arms use and its effect on arms 
production. Thus, this model considers the strategic factors in the arms race. The use of arms 
has two purposes: attack (war) or deterrence (peace), and these strategic considerations which 
are perceived by defence planners are connected to the arms race in the Intriligator and Brito 
model. In their basic model, there are two countries, 1 and 2 (superpowers), that confront each 
other with their missile stockpiles. The defence planners seek to justify their budgetary 
requests for missile stocks, z_i (t), and their current inventories of missiles, m_i (t), in terms 
of national security considerations. The security considerations are the two countries’ 
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potential for deterrence or attack. Intriligator and Brito set up a hypothetical missile war 
which could be used to calculate this potential in a computer simulation. 
 
The time path for missiles and casualties in the two countries can be used to describe the 
simulation of a missile war. A dynamic model representation of the simulated missile war is 
shown in the following equations: 
 (   	  ′) (2.12)  
 (     	′	) (2.13)  
 *(  1  ′+ (2.14)  
 *(  1  	′	+ (2.15)  
where: 
 = stock of missiles at time t in country i, i=1, 2.  
(  = change in stock of missiles at time t in country i. 
* = casualties at time t in country i. 
*( = change in casualties at time t in country i. 
	,  = rates at which countries 1 and 2 fire their missiles at time t. 
	′, ′ = proportion of missiles targeted counterforce by countries 1 and 2. 
) = the number of 2’s missiles destroyed by one of 1’s missiles. 
) = the number of 1’s missiles destroyed by one of 2’s missiles. 
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+ = the number of 2’s casualties caused by one of 1’s missiles. 
+ = the number of 1’s casualties caused by one of 2’s missiles. 
 
In Equation (2.12), country 1’s stock of missiles declines for two reasons. First, due to its own 
firing decisions, country 1 fires its missiles by 	. Second, due to country 2’s counterforce 
attack, country 1 missiles are destroyed by ′). The remaining country 2 missiles 1 
′ which are launched at time t are aimed at country 1’s cities and lead to casualties of 
country 1 by 1  ′+. A similar interpretation holds for country 2 given in Equations 
(2.13) and (2.15). Thus, the above four equations describe the evolution of the simulated war 
which is dependent on the initial missile stocks, the strategic decisions (over time) on rates of 
fire and targets, and the effectiveness of missiles against rival missiles and against rival cities 
(Brito and Intriligator, 1995).  
 
In the case of war initiation, it is assumed that country 1 starts a war and then it chooses a 
maximum rate of firing, 	  	, , aiming at country 2’s missiles and thus 	′=1. This first strike 
is supposed to last -  minutes during which time there is no response from the targeted 
country 2, so that   0.The time span is 0 .  . -. By these assumptions, it is found that at 
the stage of war initiation: 
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-  /exp 	,- (2.16)  
 -  /  )1  exp	,-/ (2.17)  
 The remaining missiles stock of country 1 is /exp 	,- and it uses /1  exp	,- 
to destroy )1  exp	,-/ of country 2’s missiles. So country 2 is left with a missile 
stock of /  )1  exp	,-/. 
 
During the retaliatory phase, country 2, as aiming at tit-for-tat, chooses its maximum rate of 
countervalue attack, targeting country 1’s cities, so that   3 and ′  0. Assume that the 
time span for retaliatory attack is from   - to   - 
 4 , and during this phase 	  0 
without country 1’s response. The number of casualties in country 1 at the end of country 2’s 
retaliatory attack is given as: 
 *- 
 4  +5/  )1  exp	,-/61  exp7348 (2.18)  
If country 2 starts the war, an analogous analysis would be applied.  
 
If the objectives of the defence planners in both country 1 and country 2 are to be fulfilled to 
deter, each must possess sufficient missile stocks to absorb an all-out first-strike and still 
respond with a second strike which inflicts unacceptable casualties. Intriligator (1975) solved 
the deterrence conditions for countries 1 and 2 as shown in following equations: 
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  )1  exp7348 
 *3/5+1  exp	,9-6 (2.19)  
   )1  exp	,- 
 *3/5+:1  exp73948;6 (2.20)  
where:  
	,, 3 = maximum rates at which country 1 and 2 fire missiles at time t. 
*3 = country 2’s recognition of the minimum unacceptable civilian casualties in country 1. 
*3 = country 1’s recognition of the minimum unacceptable civilian casualties in country 2. 
-, 4= time interval of country 1 and 2’s first strike, respectively.  
 9-, 94 = time interval of country 1 and 2’s second strike, respectively. 
 
In Equation (2.19), country 1 believes that the minimum unacceptable casualties to country 2 
are *3 . It must have sufficient missiles to inflict these casualties in a second strike.  Thus the 
amount of country 1’s missiles which are needed to deter country 2 is a function of the 
number of country 2’s missiles. A similar interpretation holds for country 2 in Equation (2.20). 
In fact, Equations (2.19) and (2.20) are Richardson-type reaction functions, which could be 
written as: 
   <′  
 *3/<=′  (2.21)  
   <′ 
 *3/<>′  (2.22)  
where: 
<′  )1  exp	,-,    <′  )1  exp4 
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<>′  +:1  exp73948;,  <=′  +1  exp	,9- 
<′  and <′  are the normalized defence terms. *3/<=′  and *3/<>′  are the grievance terms. 
Because the grievance terms are positive, there exists a stable equilibrium when <′ <′ ? 1. 
The equilibrium point is: 
 @  <
′ *3 +<>′⁄ 
 *3 +<=′⁄1  <′<′  (2.23)  
 @  <
′ *3 +<=′⁄ 
 *3 +<>′⁄1  <′<′  (2.24)  
 
According to Sandler and Hartley (1995), in a simplified analysis the firing interval can be 
assumed to be long enough and thus exp.  could be replaced by zero in Equations (2.19 ) 
and (2.20)2. This leads to the following equations: 
   ) 
 *3/+ (2.25)  
   ) 
 *3/+ (2.26)  
Now the stable condition becomes )) ? 1. Intriligator (1975) indicates that the “hardness” 
condition that more than one missile is needed to destroy one rival missile is a sufficient 
condition (but not necessary) for stability. 
 
                                                           
2
 Set *  *3,   /,   / . 
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If country 2 attacks, a similar analysis and corresponding notation can be applied as above. As 
the aggressor, country 2 would need to have sufficient missiles to damage country 1’s 
missiles and thus country 1 would not have enough missiles left to inflict many casualties 
during its retaliatory strike. The maximum acceptable casualty level for country 2 is set by *̂. 
Thus, the level of missiles country 2 needed for an attack can be solved and written as: 
    )⁄   *̂ )+⁄  (2.27)  
 Similarly, the level of missiles country 1 required for an attack is: 
    )⁄   *̂ )+⁄  (2.28)  
If the “hardness” condition holds, 1 ))⁄  must exceed unity and the equilibrium described by 
Equations (2.27) and (2.28) simultaneously is unstable.  
 
Equations (2.25)-(2.28) are presented in Figure 2.1. Because  *̂ ? *3,   1,2, the intercept of 
the attack line is smaller than the corresponding deter line. In (, ) space, Equation (2.26) 
and (2.28) have the same slope and so that the country 1 attack  line is parallel to the country 
2 deter  line; Equations (2.25) and (2.27) have the same slope so that the country 1 deter line 
is parallel to the country 2 attack line.   
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Figure 2.1 Cone of Mutual Deterrence 
 
In Figure 2.1, there are nine regions. In region 1, country 2 has enough missiles to attack 
country 1 but not to deter and country 1 has inadequate missiles to attack or deter. Thus, 
country 2 is forced to attack as it has sufficient missiles for a first strike but not sufficient for a 
second strike (Intriligator, 1975). Region 3 is the reverse case. In region 2, both countries can 
attack the other but neither can deter the other. So regions1-3 are called the regions of war 
initiation by Intriligator. In region 4, both countries have sufficient missiles to deter the other 
and the region is known as the cone of mutual deterrence. Within this cone, both countries 
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could decrease their missile stocks while maintaining stability and peace, and equilibrium E is 
stable. 
 
In region 5, neither country has adequate missiles to attack or deter. In region 6, country 1 has 
enough missiles to deter but not enough to attack country 2 while the status is reversed in 
region 7. Anderton (1992) suggests that regions 5-7 could be called the cone of mutual attack 
avoidance. Equilibrium E’ is unstable since upward spiralling arms races might occur in 
regions 5-7 (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). In region 8, country 2 can attack or deter country 1 
and has the advantage, but country 1 can do neither. In region 9, country 1 has the power 
advantage instead.  
  
According to Intriligator (1975) and Intriligator and Brito (1986), large missile stockpiles 
could have a deterring effect as shown in the cone of mutual deterrence. Thus, heavily armed 
countries in an arms race would not tend to initiate war since the casualties and damages 
would be huge and unacceptable. However, when two countries have low levels of armaments 
and at the beginning of an arms race, the risk of war will be high.  
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The Intriligator and Brito model involves the deterrence-attack strategy, effectiveness 
coefficients, rates of fire, and time intervals for firing. These factors are important in 
influencing the cone of deterrence and provide policy implications for arms control. The 
model also presents possible peace equilibrium and the possible outbreak of war under 
different conditions.  However, the Intriligator and Brito model has a similar reaction 
framework to the Richardson model and also has some limitations. For example, one country 
starts an attack which is counterforce and its rival will then have a retaliatory strike which is 
countervalue, but there is no theoretical evidence to support these predetermined counterforce 
and countervalue attacks. Furthermore, the impact of the quality of armaments on the modern 
arms race becomes more and more important rather than the quantity of weapons in the 
Intriligator and Brito model. 
 
2.2.1.3 Other Related Models
3
 
Luterbacher (1976) applies a disaggregated Richardson type arms race model which 
distinguishes between conventional and strategic weapons. Both countries would have two 
equations, one for the change in conventional weaponry and one for the change in strategic 
weaponry. Other elements are also considered in different arms race models. For example, the 
                                                           
3  More details see Isard and Anderton (1988, p43-51). 
30 
 
effect of uncertainty on military expenditure is examined by Liossatos (1980) and Cusack and 
Ward (1981). Uncertainty, secrecy and the intelligence effort, international tensions and some 
psychological factors (e.g. insecurity, fear and distrust) are also introduced into arms models.  
 
Siljak (1977) developes an n-nation system in which the change in each country’s defence 
spending is a linear function of the defence spending of every other country in the system. 
Choucri and North (1975) and Bremer (1986) set up a framework for the operation and 
functioning of the world system. In addition to military expenditure, other key endogenous 
variables are included into their models, such as the military expenditure of alliances and non-
alliances, intensity of intersections and violent behaviour toward other nations. 
 
2.2.2 Empirical Studies of Arms Race between India and Pakistan 
Various models and estimate methods have been used to study the arms race phenomenon in 
different countries: for example, arms races between Greece and Turkey, South & North 
Korea. In this section, we focus on empirical studies of an arms race between India and 
Pakistan (see Table 2.3). The empirical results are not conclusive. Hollist (1977) provides 
empirical analysis of a competitive arms process in India and Pakistan for the period 1949-
1973. Different variants of Richardson-type arms race models are employed and assessed 
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which consider the effects of submissiveness, explicit cost constraints, and technology factors. 
However, the results show that the estimated coefficients of reaction factor are less than clear 
for India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the estimated sign of reaction factor is negative in most 
models and inconsistent with the hypothesis of the Richardson type models. Thus Hollist 
(1977) suggests that internal factors play a comparably greater role than the rival’s military 
expenditure (reaction factor) and military expenditure processes are influenced by both 
external and internal factors. 
 
Deger and Sen (1990) empirically analyze the military expenditure process of India and 
Pakistan during 1960-1985. The Richardson arms race model is applied and its differential 
equations form is written as: 
 (  C 
 < 
 D 
 E (2.29)  
 (   * 
  
 D 
 E (2.30)  
where  and  are the military expenditure of India and Pakistan, respectively. The EF are 
vectors of environmental and dummy variables. The coefficients b and c are reaction terms 
while the coefficients a and d are fatigue terms. The constants, Xs are grievance terms. The 
authors consider the unequal size between India and Pakistan, where India can be 
characterized as the large country and Pakistan is the small one. The unequal size might imply 
that those two countries’ military reaction functions, threat perceptions and economic costs 
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are asymmetric. Furthermore, some variables are added into the arms race model to represent 
the effects of economic environmental factors on military expenditure. National income 
(GDP), the ratio of central government expenditure to GDP (CGESH), arms imports (AIMP) 
and arms productions (APROD) are chosen.  
 
Based on model specifications and diagnostic tests, the regression equations are chosen and 
the estimating results (OLS) for India and Pakistan are presented in Table 2.2. Regarding the 
military expenditure process of India and Pakistan, empirical results provide the analysis of 
three issues which include: the relative importance of military and economic variables, the 
existence of an India-Pakistan arms race and the asymmetric behaviour.  
 
Table 2.2 Empirical Estimates of Military Expenditures of India and Pakistan 
 constant 1 1 AIMP APROD GDP CGSH G  
 -289 0.52* 0.06 0.06 -1.13 2.66* -- 0.935  
 (-0.67) (2.73) (0.09) (0.18) (-1.17) (2.64) --   
 -623* 0.08* 0.62* 0.27* -- -- 41.4*   
 (-2.07) (2.25) (5.55) (1.66) -- -- (1.86) 0.970  
Notes: 
1) t-values are in parentheses. 
2) 1,   1,2 is the military expenditure in previous year.  
3) 10 per cent significance levels are used and denoted by *. 
4) Results are from Deger and Sen (1990). 
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For India, the Pakistan previous year’s military expenditure has no statistically significant 
effect on military expenditure in India. The influences from arms import and arms production 
are insignificant as well. But GDP is found to be an important determinant for military 
expenditure. For Pakistan, Indian threat and arms import both play an important role in the 
military expenditure process. The impact of the ratio of central government expenditure in 
GDP reflects the role of the government in the politico-economic structure of Pakistan. This 
impact is statistically significant and indicates the positive impact on defence allocation. On 
the other hand, economic variables, such as GDP seem to have little impact on military 
expenditure.  
 
Thus, the strategic relationship between India and Pakistan seems to be asymmetric where 
Pakistan is relatively more response to Indian military expenditure. However, that direct 
effect from Indian military expenditure to the one of Pakistan is weak. Thus, the question as 
to the existence of an arms race is hard to give a clear answer. Deger and Sen (1990, p214) 
provide their conclusion that India-Pakistan arms race might probably “more a matter of 
political rhetoric than an empirically supported description of the military expenditure 
process”. 
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Oren (1994) analyzes the India-Pakistan arms competition where each country’s military 
expenditure responds not only to the rival country’s military expenditure but also to its 
intentions. According to the intentions, the rival’s bellicose acts would be more threatening 
when its military power is weaker (i.e. smaller military expenditure). The regression equations 
for India and Pakistan, respectively, can be written as follows: 
 ln IJK  	 
 )   ln7L8 
  ln7DL8 
 M (2.31)  
 ln NLJLO  	L 
 7)L  L8 ln 
 L lnD 
 ML (2.32)  
where subscript i refers to Indian and p denotes Pakistan.   and L are the military 
expenditure, J and JL are non-military output (GDP minus military expenditure), )  and  
()LandL are the relative weights that India (Pakistan) assign to Pakistan (India)’s military 
expenditure and intentions, respectively. D and DL are the belligerent behaviour of India and 
Pakistan, respectively. The empirical analysis of Indo-Pakistani relations for the period 1947-
1990 shows that both countries respond positively to the rival’s belligerent behaviour. 
However, both India and Pakistan react to increases in each other’s military expenditure by 
decreasing their own expenditure and thus the estimated arms-reaction coefficients are found 
to be negative. Based on his empirical finding, Oren (1994) suggests that perceived intentions 
are more important that military expenditure (power) as the determinants of India and 
Pakistan’s armament levels.   
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Using a second order VAR framework, Dunne, Nikolaidou and Smith (1999) examine the 
existence of Richardson-type arms race in India and Pakistan for the period 1962-1996. The 
basic VAR model is set up which included two variables: real military expenditure of India 
and Pakistan. The Johansen estimating technique is applied and the results presented the 
cointegration vector as: 
 EP  QP  2.008SP (2.33)  
where QP  and SP  are the level of military expenditure in India and Pakistan at time t, 
respectively. Thus, they suggest that there is a long run relationship between India and 
Pakistan’s military expenditure where the level of India’s military expenditure is about twice 
the level of Pakistan’s military expenditure and there exists an action-reaction arms race 
between India and Pakistan during 1962-1996. Additional, the Granger causality tests 
indicates there is a bi-directional causality between the level of India and Pakistan’s military 
expenditure. 
 
Dunne and Smith (2007) update the data for India and Pakistan’s real military expenditure to 
1960-2003 by using revised SIPRI data. They re-estimate the VAR framework for the same 
time period 1962-1996 as in Dunne, Nikolaidou and Smith (1999)’s study. Comparing with 
the previous finding, EP   QP  2.008SP, the new result is slightly different where EP   QP 
2.51SP. Then the revised data are extended to 1962-2003, less evidence is found to support 
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the existence of long-run relationship between India and Pakistan’s real military expenditure. 
So the authors investigate the difference between these two estimating periods: 1962-1996 
and 1962-2003 and they add dummy variables into the cointegrating vector. The dummies are 
used to allow a break in the intercept in 1996 and also to allow a trend starting from 1996. 
The cointegrating vector includes a dummy, UP  which is equal to one after 1996 and a 
trend, UV which started from 1996. The cointegrating vector is found to be: 
 EP  IX  2.51PX  921D  272DT (2.34)  
The estimating results show that the dummies are both statistically significant. Comparing 
with the earlier equilibrium, Indian military expenditure is steadily increasing after 1996. The 
dummies are believed to be related with India and Pakistan’s preparations for nuclear 
weapons tests (Both countries had their own nuclear test in 1998). However, the adding of 
these dummies in the cointegrating vector is ad hoc and has no theoretical explanation.  
 
Using a smooth transition-type non-linear model, Öcal (2003) investigates the India-Pakistan 
arms race and the possibility of asymmetric effects of those two countries’ military 
expenditures during the period 1949-1999. In his analysis, the level of each country’s military 
expenditure is a function of the lagged values of its own and the rival’s military expenditure 
and the transition variables. The empirical finding for Pakistan provides evidences to support 
the possible non-linear dynamics between India and Pakistan’s military expenditure. The 
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specification of the non-linearity is corresponding to the dynamic of Pakistan military 
expenditure from the 1960’s to the middle of 1980’s when the tension between India and 
Pakistan is high. Öcal (2003) also finds that when the past level of Pakistan military 
expenditure is high, the effect of Indian military expenditure on Pakistan military expenditure 
seems to become greater.  
 
Yildirim and Öcal (2006) investigate the causality between the military expenditure of India 
and Pakistan for the time period 1949-2003. A multivariate VAR model is employed to allow 
for both economic and political factors, which include military burden (MB), income (Y), 
defence burden of the rival country (THR), population (POP) and the trade balance. In a 
seemingly unrelated regression form, the regression system is represented as follows: 
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 (2.35)  
where subscript i denotes India and Pakistan and t refers to time. p is the total number of lags 
which is equal to 3 in their analysis. Then the Granger causality tests4 are carried out to 
examine the causality relationship between India and Pakistan’s military spending. When i 
                                                           
4 Toda and Yamamoto (1995) approach was employed to test the Granger causality. 
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denote India, the hypothesis that the military spending of Pakistan Granger cause the military 
spending of India can be tested by: 
: 
  b/: 	>  	>  i  	L>  0 (2.36)  
where 	v>, j=1,.., p, are the parameters of VbGP, VbGPh, … , VbGPhL in the first equation 
of the system (Equation (2.35)). The similar tests can be held for the Granger causality from 
India to Pakistan. The empirical results show that there exists a bi-directional causality 
between the military spending of India and Pakistan which confirm the finding of Dunne, 
Nikolaidou and Smith (1999). 
 
The summary of empirical studies of the arms race between India and Pakistan reviewed 
above are presented in Table 2.3. Different regression equations and different econometric 
methods have been applied to investigate the Indo-Pakistani arms race or the long run 
relationship between real military expenditures of India and Pakistan. However, the empirical 
findings of these studies are inconclusive either on the suitable regression equations or on the 
empirical analyzing methodologies. The inconclusive results indicate that the empirical 
analysis of India and Pakistan’s arms race should based on the examining of their conflict 
history and the dynamics of their military expenditures which will be analyzed in the 
following sections. 
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Table 2.3 Review of Empirical Literature of India-Pakistan Arms Race 
Author(s) Period                Remarks                          Main Conclusion 
1. Hollist (1977) 1949-1973 Different variants of Richardson -type 
arms race model. 
The estimated coefficients of reaction factor are unclear 
for India and Pakistan. The estimated sign of reaction 
factor is negative in most models. 
2. Deger and Sen 
(1990) 
1960-1985 Richardson arms race model with 
additional considerations of the effects 
of economic environmental factors. 
Asymmetric arms race where Pakistan is relatively more 
response to Indian military expenditure. 
3. Oren (1994) 1947-1990 The effects of military expenditure, 
intentions and belligerent behaviour of 
India and Pakistan on each other’s 
levels of armament.  
Negative arms-reaction coefficients and thus perceived 
intentions are more important that military expenditure 
(power) as the determinants of India and Pakistan’s 
armament levels.   
4. Dunne, 
Nikolaidou and 
Smith (1999) 
1962-1996 Bivariate VAR model and 
cointegration analysis of military 
expenditures in India and Pakistan. 
There existed an action-reaction arms race between India 
and Pakistan and their military expenditures Granger 
caused each other. 
5. Dunne and 
Smith (2007) 
1962-2003 Bivariate VAR model and 
cointegration analysis of military 
expenditures in India and Pakistan 
which allowing for a break in the 
intercept and a trend in 1996. 
There existed a long-run relationship between India and 
Pakistan’s military expenditures. India and Pakistan’s 
preparations for nuclear weapons tests had an effect on 
the long-run relationship where comparing with the 
earlier equilibrium (1962-1996), Indian military 
expenditure is steadily increasing after 1996. 
6. Öcal (2003) 1949-1999 Smooth transition-type non-linear 
models. 
There is a non-linear dynamics between India and 
Pakistan’s military expenditures. When the past level of 
Pakistan military expenditure is high, the effect of Indian 
military expenditure on Pakistan military expenditure 
seemed to become greater.  
7. Yildirim and 
Öcal (2006) 
1949-2003 Multivariate VAR model which 
considered both economic and 
political factors. 
There is a bi-directional causality between the military 
spending of India and Pakistan. 
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2.3 Military Expenditure and Conflicts in India and Pakistan 
2.3.1 India and Pakistan Conflict History 
After 300 years of Imperial rule and the partition of sub-continent into Hindu-majority 
India and Muslim-majority Pakistan in 1947, these two new countries not only gained 
independence but also started their long-running conflicts. India and Pakistan have much in 
common such as state institutions, budgetary mechanisms and government macroeconomic 
policies but at the same time, they are different in foreign policies, religions and security 
strategies. So India and Pakistan could be characterized as ‘diversity in unity’. These 
characteristics are believed to have considerable influence on the two neighbouring 
countries’ relationship and military expenditure dynamics.  
  
The creation of the two independent countries began the hostility and conflicts between 
India and Pakistan. The partition and independence in 1947 caused severe riots, communal 
violence and population movements. In the partitioned provinces of Punjab and Bengal, 
Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus all tried to move to the right sides (where Muslims moved to 
Pakistani side and Sikhs and Hindus moved to Indian side). During these movements, an 
estimated half a million people were killed in communal violence and a million people 
became homeless. India and Pakistan were separated but the dispute in the territory of 
Jammu and Kashmir has remained and is seen as a root of the Indo-Pakistani animosity. 
Generally, India tends to claim the entire erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir 
while Pakistan claims all areas of the erstwhile state except for those claimed by China. 
The dispute areas between India and China are located in the Shaksam Valley and Aksai 
Chin . The dispute areas are shown in Figure 2.2.  
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Table 2.2 Major Conflicts Between India and Pakistan, 1947-2008 
Year Conflicts Place 
1947-1948 First Indo-Pakistani War Northern Kashmir 
1965 Second Indo-Pakistani War Punjab and Sind 
1971 Third Indo-Pakistani War East Pakistan 
1999 Kargil War India-held Kashmir around Kargil 
 
These two countries have come to four large scale armed conflagrations, which are 
presented in Table 2.4 and countless border skirmishes since independence. The first Indo-
Pakistani war took place in October, 1947 after Pakistan troops supported a Muslim 
insurgency in the disputed territory in Kashmir and according to the request from 
Kashmir's Maharaja, the Indian government provided armed assistance. The war ended in 
January 1949 and a ceasefire line, later known as the Line of Control, was established. 
During the war, each side suffered 1500 battlefield fatalities.  
 
Over the Kashmir issue, the two countries clashed again on 5th August, 1965 in the Rann of 
Kutch. Pakistan launched a covet offensive across the West Pakistan-India border and the 
fighting broke out. India retaliated by crossing the international border at Lahore and the 
fighting spread to Kashmir and the Punjab. In September, both countries’ troops crossed 
the partition line between them and air assaults on each other’s cities were launched. In this 
war, 3000 Indian soldiers died while the Pakistan side lost 3800. By 22nd September both 
sides decided to adopt UN mandated ceasefire resolution. But the suspicion and hostility 
between India and Pakistan was enhanced and the disputes over Kashmir remained. 
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Figure 2.2 the Disputed Area of Jammu and Kashmir 
 
Source: The University of Texas at Austin, PCL Map Collection. Accessed 08/2009, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_disputed_2002.jpg 
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Although the Eastern wing of Pakistan was more populous than the Western one, political 
power rested with the Western elite since independence. This caused East Pakistanis 
resentment and demanding autonomy. In 1971, civil war erupted in Pakistan which pitted 
the West Pakistan army against East Pakistanis. Entire East Pakistan was in revolt and an 
estimated 10 million East Pakistani civilians were forced to flee to India. In December, 
1971 India invaded East Pakistan in support of the East Pakistani people. The relationship 
between India and Pakistan deteriorated again and the third Indo-Pakistani war was fought. 
Pakistan attacked Indian airfield in Kashmir while India attacked both East and West 
Pakistan. The Pakistani army surrendered at Dhaka and East Pakistan became the 
independent country of Bangladesh on 6th December 1971. It was a humiliating and major 
military defeat for Pakistan with loss its Eastern wing, 15% in territory and 60% in 
population.  
 
The tension between the rivals escalated dramatically in the 1990s and both sides 
conducted nuclear tests in the same year 1998. In 1999, Pakistan’s army captured strategic 
heights in India-held Kashmir around Kargil. India responded with launching air strikes 
against Pakistan troops and recaptured a majority of the positions which were infiltrated by 
the Pakistani troops and militants. With international diplomatic support, the Pakistani 
forces were forced to leave Kargil. During the 73 day Kargil conflict, it was reported that 
more than 30,000 people were forced to leave their homes on the Pakistani side of the Line 
of Control and about 20,000 people became refugees on the Indian side. The Kargil war 
was the most recent ground war between two countries both possessing nuclear weapons 
and led to a heightened tension between India and Pakistan. 
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During 2001-2002, one million troops had squared off menacingly along the Indo-Pakistan 
border and actual war was in a near state. However, there were some improvement in the 
India-Pakistani relationships since April 2003 and the two neighbors took steps to restore 
diplomatic relations and resume flight, bus service, and cricket matches between them. 
Recently, the mutual suspicion governed the India-Pakistani relations again after the 2007 
Samjhauta Express Bombings5, and the 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks6 by a group of 
Pakistani people. Nowadays, the two governments have made clear that they want to a 
peaceful and beneficial resolution to the issues that they both concerned, such as Kashmir, 
conventional and nuclear arms, terrorism and economic cooperation. Whether India and 
Pakistan can capitalize on the desire for peace and cooperation, or whether the long 
hostilities will destroy any such initiative remains to be seen. 
 
2.3.2 India and Pakistan’s Military Expenditure Dynamics 
Military expenditures in India and Pakistan have been influence by their conflict history 
and the enduring hostility with each other. The competitive arms race was born almost at 
the same time as the two countries’ independence. After the partition, most of the ordnance 
factories were located in India and thus at the beginning India had the prevailing advantage 
in the military industrial base over Pakistan. Then Pakistan was forced to 'catch up' through 
increasing military expenditure and arms importation. To compete with India’s military 
industry and partly due to the first Indo-Pakistani war in 1948, Pakistan believed it was 
                                                           
5  The 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings were a terrorist attack that occurred around midnight on 18 
February 2007 on the Samjhauta Express, a twice-weekly train service connecting Delhi, India, and Lahore, 
Pakistan. Sixty-eight people were killed in the ensuing fire and dozens more were injured. 
 
6 The 2008 Mumbai attacks were more than ten coordinated shooting and bombing attacks across Mumbai. 
The Mumbai attacks were planned and directed by Lashkar-e-Taiba militants inside Pakistan At least 164 
victims (civilians and security personnel) and 9 attackers were killed in the attacks. 
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necessary to have a modest domestic arms production and raised its military spending 
which included all categories, from procurement to operations and maintenance to R&D. 
 
During the 1950s, as a member of various US-sponsored Treaty Organizations (for 
example, the Central Treaty Organization7), Pakistan acquired arms through imports and 
military aid from the United States. The arms in Pakistan were thus being bolstered by 
sophisticated arms imports and US military aid. On the other hand, India kept its policy of 
the self-sufficient import substitution industrialization and expanded its military industries. 
Thus, India’s military expenditure and domestic arms production experienced a rapid 
expansion partly to offset the high foreign exchange costs of imports and partly to keep the 
advantage over Pakistan whose armaments were improved during that period.  
 
In the start of 1960s, India expanded its military expenditure dramatically due to the defeat 
in the Sino-Indian war in 1962. A dispute arose over disagreements regarding to the border 
in the Rann of Kutch between India and Pakistan in 1965 and the Second Indo-Pakistani 
war broke out. Then the traditional rival relationship between these two neighbouring 
countries continued, and culminated in the Third Indo-Pakistani war in 1971. Pakistan lost 
its Eastern wing and the state of Bangladesh was created in that year. Both sides kept 
building up their armaments. The levels of India’s military expenditure (MEI) and 
Pakistan’s military expenditure (MEP) for the period 1960-2007 are illustrated in Figure 
2.3. 
 
                                                           
7Mutual-security organization originally composed of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Britain. It was formed 
in 1955, at the urging of the U.S. and Britain, to counter the threat of Soviet expansion into the Middle East. 
It was dissolved in 1979. 
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Figure 2 3 India and Pakistan’s Military Expenditure (Constant 2000 Millions US$), 1960-
2007 
 
Data sources: SIPRI Yearbooks 
 
In the 1980s, Russia invaded Afghanistan and Pakistan acted as the principal channel 
through which assistance from the United States was provided to Afghan freedom fighters. 
Pakistan also provided access to its military bases to use against the Soviet Union. Thus, 
Pakistan received financial and military aid from the U.S. during the period with the supply 
of F-16 fighters and other weaponry. In response to the sizeable arsenal built up by 
Pakistan, India imported armaments from the Soviet Union and speeded up the process of 
defence industrialization. In the late 1980s both countries expanded their military spending 
and were concerned about the sophistication of warfare and missile programmes. 
 
The expansion of military expenditure continued in both India and Pakistan due to the 
escalated tension between the rivals in the 1990s. The new menace of arms rivalry was 
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brought to the South Asia continent by nuclear weapons tests of both countries in 1998. 
The Kargil war of 1999 was also seen as a factor driving up the two rivals’ military 
spending. In the 2000s, military expenditures in both countries had shown continuing rises 
which were fuelled by rapid economic growth, especially in India.  
 
This brief conflict history of India and Pakistan and their military expenditure dynamics 
indicates that, although other actors (China, Russia and the United Sates) have been 
present in the interaction between India and Pakistan’s arms acquisition process, in many 
ways they have been driven by the arms race with each other which could be characterized 
by an action-reaction model. Hence it would be simplistic to believe that this was the 
predominant reason for India and Pakistan’s respective military expenditures (Barrett and 
Sen, 2009). 
 
2.4 Theoretical Model and Specification 
Based on the analysis in section 2.3, it is known that India and Pakistan’s arms race could 
be characterized by an action-reaction model. Thus, this study employs the Richardson 
action-reaction model. Dunne and Smith (2007) indicate that a recent and advanced 
econometric technique can be used to estimate long-run arms race relationships and their 
method is applied in this study to examine the possible arms race relationship between 
India and Pakistan. Based on Lewis F. Richardson’s (1960) seminal study, the standard 
framework is summarized by two differential equations describing the change over time of 
weapon stocks in each of the two countries as a function of the weapon stocks or military 
expenditure of each side. Focusing on a two-country model, the process is as follows: 
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 dm1 /dt= a1 + b1m2 - c1m1                   (2.37) 
 dm2 /dt= a2 + b2m1 - c2m2 (2.38) 
For two rival countries with weapon level or military expenditure m1 and m2, the rate of 
change in one country’s weapon levels or military expenditure, m1, is influenced positively 
by the increases in the other country’s weapon levels or military expenditure, m2.  
 
For empirical analyses, the ‘structural form’ of the Richardson model can be given in 
discrete time with the addition of a stochastic error term: 
 ∆m1t = a1 + b1m2t -c1m1t-1 + ε1t  (2.39) 
 ∆m2t = a2 + b2m1t - c2m2t-1 + ε2t  (2.40) 
We assume that:  E(εit) = 0, E(ε
2
it)=σ
2
i, E(εitεjt)= σij, E(εitεjt-s)= 0,where s≠0 and i, j=1,2 and 
as explained by Dunne and Smith (2007), the structural shocks εit are not expected to be 
independent.  
 
The ‘reduced form’ of the equations which are in term of predetermined and lagged 
variables as a first order Vector Auto-regression (VAR) model can be written as: 
 ∆P  C 
 <C1  << 

* 
 <<1  << Ph 

<1 
 *1  << Ph
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 <nP1  <<  
∆P  C 
 <C1  << 

* 
 <<1  << Ph 

<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 *1  << Ph

 <nP 
 nP1  <<  
 
or 
 ∆m1t = δ11 + δ 12 m1 t-1 + δ 13 m2t-1 + µ1 t   
 ∆m2t = δ21 + δ 22 m1 t-1 + δ 23 m2t-1 + µ2 t  (2.41) 
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Where  E(µ it) = 0, E(µ
 2
it)=ω
 2
i, E(µ it µ jt)= ωij, E(µ it µ jt-s)= 0,where s≠0 and i, j=1,2. 
 
If there is a long run relationship between variables m1t and m2t, which might be non-
stationary, the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) can be written in the form: 
 y P  z/  
  	EPh 
 MP 
y P  z/  
  	EPh 
 MP (2.42)  
where Z denotes the long run relationship between m1t and m2t, i.e. the cointegrating vector. 
 
Before using VAR techniques to empirically test the Richardson type arms race between 
India and Pakistan, two things need to be noticed. Firstly, despite the popularity of the 
Richardson model, it has a number of weaknesses.  For the model itself, it is a descriptive 
rather than normative model as discussed in section 2.2. Secondly, when applied to the 
data, the empirical results of these models have been disappointing (Hartley and Sandler, 
1995). Smith et al. (2000) analyse the problems when applying the Richardson model: 
these problems include measurements of m, a stochastic specification for ε, a theoretical 
interpretation and an estimation method. Furthermore, the quality and reliability of the data 
also make the application of the model questionable. Thus, our empirical analysis of India-
Pakistan arms race in the following sections not only employs conventional cointegration 
techniques but also applies recently developed methodologies to examine the existence of a 
long-run relationship between these two neighbour countries’ real military expenditure. 
 
2.5 Methodologies of Empirical Analysis 
During the past decade, the methods of estimation of unit root, structural breaks and 
cointegration have been developed at a fast pace. In particular, it is now widely accepted 
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that many macro time series are non-stationary which have substantial implications for 
empirical analyses. Most econometric analyses are based on the variance and covariance 
among variables. For instance, the method of estimating a standard regression model, 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS), assumes that means and variances of the variables being 
tested are constant over time. But non-stationary variables have means and variances 
which change over time. Thus, if the regression contains these non-stationary variables, 
OLS technique is invalid and could lead to spurious regression results - i.e. if two variables 
are trending over time, they can be highly correlated even if the increments in each 
variable are uncorrelated at all. However, if variables are cointegrated (i.e. there exist co-
movements among these trending variables), regressions could be exploited to test for the 
existence of long-run equilibrium relationships within a dynamic specification framework 
(Engle and Granger, 1987).  
  
Furthermore, the cointegration relationship has the long-run property which implies that 
the testing time series cover long periods. Thus, it is more likely that there exist structural 
breaks in those time series. In the presence of structural breaks, the standard tests for unit 
root and cointegration are biased (Perron, 1989; Gregory and Hansen, 1996). Structural 
breaks may reflect large economic shocks, changes in economic policies and changes in 
institutional arrangements. For example, India and Pakistan’s arms race relationship might 
change when both of them had nuclear tests in 1998 (i.e. there is a possible structural break 
around 1998.). So it is very important to take into account structural breaks in empirical 
analyses.  If the cointegration relationship is not distorted with structural breaks, Stock and 
Watson (1993)’s Dynamic OLS (DOLS) method could be applied to test the long-run 
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relationship and to be compared with other related cointegration analyses which are 
applied in our empirical studies. 
 
The objective of this section is to provide the empirical methodologies for testing the 
existence of the long run relationship (arms race) between military expenditure of India 
and Pakistan. Since unit root tests are the preconditions to test of the existence of 
cointegration relationship, unit root tests of military expenditures of India and Pakistan are 
firstly discussed. Given the fast development and importance of unit root tests, a brief 
review of unit root tests are provided and five different methodologies are applied which 
include the conventional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, Kwiatkowski, Phillips, 
Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) Test, Zivot-Andrews unit root test, Clemente et al. (1998) unit 
root tests and the Minimum LM Unit Root test (Lee and Strazicich, 2003, 2004). The 
results from these five unit root tests will be summarized and the robust conclusion could 
be made based on the comprehensive analysis.  
 
Then the Engle-Granger Cointegration tests (Engle and Granger, 1987) and Vector 
Autoregressive procedure (Johansen, 1991, 1995; Johansen and Juselius, 1990) are 
provided to estimate the cointegrating relationship without structural breaks. In the case of 
existence of structural breaks, the Gregory Hansen (1996) test is employed to allow for a 
single unknown structural break in the cointegration relationship. This test captures one 
structural break and identifies the break-point empirically. Finally, the Stock-Watson 
DOLS technique with the structural break (captured by earlier tests) is employed and 
provides more robust results in the small sample. The results of the long-run relationship 
reported by different tests are compared and summarized as well.   
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2.5.1 Unit Root Tests without Structural Breaks: The ADF Test and KPSS Test 
2.5.1.1 The ADF Test 
The conventional methods to test for the presence of unit roots are developed by Dickey 
and Fuller (1979), and Said and Dickey (1984). The standard Dickey-Fuller (DF) test is 
carried out as follows.  
 
Consider a simple Autoregressive (AR) (1) process: 
 {P  |{Ph 
 }P~' 
 nP (2.43) 
where }P are optional exogenous regressors which may include a constant, or a constant 
and a trend, ρ and δ are parameters to be estimated, and  nP  are white noise. After 
subtracting {Ph from both sides of the equation, we get 
 ∆{P  	{Ph 
 }P~' 
 nP (2.44) 
where α = ρ-1. y is non-stationary if α is zero. If the series is an AR(1) process, the simple 
DF unit root test is valid.  
 
However, if the series is correlated at higher order, the white noise assumption of nP will be 
violated. By assuming that y series follows an AR(p) process and adding p lagged 
difference terms of the dependent variable y to the right-hand side of the regression 
equation, the ADF test constructs a parametric correction for higher order correlation as 
following: 
 ∆{P  	{Ph 
 }P' 
 ∆{Ph 
 ∆{Ph 
i
 L∆{PhL 
 P (2.45) 
The information criterions such as Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC) are used to determine the optimal lag length p.  
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The null and alternative hypotheses can be written as: 
 b/: 	  0  
b: 	 ? 0 
(2.46) 
Non rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the series is non-stationary,(i.e. exhibits 
unit root); whereas the rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the series is stationary.   
 
However, it need to be concerned that the ADF test tends to have low power and cannot 
reject the unit root hypothesis when the series is stationary. As argued by Perron (1989), 
structural breaks in time series can influence the results of unit root test. The ADF test 
could rarely reject the null of unit root where in fact the series is a stationary process with a 
broken trend.  
 
2.5.1.2 The Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) Test  
The KPSS (1992) test differs from the ADF unit root test. Under the null of KPSS test, the 
series {P is assumed to be stationary. Its statistics is based on the residuals from the OLS 
regression of {P on the exogenous variables }P: 
 {P  }P' 
 P (2.47) 
The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic is defined as: 
  $
P
/V)/ (2.48) 
Where )/  is an estimator of the residual spectrum at frequency zero and $  is a 
cumulative residual function: 
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 $  
P

 (2.49) 
Where P  {P  }P'0. So the KPSS test is a stationary test, while the ADF test is a 
non-stationary test.  
 
2.5.2 Unit Root Tests with Structural Breaks 
2.5.2.1 The Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test with a Single Structural Break  
The Perron (1989) unit root test assumes that the structural break date is uncorrelated with 
the data and known ex ante by economic information: for example, the 1973 oil price 
shock. However, according to Christiano (1988), the Perron (1989)’s assumption of 
exogenous breaks has been criticized and considered inappropriate. Due to problems 
associated with “pre-testing”, Perron’s methodology invalidates the distribution theory of 
conventional testing and will tend to over reject the null of unit root. Instead, Zivot and 
Andrews (1992, hereafter ZA) treat the selection of the break points as the outcome of an 
estimation procedure. They transform Perron (1989)’s test into an unconditional unit root 
test which allows endogenously determined break points in the intercept and/or the trend 
function.  
 
Following Perron(1989)’s notation, ZA test the null of unit root against the alternative of a 
one-time structural break with three models: Model A allows a one-time change in the 
level of the series, Model B permits a one-time change in the slope of the trend function of 
the series and Model C admits both changes. The regression equations corresponding to 
these three models are as following.  
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Model A ∆{P  * 
 	{Ph 
  
 UP 
v∆{Phv

v

 nP (2.50) 
Model B ∆{P  * 
 	{Ph 
  
 UVP 
v∆{Phv

v

 nP (2.51) 
Model C ∆{P  * 
 	{Ph 
  
 UP 
 UVP 
v∆{Phv

v

 nP (2.52) 
where UP  and UVP  are break dummy variables for  a mean shift and a trend 
shift,respectively. The shift occurs at each possible break point V4 ( 1 ? V4 ? V). Formally: 
 
 UP   1 )   V40 F  C UVP    V4 )   V40 F  (2.53) 
where k is the number of lags determined for each possible break point by one of  
information criteria.  
 
The null hypothesis is α=0, which implies that the series exhibits a unit root with a drift 
and excludes any structural break points. The alternative hypothesis is α<0, which implies 
that the series is a trend-stationary with an unknown one-time break. So Equations (2.50), 
(2.51) and (2.52) are sequentially estimated and V4 is chosen so as to minimize the one–
sided t-statistics for testing   0. Following the same method, Lumsdaine and Papell 
(1997, hereafter LP) extend the ZA minimum unit root test and include two structural 
breaks. The null hypothesis is also unit root with no break against the alternative stationary 
with breaks hypothesis.  
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2.5.2.2 The Clemente, Montanes and Reyes (1998) Unit Root Test with Double 
Structural Breaks  
Since some variables exhibit multiple break points, Clemente, Montanes and Reyes (1998, 
hereafter CLEM) extend the Perron and Vogelsang (1992) tests to allow for two structural 
breaks in the mean of a series. There are two different forms of those structural breaks: the 
Additive Outlier (AO) and Innovational Outlier (IO) models. They test the null hypothesis 
b/ against the alternative hypothesis b: 
           b/: {P  {Ph 
 'UVaP 
 'UVaP 
 MP  (2.54) 
 b: {P  M 
 UP 
 UVaP 
 P (2.55) 
In these equations UVaP is a pulse variable that takes the value one if   Va 
 1 (i=1, 2) 
and zero otherwise, UP  1  if    Va  (i=1, 2) and zero otherwise. Va  and  Va 
represent time periods when the shifts in the mean occur. For the sake of simplicity, 
suppose that Va  V (i=1, 2) where  0 ?  ? 1  and    (Clemente Montanes and 
Reyes, 1998). 
 
For the case the two breaks belong to the IO, the estimating regression can be written as: 
 {P  M 
 	{Ph 
  
 'UVaP 
 'UVaP 
 UP 
 UP

*∆{Ph



 P 
(2.56) 
Equation (2.56) is then sequentially estimated and the null hypothesis of unit root is tested 
by obtaining the minimum value of the t-statistic for the hypothesis α = 1 for all break time 
combinations.  
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2.5.2.3 The Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004) Minimum LM Unit Root Test 
Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004) provide evidences that assuming no break under the null 
in above endogenous break(s) tests cause the test statistic to diverge and lead to significant 
rejections of the unit root null. In fact, the data-generating process (DGP) is a unit root 
with break(s). Based on these unit root tests such as ZA and LP tests, the rejection of the 
null does not indicate the rejection of a unit root per se, but would indicate the rejection of 
a unit root without break(s). Thus, the above unit root tests with endogenous break(s) will 
exhibit size distortions and will reject the null hypothesis of unit root too often.  
 
Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004) develop a one- and two-break minimum Lagrange 
multiplier unit root test which is a remedy to the problem noted above.  Their LM unit root 
test allows for break(s) under both the null and alternative hypotheses. As a result, 
rejection of the null hypothesis unambiguously implies trend stationarity.  
 
Following the notation of Lee and Strazicich (2003), the LM unit root test with two 
structural breaks can be obtained from the regression: 
 Δ{P  ΔEP 
 $Ph 
Δ$Ph
L


 MP,   1,… , V (2.57) 
where  EP  contains a vector of exogenous variables, $P  {P  9  EP'  and 9  { 
E' . ' are the coefficients in the regression of Δ{P  on ΔEP . The lagged terms Δ$Ph are 
included as required to correct for serial correlation. The number of lagged augmentation 
terms is determined by following the general-to-specific procedure which is suggested in 
Ng and Perron (1995). 
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 There are two forms of models. Model A allows for two shifts in level and is defined by 
 EP  1, , UP , UP~, where UvP=1 for   V4v ,   1,2 and 0 otherwise. V4v  denotes the 
points at which breaks occur. Model C includes two breaks in level and trend and is 
defined by  EP  1, , UP , UP, UVP, UVP~, where UVvP    V4v for   V4v 
 1,   1,2 
and 0 otherwise. The unit root null hypothesis   0 is then tested via the t-statistic being 
denoted as ̃. The break points are determined endogenously to be where the test statistic is 
minimized over the interval [0.1T, 0.9T] (to eliminate endpoints). The break fractions are 
denoted as  v Vav/V and the LM test statistic  is given by: 
   Q) ̃  (2.58) 
 
2.5.3 Cointegration Tests  
2.5.3.1 The Engle-Granger Cointegration Test 
Engle and Granger (1987) propose a theoretical representation for estimating and modeling 
cointegration relationship among non-stationary time-series variables. They propose that a 
linear combination of two or more non-stationary series may be stationary. This stationary 
linear combination is called the cointegration equation and could be interpreted as a long 
run equilibrium relationship among the series.  
 
As the most well known cointegration test, Engel and Granger provide a formal framework 
for testing the existence of long run equilibrium relationship and avoid spurious regression 
problems. Consider the set of (k+1) variables {P which are I(1). If there exists a vector  
such that ~{P is I(0), then  is the cointegration vector. In a simple two-variable case, the 
residual-based test considers the equation: 
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 {P  {P 
 MP (2.59) 
If MP is I(0), then {P  {P is a cointegrating relationship. If MP has a unit root, then {P 
and {P are not cointegrated. Thus, a test for a unit root in MP is a test that {P and {P are 
not cointegrated. The ADF test and Phillips-Perron E  and EP tests could be applied to the 
estimated residuals,  P . Since the linear combination {P  {P  is stationary, an error 
correction model (ECM) could be written as following: 
 ∆{P  	∆{P 
 {Ph  {Ph 
 P (2.60) 
where all of these transformed variables are I(0) and could be estimated. So it provides 
both long- and short-run information. Engle and Granger (1987) suggest a two stage 
procedure. In the first step, all dynamics are ignored and estimate the static cointegrating 
relationship in Equation (2.59) by the OLS. If the estimated residuals, MP , are stationary, 
{P  and {P  are cointegrated. So the test of the unit root null implies the test of null 
hypothesis that {P and {P are not cointegrated. If {P and {P are cointegrated, a long-run 
equilibrium relationship exists and the short run disequilibrium relation can always be 
represented by an ECM. In the second step, since {P and {P are cointegrated, we could 
get   from estimating {P  {P 
 MP . Then the ECM could be estimated in the form: 
 ∆{P  	∆{P 
 7{Ph  {Ph8 
 P . Thus, the Engle-Granger two steps test 
provides a model incorporating both the static long-run and the dynamic short-run 
components. 
 
The Engle-Granger is easy to apply and OLS estimates can provide super-consistent 
coefficients of a long-run model (Stock, 1987). But it has some weaknesses. For example, 
firstly, it is only suitable for bivariate model and rules out multiple cointegration vectors 
between more than two variables. Secondly, standard significance tests on the long-run 
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model (cointegration vector) coefficients are invalid because standard errors are unreliable.  
Thirdly, it suffers from small sample bias. Fourthly, independent variables are assumed 
exogenous and it may violate weak exogeneity. Fifthly, it is not invariant with the choice 
of dependent variable and has the normalization problem. Finally, it is likely to have lower 
power against alternative tests, such as Engle-Granger-Yoo (1991) 3-step approach and 
Johansen cointegration test (1990).  
 
2.5.3.2 The Johansen Cointegration Test 
Another commonly employed cointegration test is developed by Johansen and Juselius 
(1990). Based on a vector autoregressive (VAR) model, Johansen and Juselius’s 
methodology is widely used to test whether a group of non-stationary series are 
cointegrated or not. The Johansen cointegration test can test a number of cointegration 
relations. All variables are assumed endogenous and then the test is insensitive to the 
choice of dependent variables and the variable being normalized. Here a VAR model treats 
every endogenous variable in the system as a function of the lagged values of all of the 
endogenous variables in the system.  
 
 
Consider a VAR of order p:  
 {P  g{Ph 
i
 gL{PhL 
 a}P 
 nP (2.61) 
where  {P is a k-vector of non-stationary I(1) variables, i.e. integrated with order 1, }P is a 
d-vector of deterministic variables, and nP is a vector of innovations. It may be rewritten as: 
61 
 
 
y{P  ¡{Ph 
¢y{Ph
Lh


 a}P 
 nP (2.62) 
where  
 ¡  g  Q,
L

 ¢    gv
L
v£
 (2.63) 
If the coefficient matrix Π has reduced rank r < k, there exist k×r matrices α and β each 
with rank r such that ¡  	~  and ~{P  is I(0), i.e. stationary. So r is the number of 
cointegration relations and each column of β is the cointegration vector, and the elements 
of α are the adjustment parameters which measure the speed of adjustment coefficient of 
particular variable to a disturbance in the long-run equilibrium relationship. By applying 
trace or maximum eigenvalue statistics, Johansen’s methodology is to estimate the matrix 
¡ based on an unrestricted VAR and to test whether we can reject the restrictions implied 
by the reduced rank of ¡. 
 
For the lag length of the unrestricted VAR, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and the Long Run sequential modified LR statistics 
(LR) are adopted to determine the lag length. However, it is important to avoid too many 
lags in the VAR since the number of parameters grows very fast with the lag length 
(Johansen, 1995). In the case of small samples, it is the best choice to use a rather small lag 
length.  
 
The cointegrating equations may have intercepts and deterministic trends. The asymptotic 
distribution of the Likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic for cointegration depends on the 
assumption made with respect to deterministic trends including in the cointegration 
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relations. Johansen (1995) specifies five general models of deterministic trends cases. One 
could make an appropriate assumption regarding the trend underlying the data. The choice 
of the appropriate specification could rely on the so-called “Pantula principle” (Johansen, 
1992) by proceeding from the most restrictive model, (i.e. no deterministic components), to 
the least restrictive model. The model which accepts cointegration first will be the 
preferred one.  
 
There are three main weaknesses of the Johansen approach. The first one is the 
interpretation problems.  The symmetrical treatment of all variables in the VAR system 
and the possibility of multiple cointegration relations both cause the interpretation 
problematic. The second one is the sensitivity to variables selection and number of lags 
included. The last weakness is that the Johansen cointegration test does not perform well in 
small samples. Maddala and Kim (1998) suggested that by comparison, the least squares 
methods are more robust. 
 
2.5.3.3 The Gregory and Hansen Cointegration Test  
The conventional approach to cointegration assumes that cointegration vectors are time-
invariant. When there is a structural break in the cointegration relationship, the power of 
the Engle-Granger (1987) test of the null of no cointegration will be substantially reduced. 
Denoting the standard cointegration between two series { {P, {P} as: 
Model1: Standard cointegration 
 {P  M 
 	p{P 
 P ,   1, … ,  (2.64) 
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If Model 1 captures a long-run relationship, the parameters α and µ are expected to be 
time-invariant. But in some applications, due to structural changes it may be desirable to 
consider a shift in the relationship, (i.e. the cointegration holds over some period of time), 
and then shifts to a new equilibrium relationship. One important point to bear in mind is 
that the test needs to use time series covering long period for capturing long-run 
relationships. 
 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) develop Engle-Granger’s single-equation regression models 
and allow for cointegration with a structural change in either the intercept or the intercept 
and trend at an unknown time. Allowing different forms of structural change in the 
cointegration relationship, three models are specified and denoted as follows: 
 
Model 2: Level shift (C) 
 {P  M 
 M¥P 
 	p{P 
 P ,   1, … ,  (2.65) 
There is a level shift in the cointegrating relationship in Model 2. M denotes the intercept 
before the shift, and M denotes the change in the intercept at time of the shift.  
 
Model 3: Level shift with trend (C/T) 
 {P  M 
 M¥P 
  
 	p{P 
 P ,   1,… ,  (2.66) 
This model introduces a time trend into the level shift model. 
 
Model 4: Regime shift (C/S) 
 {P  M 
 M¥P 
 	p{P 
 	p{P¥P
P ,   1,… ,  (2.67) 
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Allowing both the intercept and slope to shift, Model 4 permits the cointegrating 
relationship to shift parallel as well as rotate. M and M are as Model 2.  represents the 
cointegrating slope coefficients before the regime shift and  represents the change in the 
slope coefficients.   
 
Structural change via the dummy variable ¥P in the above models is defined as: 
 ¥P  ¦0 )  . 1 )    (2.68) 
Where the unknown parameter  § 0,1 denotes the timing of the break point, and [ ] 
denotes integer part.  
 
To detect cointegration relationship with a possible shift, Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
suggest three tests: E ¨, EP¨ , and gU©¨. The first two are modified Phillips (1987) test 
statistics and the third one is based on the ADF statistic. These three statistics can be used 
alternatively. By computing the cointegrating test statistics for each possible regime shift τ
∈T, the smallest values of the above statistics are taken to test the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration with shifts.  
 
2.5.3.4 The Stock-Watson Dynamic OLS 
Stock and Watson (1993) propose a technique to estimate long-run relationship via 
dynamic OLS which is a more robust approach, particularly in small sample. By the 
inclusion of lags and leads of the change in the regressors, the potential of simultaneity 
bias and small sample bias among the regressors are eliminated. Stock-Watson DOLS 
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presents efficient estimators of cointegrating vectors and statistical inferences (for example, 
normal t-statistics) on the parameters of the cointegrating vectors.  
 
Given that two or more series are non-stationary, test the following regression by OLS, 
 {P  / 
}P
ª


  v∆}Phv
£
vh
ª


 nP (2.69) 
where , and   denote leads (future) and lags (past), respectively. Using information 
criteria (AIC and SIC), the values of , and  are selected and usually set ,   . The 
resulting DOLS estimators are asymptotically equivalent to the Johansen estimator and 
have been proved that they perform well relative to the other asymptotically efficient 
estimators (Stock and Watson, 1993).   
 
2.6. Data and Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Data  
The section uses SIPRI data on India and Pakistan’s (nominal) military expenditures. The 
data on price index and interest rates are from World Development Indicators by World 
Bank. Then real military expenditure data are derived at constant 2000 price US$ (Data on 
real military expenditure, defence burden of India and Pakistan, 1960-2007, are listed in 
Table A1 and A2, respectively in the Appendix; data on military personnel of India and 
Pakistan, 1985-2005 are listed in Table A3 in the Appendix). The testing period covers 
1960-2007 for both countries. Real military expenditure variables are employed by the 
logarithm forms of series, in order to overcome some statistic problems in the regression: 
for example unequal variation. Many macroeconomic time series are non-stationary and 
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contain a unit root. Thus, real military expenditure data would be non-stationary as well 
and unit root tests need to be carried out. The following section will use different unit root 
tests outlined previously to examine the existence of a unit root in India and Pakistan’s real 
military expenditure data. 
 
2.6.2 Unit root Tests 
First, the ADF test is used to test for unit root without allowing for any breaks. The 
variables tested are the logarithm of the real military expenditure of India (LNMEI) and the 
one of Pakistan (LNMEP). Table 2.5 shows the results from the ADF test. The ADF test 
for unit root in levels indicates that both series are non-stationary. After taking the first 
difference of the series, the results indicate stationarity. So LNMEI and LNMEP exhibit 
unit root.  
 
Another conventional unit root test is the KPSS test. The null hypothesis is different with 
the ADF test which is stationary. The rejection of the null indicates the series is non-
stationary. Table 2.6 presents the results of KPSS test. We can reject the null of stationary 
in levels but cannot reject it after taking the first difference of the series. The results also 
indicate that both LNMEI and LNMEP have unit root.  
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Table 2.4 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
  Level First Difference 
  K ADF K ADF 
LNMEI 0 -1.590 1 -5.605*** 
LNMEP 1 -1.847 0 -4.862*** 
Notes:  
1) Estimation with constant for the level and the first difference. 
2) Lag order is determined by using SIC with a maximum of 8 lags allowed. 
3) Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
4) K denotes the lag length. 
 
Table 2.5 KPSS Stationary Test 
Level First Difference 
LM statistic LM statistic 
LNMEI 0.9232*** 0.1434 
LNMEP 0.8799*** 0.2261 
Notes:  
1) Estimation with constant for the level and the first difference. 
2) Critical value: 1% 0.739, 5% 0.463 and 10% 0.347 
3) Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 
The criticism against the conventional unit root tests is that they tend to have low power 
and cannot reject the unit root hypothesis due to without allowing for structural breaks. 
Then we continue to perform the Zivot-Andrews unit root test with a single structural 
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break and the Clemente, Montanes and Reyes (1998) unit root test with double structural 
breaks. The results are shown in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8, respectively.  
 
Table 2.6 Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test with a single structural break 
Intercept Trend Both 
K t-statistic K t-statistic K t-statistic 
LNMEI 1 -7.662*** 1 -6.708*** 1 -7.767*** 
LNMEP 2 -3.574 2 -3.302 2 -4.081 
Notes: 
1) Lag length is determined by using AIC and TTEST. 
2) Estimation with 0.15 trimmed. 
3) Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
4) K denotes the lag length. 
 
Table 2.7 The Clemente, Montanes and Reyes Unit Root Test 
Additive Outliers Innovative Outliers 
Breaks K t-statistic Breaks K t-statistic 
LNMEI 
1 0 -2.878 1 1 -2.955 
2 0 -3.861 2 0 -3.702 
LNMEP 
1 0 -2.674 1 6 -3.622 
2 1 -4.710 2 7 -3.529 
Notes: 
1) Maximum lags allowed 8. 
2) Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
3) K denotes the lag length. 
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The results of Zivot and Andrew unit root test indicate that LNMEI is trend-stationary with 
a one-time break and reject the null hypothesis of unit root. But for series LNMP, we 
cannot reject the null of unit root. By allowing for one and two structural breaks of two 
forms (AO and IO), all the test statistics from Clemente, Montanes and Reyes unit root test 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit root. LNMEI and LNMEP are non-stationary 
which are coinciding with the finding of ADF test. 
 
Table 2.8 The LM Unit Root Test 
Crash (Model A) Break (Model C) 
Breaks K t-statistic Breaks K t-statistic 
LNMEI 
1 0 -3.3295 1 1 -3.8258 
2 0 -3.7795 2 4 -4.9543 
LNMEP 
1 5 -1.5235 1 5 -3.3544 
2 5 -1.7277 2 5 -5.3275 
Notes: 
1) Lag order is determined by using general to specific with a maximum of 5 lags allowed. 
2) Critical value from Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004). 
3) Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
4) K denotes the lag length. 
 
Finally, the LM unit root tests are adopted to test the null hypothesis of unit roots against 
the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. As discussed above, those tests are different with 
Zivot and Andrew and Clemente, Montanes and Reyes unit root test by allowing for one or 
two endogenous breaks under both hypotheses.  The test results are presented in Table 2.9. 
With one or two breaks, all the test statistics are unable to reject the null hypothesis of unit 
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root with one or two breaks which indicate that LNMEI and LNMEP both contain unit root. 
As discussed by Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004), LM unit root test statistic will not 
spuriously reject the unit root null hypothesis. So those tests tend to provide more accurate 
results.  
 
Table 2.9 The Summary of Unit Root Tests  
Variables 
Without Breaks With One or Two Breaks 
ADF KPSS Zivot and Andrews* Clemente et al.* 
Lee and 
Strazicish** 
LNMEI unit root unit root Stationary unit root unit root 
LNMEP unit root unit root unit root unit root unit root 
Notes:  
1) *Assume no break(s) under the unit root null hypothesis  
**Assume break(s) under both the null and the alternative hypothesis 
 
As shown in Table 2.10, it is the time to make a conclusion of our unit root tests. Using 
five different methodologies, we perform unit root tests for real military expenditure of 
India and Pakistan. Except ZA test indicates LNMEI is trend-stationary with a one-time 
break, all other results find the existence of unit root. Because ZA test has size distortions 
problem and tend to reject the null of unit root when in fact the series has a unit root with 
break(s).  So we have strong evidence to conclude that both LNMEI and LNMEP are non-
stationary I(1) series.  
 
Furthermore, the aim of this section is to find out whether the testing series are stationary 
or not, which is the pre-condition for the following cointegration tests. Hence the break 
71 
 
points in the Zivot and Andrews test, CLEM and LM tests are not reported. These break 
points are based on tests of the univariate models, while the break points concerned by this 
section should relate with both series. Rather than the univariate frameworks which have 
been examined above, the break point will be tested by a multivariate model in the 
following section. The multivariate model is based on the cointegration test with one break 
which is proposed by Gregory and Hansen (1996).  
 
2.6.3 Cointegration Test  
2.6.3.1 The Engel-Granger Cointegration Test 
Given the above non-stationary results (two variables LNMEI and LNMEP both have unit 
root), we assume there exists a long run relationship (cointegration) between LNMEI and 
LNMEP. By OLS regression, the residuals are provided. Then it can be tested by the ADF 
test. The augmented lags length is chosen by information criteria as before. The ADF test 
results are presented in Table 2.11 and the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected. Thus, it 
implies that LNMEI and LNMEP are cointegrated.  
 
Table 2. 10 The Engle-Granger Cointegration Test 
ADF test statistic 
Critical Value 
Conclusion 
1% 5% 10% 
Residuals -4.136** -4.14 -3.47 -3.14 stationary 
Notes: 
1) Lag order is determined by SC with a maximum of 8 lags allowed. 
2) Critical values for t-test are from MacKinnon (1991). 
3) Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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2.6.3.2 The Johansen Cointegration Test 
Charemza and Deadman (1992) suggests that Johansen cointegration test may be used as a 
confirmation test of the Engle-Granger single equation test. Thus, Johansen cointegration 
test is also employed to confirm the Engle-Granger method. 
 
Using AIC, SC and LR test, the information criteria indicate that a second order VAR. 
Given that the variables, LNMEI and LNMEP are both I(1), we could move on to test 
cointegration relationship between them. The Johansen cointegration test provides the 
results in Table 2.12. Estimating with constant and no trend in the cointegration space, the 
results shows that the two variables are cointegrated and a long-run relationship exists 
between them. But due to the existence of two cointegration equations, there is an 
interpretation problem of the long-run relationship. It is hard to decide which one is the 
proper cointegrating equation depending on the empirical results. The results are consistent 
with the finding of Engle-Granger test.  
 
Table 2.11 The Johansen Cointegration Test 
Hypothesized Trace Max-Eigen 
No. of CE(s) Statistic Statistic 
None * 19.521(15.495) 15.513(14.265) 
At most 1 * 4.008(3.841) 4.008(3.842) 
Notes: 
1) * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level. 
2) ‘CE(s)’ is the Cointegrating Equation(s). 
3) 5% critical values are shown in parentheses 
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2.6.3.3 The Gregory and Hansen Test  
By extending the conventional cointegration tests to allow for the possibilities of one 
structural break in the cointegration relationship, the Gregory-Hanson residual based test is 
postulated. The results in Table 2.13 provide the empirical evidence for the presence of a 
long-run relationship between LNMEI and LNMEP. In particular, the level shift model 
indicates that the cointegration is present with a break at 1997. Adding a trend, the model 
C/T indicates that the cointegration is present with a break at 1970. By taking into 
consideration the simultaneous presence of both a mean break and a slope break, the 
regime shift model indicates that the cointegration with a regime shift at 1997.    
 
Table 2.12 The Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Test 
Model Break Time GH Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 
Level Shift(C) 1997 -6.496*** -5.440 
Level Shift with Trend(C/T) 1970 -7.022*** -5.800 
Regime Shift(C/S) 1997 -6.704*** -5.970 
Notes: 
1) Reported statistics are obtained using 1 lags for all tests. 
2) *** indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level. 
3) Fraction of data range to skip at either end when examining possible break points [.15]. 
 
We have examined the possible cointegration between real military expenditure of India 
and Pakistan over the period 1960 to 2007. The empirical results are based on not only the 
commonly employed Engle-Granger and Johansen cointegration tests but also the Gregory 
and Hansen test which accounts for one endogenous structural break in the cointegration 
relationship. All the three tests provide evidences in favour of a long-run relationship. It 
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can therefore be concluded that for India and Pakistan over the sample period, these two 
countries’ real military expenditures are cointegrated and there is an arms race between 
them. Another finding is that the long run relationship might experience a break in 1997. 
Both India and Pakistan had their own nuclear tests in 1998. The preparation of nuclear 
tests might change the relationship between MEI and MEP and thus, a break could exist in 
1997. 
 
2.6.3.4 The Stock-Watson DOLS Test 
Given the existence of a cointegration vector (with and without one structural break) and 
the small sample size, the Stock-Watson DOLS test is applied to estimate the long-run 
relationship between the real military expenditure of India and Pakistan. One lag and one 
lead of the first difference of the regressors are used. The likely breaks captured by the 
Gregory and Hansen test are adding to the regression equation by the intercept and slope 
dummies. The corresponding breaks are in 1970 and 1997. The regression equation could 
be written as: 
 P /
 &P 
 U 
> U&P

= ∆&P 
« ∆&P1

¬ ∆&P1 
 MP 
(2.70) 
where ∆&P1  and ∆&P1  are leads and lags of the first difference of 
∆&P respectively. U is the dummies for the break in the intercept which equal 0 up to 
1970 and equal 1 thereafter. U is the dummies for the break in the slope which equal 0 up 
to 1997 and equal 1 thereafter.  
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The results are given in Table 2.14. The t-statistics of DOLS indicate that the intercept 
dummies are insignificant and slope dummies are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The positive coefficient of slope dummies also indicates that the shift in 1997 is an upward 
one. The slope coefficient measures the elasticity of real military expenditure of India with 
respect to real military expenditure of Pakistan. Thus, before the regime shift in 1997, real 
military expenditure of India would increase 0.830 percent given one percent increase in 
real military expenditure of Pakistan. But after 1997, the increasing percentage will change 
from 0.830 to 0.876. So with respect to the increase in real military expenditure of Pakistan, 
real military expenditure of India will increase more after 1997 comparing with the period 
before 1997. Even taking into account the regime shift, there exists a long-run relationship 
between these two countries real military expenditure which implies the existence of 
enduring arms race.  
 
Table 2.13 The Stock-Watson DOLS Test 
Coefficient   > 
 
0.830*** -0.090 0.046*** 
 
(0.061) (0.114) (0.007) 
Notes: 
1) Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance are used in t-tests. 
2) Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table 2.14 The Long-Run Relationship between lnmei and lnmep 
 Model   Slope Coefficient 
Engle-Granger 0.931 
Johansen  1.002 
Gregory-Hansen (C/S) 0.836 0.883* 
Stock-Watson DOLS 0.830 0.876* 
Notes: 
1) Dependent variable is lnmei. 
2) The slope coefficient measures the elasticity of lnmei with respect to lnmep. 
3) * denotes the value of slope coefficient after regime shift. 
 
In the end the long-run relationship captured by different cointegration tests can be 
compared and summarized in Table 2.15. All tests imply that there exists a long-run 
relationship between the real military expenditure of India and Pakistan. The slope 
coefficients are ranging from 0.830 to 1.002. Thus the increase percentages in real military 
expenditures of India and Pakistan are similar which are responding to each other. The 
tests provide robust evidences to support the conclusion that there was an enduring arms 
race between India and Pakistan in the period 1960-2007. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has surveyed the confrontation between India and Pakistan since their creation 
as separate countries in 1947. After more than 60 years independence, India and Pakistan 
have been in long-running conflict with each other. The rival relationship and the Indo-
Pakistani arms race are always concerned by both defence economists and political 
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scientists. After reviewing the literature of the theoretical arms race models and empirical 
studies of the arms race between India and Pakistan, the Richardson action-reaction model 
was employed to investigate the existence of an arms race between India and Pakistan. By 
reviewing India and Pakistan’s conflict history and their military expenditures dynamics, it 
shows that these two neighbor countries represent a classic arms race and structural breaks 
exist for the long-term arms race relationship. 
 
By applying VAR frameworks, empirical analyses are carried out to find out the possible 
long-run relationship between India and Pakistan’s real military expenditure for the period 
1960-2007. Due to the importance of estimation of unit root and structural breaks in time-
series analysis, both traditional and recent developed approaches are employed to 
investigate this long-run relationship. The results of unit root tests show that both LNMEI 
and LNMEP are non-stationary I(1) series. The empirical results of different cointegration 
tests all indicate the existence of a cointegrating relationship between these two counties’ 
real military expenditure, even after taking into account a structural break. Thus, it can be 
concluded that there is quite strong evidence to support the existence of an enduring arms 
race between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, there is a regime shift (structural break) in 
1997. Compared with the period before 1997, real military expenditure of India increases 
by a bigger per cent after 1997, with respect to the increase in real military expenditure of 
Pakistan. A possible reason for that change is the preparation of nuclear tests by both 
countries. 
 
Compared with the previous empirical studies reviewed in this chapter, our results were 
based on the analysis of India and Pakistan’s conflict history and the dynamics of their 
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military expenditures. Both conventional and advanced econometric techniques were 
employed which all indicated the existence of a long-run relationship between India and 
Pakistan’s real military expenditure for the period 1960-2007. Especially, a structural 
break was examined and estimated in our long-run relationship analysis which shed light 
on the current empirical studies of India and Pakistan’s arms race.  
 
Thus, Chapter 2 provided empirical studies of the long-standing arms race between the 
India and Pakistan and the parameters of this relationship were identified. For example, the 
parameter was 0.876 after 1997 by applying the Stock-Watson DOLS method, i.e. when 
Pakistan’s real military expenditure increases by 1 per cent, India’s real military 
expenditure would increase by 0.876 per cent. Thus, on the one hand, it provided the 
evidence of the existence of the long-run arms race which these two series were responded 
with each other. On the other hand, compared with the amount of Pakistan’s real military 
expenditure, India’s amount was huge and about 4.6 times (average) as high as Pakistan’s. 
So the responding increase was huge as well and when Pakistan’s real military increased 
US$1, India’s would increase US$4.03. From India’s point of view, the level of Pakistan’s 
real military expenditure was relatively small compared with her own spending. However, 
as shown in Table A2, Pakistan’s defence burden was much higher than India’s. Thus, 
India would concern Pakistan’s defence burden which indicates the priority of Pakistan’s 
government expenditures and provides a proxy of Pakistan’s military threats faced by India. 
 
Stylised facts and the empirical results of this chapter indicated that there is a long-
standing India-Pakistan arms race. On the other hand, defence spending is also affected in 
by various economic and political factors. How these arms race factor, various economic 
and political factors are related to each other to determine India’s defence spending is an 
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obvious issue for discussion. Thus, the demand for military expenditure in India will be 
examined in the next chapter which will consider not only its rival-Pakistan’s military 
expenditure but also other related factors such as its economic and political environments. 
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Chapter 3 the Demand for Military Expenditure in India  
3.1 Introduction 
Although a number of studies have concerned the demand for military expenditure in 
developing countries, there are few such studies for India. The goal of this chapter is 
attempt to fill the gap and examines the determinants of military expenditure in India. 
There are several reasons which make India a valuable case for such a study. Firstly, India 
is strategically located in South Asia which has witnessed a high level of insecurity. It is 
claimed by many economists that there is an arms race between India and its neighbor-
Pakistan due to the ongoing political hostility and religious differences. Our empirical 
analysis in chapter 2 provides a robust evidence to support the existence of the India-
Pakistan arms race. But the effect of arms race on India’s military expenditure is not 
conclusive and the natural of the determinants of military expenditure of India is not 
clearly investigated.  
 
Secondly, security environments are of great concern to many. For India, since the Sino-
Indian border war in 1962, India’s conflicts with China have been acknowledged and as 
two of the largest and most powerful nations, their relationship becomes more and more 
important and influences the whole world’s political environment. India’s strategies to 
assert its regional power in South Asia and global power status influence its security policy 
and military expenditures.  Thirdly, the nuclear explosions which were carried out by both 
India and Pakistan in 1998 have increased the uncertainty and complication of the stability 
in South Asia. Finally, even though India is still among the poorest countries in the world, 
it devotes a substantial portion of their resources for defence. In 2008, military expenditure 
of India was US$24,716 (SIPRI 2009: in constant 2005 prices), ranking as 10th in the world.  
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Thus, India’s military expenditure is determined not only by its rival-Pakistan’s military 
expenditure which has been confirmed in Chapter 2 but also by other related factors such 
as its economic and political environments. This chapter adds to the defence economics 
literature by applying the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration 
to investigate these determinants for military expenditure in India. The structure of this 
chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 provides theoretical models of the demand for military 
expenditure. Section 3.3 reviews the relevant empirical literature. Section 3.4 describes the 
brief background of military expenditure and security concerns in India. Section 3.5 
provides the model specification and data description. The econometric model and the 
estimation method used by this study are given in section 3.6. In section 3.7, empirical 
results are presented for India. Section 3.8 concludes.  
 
3.2 The Theoretical Models of the Demand for Military Expenditure 
Over the years, the study of the demand for military expenditure has been carried out using 
a variety of different approaches. It has attempted to identify strategic, political, economic 
and other related factors that influence the evolution of military burden or military 
expenditure. Broadly, the demand models of military expenditure could be grouped into 
three groups: organizational politics models, arms race models and neoclassical models 
which are reviewed as follows. 
 
3.2.1 Organizational Politics Models 
Some models are focus on the defence budgetary process where interest groups including 
bureaucrats, politicians and arms industry are struggling for power and trying to optimize 
their separate objectives.  The level of defence budget or military expenditures is the result 
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of such struggle, competition and optimization. These models are called “organizational 
politics” models and are basic for the short-run determinants of military expenditure, and 
types and scope of weapon development (Isard and Anderton, 1988).  
 
The simplest organizational type model is proposed by Lucier (1979). In Lucier’s model, 
future defence budget decisions are based on small revision of past spending levels and can 
be written as: 
 P  ­Ph (3.1) 
where P is the military expenditure at time t and q is the parameter which refers to policy-
making rule. The model is focusing on the change of the parameter, q, which is based on 
two propositions. First, if there is a revision of the armament standard operating procedure 
(SOP), the value of parameter, q, will usually change in the following year. Second, if 
there is a deadline, a dramatic domestic or international event with manifest implications 
for armaments, or a replacement of decision-makers, the value of parameter, q, will change 
in the following year. Thus, the level of military expenditure is dependent on the past level 
of military expenditure and the value of parameter, q, in Lucier’s model.  
 
Majeski (1983) constructs an organizational politics model to analyze the decision-making 
process of the United States’ military expenditure. There are four policy-making groups 
playing a role in deciding the level of military expenditures: 
1. the Defence Services Agencies with a request for a defence budget, ; 
2. the President, who follows with his/her request,  and might focus on the next 
election and the expected federal deficit; 
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3. the Congress, which then makes an appropriation, > and might focus on the 
electorate as well as the expected federal deficit; 
4. the Department of Defence, which then spends the appropriation, = and requests a 
supplementary appropriation when necessary.  
Each group has its own set of objectives and could state its desired level of military 
expenditure. Thus the level of military expenditure will be determined by the interactions 
of those four policy-making groups.  
 
There exist other organizational politics models which focus on different factors of the 
policy-making process. For example, Rattinger (1975) develops a model to examine the 
relationship between bureaucratic behaviours and military expenditure and investigates the 
effects of bureaucratic momentum and international tensions on the military expenditure. 
Ostrom and Marra (1986) provide a model which presents and synthesizes two distinct 
perspectives on the policy-making process: an organizational process and bureaucratic 
politics. Their model reveals the U.S. multi-step of the defence expenditure policy-making 
process where Soviet defence spending (new estimated) and the U.S. public opinion are the 
major influencing factors of U.S. defence spending.  
 
As suggested by Isard and Anderton (1988), organizational politics models have 
significance for the short run, in particular for a given year or the following year’s military 
expenditure. However, the long run is after all a sequence of the short runs and the 
cumulating of the factors and status of each short run can have a major influence on the 
long run. Thus, the short run and organizational politics cannot be ignored.    
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3.2.2 Arms Race Models 
Another type models are based on the Richardson type arms race models which are more 
suitable for situations where countries are in conflicts. As reviewed in Chapter 2, in arms 
race type models, the level of rival country’s military expenditure is the major determinant 
of one country military spending.  The decision of military expenditure is characterized by 
an action-reaction process. The details were presented in chapter 2. 
 
3.2.3 The Neoclassical Models 
The neoclassical models of the demand for military expenditures focus upon military, 
economic and political determinants of military expenditure. The formal models which are 
developed from the neoclassical approaches consider the country or state as maximising a 
social welfare function. The framework of the neoclassical model is based on Smith (1980, 
1995). In the standard neoclassical model of the demand for military expenditure, it is 
assumed that a country maximizes welfare, W, and W is a function of security S, economic 
factors such as total consumption, C, population, N and other factors, ZW: 
 #  #$, ®, J, E#. (3.2) 
 
Security can be regarded as a subjective peace of mind which is based on perceptions from 
threats of attacks. However, security is unobservable and thus can be replaced by some set 
of quantifiable variables. For example, it could be produced by military expenditure of the 
country and other countries, conditional on the strategic variables, ZS. Thus the security 
function can be written as: 
 $  $,, … ,ª, E$ (3.3) 
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where , … ,ª are the military expenditure of other countries which can be grouped into 
two types: allies and rivals. Allies’ military expenditure could raise the country’s security 
while rivals’ military expenditure could pose a threat to the country’s security. 
 
The maximization is subject to the security function and a budget constraint. The simplest 
budget constraint is: 
 "  &¯® 
 &° (3.4) 
where Y is nominal aggregate income. &° and &¯ are the prices of real military expenditure, 
M and consumption, C. A derived demand for the level of military expenditure can be 
written as:  
   &° &¯⁄ , ", J,, … ,ª, E#, E$ (3.5) 
To be more specific, we can use a simple example by ignoring J, E#, and E$.  
 
As follows, some assumptions are required to estimate the model. The welfare function is 
given by:  
 #  	 log® 
 1  	log $ (3.6) 
and it is supposed that the country is not aggressive but has a rival neighbouring country 
which has the military expenditure, . There are no allies. Hence the security function is 
assumed to be: 
 $   ¨    / 
  (3.7) 
where ¨ is the level of military forces or expenditure the country requires to resist its 
rival neighbour’s attack. ¨ is determined by two factors: one factor is denoted by / 
which is the fixed element and unrelated to the rival’s military forces or expenditure. For 
example, / would be negative if the rival’s defence strategies are natural, but / would be 
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positive if the neighbour country could gain an advantage from a surprise attack. Another 
factor is denoted by  , the size of the rival’ military forces or expenditure with   
where  is the relative effectiveness of . 
 
The Lagrangean subject to the above budget constraint is then given by: 
   	 log® 
 1  	 log ¨ 
 "  &¯®  &° (3.8) 
 
The first order conditions are: 
 ³
³® 
	
®  &¯  0; . . ® 
	
&¯ , (3.9) 
 ³
³ 
1  	
 ¨  &°  0; . . 
1  	
&° 
¨, (3.10) 
 ³
³  "  &¯®  &°  0. (3.11) 
Then we get: 
"  &¯ 	&¯  &°
1  	
&° 
¨  0 
Thus the Lagrange multiplier can be eliminated by using 
 1
  "  &°¨ (3.12) 
We get two linear demand equations: 
   1  	&° " 
 	/ 
 , (3.13) 
 ®  	&¯ "  &°/ 
 . (3.14) 
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In these two demand equations, real consumption and military expenditure are a function 
of income (Y), relative prices (&¯ , &°), preference parameters (	), strategic parameters 
(/, ) and the rival country’s military expenditure. 
 
Furthermore, Smith (1995) provides a range of theoretical considerations. For example, 
security might depend on stocks of military forces rather than flows of military spending 
and thus dynamics could be introduced into the demand model. Bureaucratic and political 
factors such as governmental choice, public opinion and incrementalism can also influence 
the decision of the level of military expenditures. The budget constraint, the welfare and 
security functions have different forms. For example, Smith (1980) uses a constant 
elasticity of substitution welfare function and a Cobb-Douglas security function.  
 
Hence, the neoclassical models of demand for military expenditure can incorporate quite 
complex considerations including not only income, prices, preferences and other country’s 
strategy and military expenditure but also other related bureaucratic, political and strategic 
factors. On the other hand, the bureaucratic and politics models narrowly focus on 
bureaucratic and politics environments while arms race models only focus on the rival’s 
military forces or expenditure. It can be suggested that the neoclassical models provide a 
relatively comprehensive approach to investigate the demand for military expenditure in a 
country and get more satisfactory empirical results which are presented in the following 
review of the empirical literature.  
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3.3 Review of Empirical Literature 
Many researchers have studied the demand for military expenditure in developing 
countries. Some studies are based on cross-country regression models; others provide time-
series individual case studies. Broadly the factors that determine the military expenditure 
in developing countries can be grouped into the following categories: military activities, 
economic and geo-strategic factors, the political environment and other related factors such 
as the lagged military expenditure and population. Table 3.1 gives a summary of the 
determining factors from the selected literature reviewed in this chapter. In this section, we 
review the empirical literature on the demand for military expenditure in developing 
countries following the above categories.  
 
3.3.1 Military Activity (Security Considerations) 
Military expenditure is chosen by governments in the light of a multitude of specific 
circumstances and influences. The most important output of military expenditure is 
national security. Under these considerations, the governments will focus on military 
activity and make perceptions of threats. In general, these considerations of military 
activities include external wars, civil wars, security web and related country’s military 
activities. 
 
External wars (inter-state war) will affect governments’ ability to secure land, economic 
returns and property rights. Many studies find that external wars result in increased 
military expenditure. Furthermore, if a country experiences external war, it will not only be 
responding to the threat of the other country’s military force, but will need to replenish 
stocks of arms and ammunitions used up in the fighting (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003a). 
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Hewitt (1996) investigates the determinants of military expenditures in 125 countries for 
the period 1972-1990. For developing countries, the empirical results indicate that the 
impact of international war on military burden is significant and positive. Security 
improvements are likely playing a role for decreased military expenditure by countries at 
war. Batchelor, et al. (2002) provide an analysis of the demand for military expenditure in 
South Africa during 1963-1997. The dummy for involvement in Angolan War (1977-1993) 
has a significant and positive effect on South Africa’s military  burden. Dunne and Perlo-
Freeman (2003a and 2003b) estimate the demand functions for developing countries 
during the Cold War (1981-89) and Post Cold War period (1990-1997). The empirical 
results of static and dynamic panel models reveal a posive effect from external wars on the 
military burden. Tambudzai (2005) empirically tests the effect of external wars on 
Zimbabwe’s military expenditure from 1980-2003. Zimbabwe has external wars with 
Mozambican between 1983 and 1993 and with the Democratic Republic of Congo from 
1998 to 2002. These external wars had a significant and positive effect on its military 
expenditure in the long run.  
 
Civil wars often have significant security implications in developing countries. Ball (1988) 
argues threats to internal security outweigh external security considerations for developing 
countries. The main task of defence forces is to protect the regime in power against its 
citizens. Both civilian and military governments make use of military expenditure budgets 
in order to placate the armed forces. Dunne and Mohammed (1995) examine military 
spending in 13 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 1967-1985 and they find a 
significant and positive effect of civil war dummies on the military burden. Collier and 
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Hoeffler (2002) measure internal threats by estimating the probability of a civil war 
breaking out. The variable has a more significant effect on military expenditure than 
international wars in developing countries between 1960 and 1999. Dunne and Perlo-
Freeman (2003a) suggest that the effects of civil war on military spending are of 
comparable magnitude. Collier et al (2003) find out that in peacetime, the average 
developing country allocates 2.8 percent of GDP to military spending, while during civil 
war, this average rises to 5 percent. 
 
Rosh (1988) introduces a broader conception of the security issues facing a country, called 
the ‘security web’. Rosh defines country X’s security web to be all other countries capable 
of significantly affecting country X’s security. This includes neighbouring countries and 
regional powers capable of projecting their influence beyond their immediate land and sea 
borders. To measure the level of threat a country faces, Rosh uses the average military 
burden (military expenditure/GDP) of countries in the security web. In his study for 
military expenditure in 63 LDCs during 1969-78, security web variables play an important 
role to determine the third world’s military burden.  
 
Dunne and Perlo Freeman (2003a, 2003b) and Dunne, Perlo Freeman and Smith (2008) 
use security web variables in their recent studies to estimate demand functions for 
developing countries for the period 1981-97. Furthermore, they divide the countries in a 
country’s security web in to Enemies, Potential Enemies and others. The effects of military 
expenditure by allies, enemies and neutral countries are distinguished. Great power enemy 
is also included to take account of countries’ relations with superpowers. In their studies, 
enemies and potential enemies’ military burden influence the country’s military burden in 
91 
 
most cases while the empirical results for security web variables are mixed and the results 
for Great power enemies variables are generally insignificant. Other studies also show the 
significant and positive effect of enemies’ military burden or expenditure on the country’s 
military spending. For instance, Sun and Yu (1999) find Japanese military expenditure 
influenced Chinese military expenditure positively for the period 1965-93. Tambudzai 
(2005)  reveals that South African military expenditure has a significant and positive 
impact on Zimbabwe’s military expenditure during 1980-2003.  
 
3.3.2 Internal and External Economic Factors 
There are a number of economic influences to be considered. The overall economic 
environment may pose a constraint on military burden over time. Looney (1989) suggests 
that at the national level, economic factors such as the level of economic development 
(urbanization and inequalities in wealth and income), real income growth, the size of the 
budget, and the influence of the military-industrial complex are considered important 
determinants of military expenditure. In a general way, national income can be viewed as 
the most important determinant of the level of military expenditure. Many studies have 
used per capita income and real income/ GDP or GNP to capture income constraints on 
military expenditure. There exist other internal economic constraints to military 
expenditure (e.g. central government expenditure or non-defence government expenditure: 
opportunity cost of defence) and arms industry.  
 
In the empirical analysis of military expenditure in developing countries during 1972-1990, 
Hewitt (1996) suggests that GDP level will clearly affect the level of military burden. 
However, the relationship might be convex, the estimated coefficient on log of GDP is 
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negative and the estimated coefficient on log of GDP squared is positive. Tambudzai (2007) 
investigates the military burden determinants in 12 Southern African countries during 
1997-2004. His cross-sectional and panel results both confirm the importance of GDP per 
capita in the determination of the level of military burden in South Africa.  
 
In the studies of single country’s demand for military expenditures, income variables tend 
to have significant and positive effects on military expenditure. For example, Batchelor, et 
al. (2002) provides an investigation of the demand for military spending in South Africa 
for the period 1963-97. Their empirical results give the evidence to support the important 
role of income in determining military burden. Sun and Yu (1999) also find that China’s 
military expenditure is positively related to its GNP. In the empirical study of Taiwan’s 
military spending, Yu (2002) shows the significant and positive impact of Taiwan’s GNP 
on its military expenditure during the period 1966-1992.  
 
Central government expenditure provides the size of state budget for determination of 
military spending. Dommen and Maizels (1988) use the ratio of central government 
expenditure to GDP as one factor of internal economic linkages. For 72 LDCs, 1978-1980, 
their cross-sectional analysis shows that the estimated coefficient of the ratio of central 
government expenditure to GDP is significant and positive. Furthermore, they also 
estimate the effect of non-defence government expenditure on the military burden. 
However, the estimated coefficient is insignificant. Hewitt (1996)’s finding for 
determinants of military burden in developing countries provides similar results for the 
positive effect of the ratio of central government expenditure to GDP on the level of 
military burden. Yildirim and Sezgin (2005) estimate the effect of the government 
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consumption on military burden by using panel data techniques for 92 countries during 
1987-1997. Their empirical results also reveal that central government expenditure has a 
significant and positive impact on military burden. Those empirical results show that 
defence spending or military burden is generally positively related with central government 
expenditure.  
 
Deger and Sen (1990) investigate the military expenditure process of India during 1960-85. 
Because India has possible the largest arms industry among LDCs, the arms production 
variable is included in the demand function of military expenditure. However, their 
empirical results show that the estimated coefficient of arms production is insignificant.  
 
At the global level, Maizels and Nissanke (1986) consider the growth of foreign exchange, 
the influence of foreign capital and major aid donors to be important determinants of 
military spending. Dommen and Maizels (1988) find the growth of foreign exchange 
(positively) and the foreign investor concentrations (negatively) are very significant for the 
Asian region. In addition, foreign arms production is a positive determinant of military 
expenditure and superpowers influence non-arms producing countries in terms of their 
purchases. Arms suppliers can influence governments to purchase military weapons well in 
excess of need. 
 
Rosh (1988) hypothesize that countries that are highly integrated in the global economy 
would find it easier to access finance for arms purchases, leading to a higher military 
expenditure. His empirical results prove the hypothesis that trade has a significant and 
positive effect on military burden for developing countries. Dunne and Perlo Freeman 
94 
 
(2003b) and Dunne, Perlo Freeman and Smith (2008) use a total trade variable, imports 
plus exports, to capture this effect. They also find a significant and positive trade effect on 
military burden in developing countries during 1981-97. However, Dunne and Mohammed 
(1995) show that the trade effect on military burden in Sub-Saharan Africa for 1967-85 is 
statistically insignificant.  
 
3.3.3 Political Factors 
Some studies find that political factors such as regime type (democracy, dictatorship, 
military rule, etc) and political changes should be incorporated into the demand function of 
military spending in developing countries. It is widely found that democratic countries 
spend less on the military than non-democracies. Autocratic states are more likely to rely, 
at least partly, on the military to retain their grip on power, along with a culture and 
ideology of militarism to justify their rule.  
 
Dommen and Maizels (1988) examine determinants of military burden in 72 LDCs during 
1978-80. They find that of the 72 sample countries, nearly two-thirds have military 
governments which included two-fifths officially use violence against the public frequently. 
The empirical results of their cross sectional estimations provide the evidence for the role 
of military government in determining the level of military spending. Hewitt (1996) also 
shows the significant and positive effect of military governments on military burden in 
developing countries during 1972-90.  
 
On the other hand, democratic countries are generally governed by the rule of law where 
the allocation decisions of military spending are debated openly by elected representatives 
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and more constrained by competing demand of alternative priorities. Thus, the coefficient 
of democracy variable is expected to have a negative sign in demand functions of military 
expenditure. Dunne and Perlo Freeman (2003a, 2003b and 2007) examine the demand for 
military spending in developing countries for the period 1981-97 by using different 
econometric methodologies. The democracy data from the POLITY98 database are used to 
reflect the degree of democracy in a country. Their empirical results show that the 
democracy variable has a significant and negative effect on military burden in developing 
countries.  
 
Political changes and political shocks influence the level of military expenditures in some 
countries. For example, Sun and Yu (1999) illustrate the effect of the political change in 
China where the Chinese leadership’s top priority changed from war preparing to 
economic development after 1979. The empirical analysis shows that the change has a 
negative impact on the level of Chinese military expenditure during the period 1965-93. In 
the study of military spending demand in South Africa during 1963-97, Batchelor, et al. 
(2002) use a political dummy to reflect the regime change from 1994 to 1997 when the 
new South African government stated the commitment to development and prioritized 
social spending. The time-series results indicate that the political dummy is negatively 
related with the level of military spending in South Africa. Yu (2002) provides an 
interesting analysis of Taiwan’s military expenditure. The volatility in US-China conflict 
relationship and major political shocks during 1966-92 are incorporated into the demand 
function of Taiwan’s military expenditure. The empirical finding shows that both the 
volatility and political shocks influence the level of military expenditure in Taiwan.  
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3.3.4 Other Considerations 
Population can be included into the demand function to capture possible size effects. It 
may be seen as giving some intrinsic security, reducing the need for military expenditure, 
or may reduce costs by allowing reliance on a large army rather than hi-technology 
equipments. On the other hand, ‘public good’ theory would suggest that a large population 
makes military expenditure more effective, as it benefits a large number of people as a 
‘pure public good’ (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003a). 
 
Hewitt (1996) estimates the population effect on military burden in the demand function 
for developing countries and the estimated coefficient on population is found to be 
significant and positive. He provides the possible explanations for the positive effect: a 
larger population can enable a country to have a large army and thus enhance a country’s 
military potential. Unlike the study of Hewitt (1996), Dunne and Perlo Freeman (2003a, 
2003b) and Dunne, Perlo Freeman and Smith (2008) all find that population has a negative 
and significant impact on military burden. They suggest that large population can be 
considered to provide autonomous security in itself. For small countries, they cannot rely 
on a large army and thus have to spend more on high technology armaments. Another 
possible explanation is that larger populations need greater extra civilian consumption 
demand than security need.  
 
Some studies add military participation ratio variable into the demand function which is 
expected to be positively related with external threats. Weede (1986) shows that South 
Korea has very high military participation ratio which is more than four times as high as 
Brazilian one and reflects the seriousness of external threats during the 1970s. Looney 
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(1989) examines the effect of military participation ratio-armed forces per 1000 population 
on Third world military expenditures during 1970-82 and the effect is found to be 
significant and positive. Dunne and Mohammed (1995) use the proportion of armed forces 
in the population to estimate the effect of military participation ratio on military burden in 
13 Sub-Saharan African countries for 1967-85 and confirm the positive impact from the 
effect of military participation ratio to military burden. Similarly, Yildirim and Sezgin 
(2005) provide an empirical analysis based on the data for 92 countries during 1987-97 and 
their panel estimating results suggest that higher ratio of armed forces per 1000 population 
is associated with higher levels of military expenditure.  
 
Last year’s military spending or military burden is one of the best pointers of current 
military spending. To capture the concept of inertia, many econometric studies have 
included a lagged military expenditure variable among the explanatory variables. Dunne 
and Mohammed (1995) find that among the determinants of military burden in Sub-
Saharan African countries during 1967-85, the dominant effect is the lagged dependent 
variable-military burden which reflects the inertia or hangover in military expenditure. Sun 
and Yu (1999) also show the highly significant and positive effect of the lagged Chinese 
military expenditure in determining China’s military expenditure for 1965-93. Batchelor, et 
al. (2002)’s study of the demand for military spending in South Africa illustrate the similar 
inertia in South African military spending for the period 1963-97. 
 
In some cross-sectional and panel studies, regional factor is included for Middle East 
countries to allow for the ‘bad neighbourhood’ or ‘contagion’ effect. For example, 
Dommen and Maizels (1988) and Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003a) estimate the regional 
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factor of Middle East by adding Middle East dummy to the determinants of military 
spending in developing countries. Both studies reveal highly significant estimated 
coefficients on the Middle East dummies which reflect a strong ‘contagion’ effect for all 
countries in this region with various conflicts. 
 
Insofar, empirical literature of the demand for military expenditure in developing countries 
has been reviewed and different determinants factors are described in Table 3.1. Figure 3.1 
provides a summary of main determinants and their expected sign in demand functions of 
military spending.  
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Table 3.1 Determinants of Military Expenditure in Developing Countries 
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Figure 3.1 the Summary of Determinants of Military Expenditure in Developing Countries 
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External war and Civil war (+) 
Enemy or Potential enemy (+) 
Security Web (+/-) 
Great power enemy (+) 
 
Military 
Considerations 
GDP or GNP (+) 
Per Capita Income (+) 
Central Government Expenditure or its Ratio (+) 
Non-Defence government Expenditure (-) 
Foreign Exchanges or Investment (+) 
Trade (+/-) 
 
Economic 
Factors 
Fa 
Military Government (+) 
Democracy (-) 
Political change or Dummy (+/-) 
Political   
Factors   
Other   
Considerations 
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Population (+/-) 
Military Participation Ratio (+) 
Lagged Military Spending (+) 
Regional factor (+) 
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3. 4 India’s Military Expenditure and Security Concerns  
3.4.1 India’s Military Expenditure and Its Trend 
India is one of the largest and most powerful countries, with over one billion people and 
has one of the largest militaries in the world. In 2008, the military expenditure of India 
reached US$24,716 (SIPRI 2009: in constant 2005 prices), ranking as 10th in the world. In 
term of PPP dollar, it has the fourth largest military expenditure and is only after USA, 
China and Russia (SIPRI 2009, p183). As one of the world’s emerging economic powers, 
India demonstrated a sustained increase in military expenditure and contributed to the 
growth in world military spending in the recent years.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 3.2, India’s real military expenditure (MEI) has been 
increasing for the period 1960-2007. It illustrates that India’s military expenditure is 
keeping increasing over years. The real MEI increased from US$1321.8 millions in 1960 
to US$ 19407.9 million in 2007 and the amount of military expenditure increased more 
than 13 times from 1960 to 2007. Furthermore, the speed of increase was not stable and 
there existed some periods with big increases in the level of real military expenditure.  
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Figure 3.2 India’s Military expenditure, MEI (Constant 2000 Millions US$), 1960-2007 
 
Data sources: SIPRI yearbooks 
 
As shown in Figure 3.2, the top three biggest jumps in military expenditures are as follows.  
1. The real MEI increased from US$1426.4 million in 1961 to US$1960.4 million in 
1962 where the rate of increase is 37.4 per cent.  
2. The real MEI increased from US$ 3076.9 million in 1970 to US$3668.7 million in 
1971 where the rate of increase is 19.2 per cent.  
3. Then the real MEI increased from US$11918.6 million in 1998 to US$13840.2 
million in 1999 where the rate of increase is 16.1 per cent. 
The three jumps in the level of military expenditures are corresponding to India’s s 
external wars with China in 1962 and with Pakistan in 1971 and 1999. 
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Figure 3.3 Defence Burdens of India (DBI), 1960-2007 
 
Data sources: SIPRI Yearbooks 
 
The trend of India’s defence burden (DBI: military expenditure as a proportion of GDP) is 
shown in Figure 3.3. The range of DBI is from 1.9 per cent to 3.9 per cent. The lowest 
point was at the start of 1960s and before the Indo-China war in 1962. The highest point 
was in 1963 which was just after the Indo-China war. Thus, in the wake of the war with 
China in 1962, the defence burden of India rose from 1.9 percent of the gross domestic 
product in 1961 to 2.6 per cent in 1962 and then to 3.8 in 1963. In the period 1963-1971, 
there was a decline in the burden; but the decline ended in 1971 due to the war with 
Pakistan in the year. The defence burden rebounded from 3 per cent in 1970 to 3.4 percent 
in 1971. Except slightly declining after the war, defence burden kept growing steadily to 
the start of 1990s. During the period 1991-97, the level of defence burden in India was 
under 3 per cent. Then the burden rose again in 1998 with the nuclear test and went back to 
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above 3 per cent in 1999 due to the Kargil conflict. In the 21st century, Indian military 
expenditure has generally fluctuated around 2.8 percent of GDP.  
 
The share of military expenditure to the total central government expenditure (CGE) is also 
an important indicator to understand the pattern of India’s military spending. Figure 3.4 
and Table 3.2 give time-series data for India’s central government expenditure shares by 
function which include the expenditure on defence, economic affairs, health, education and 
housing and community amenities (HCA). For India, the biggest share of CGE went to 
defence sector. During the period 1970-2005, the defence share was almost always over 30 
per cent of CGE. The average share of 1971-75 was even as high as 41.08 per cent. In 
1990s, the defence share slightly declined but since 2000, it has increased again.  
Figure 3.4 India’s Central Government Expenditure Share by Function, 1970-2005 
 
Data sources: United Nations Statistics Division 
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Table 3.2 India’s Central Government Expenditure Share by Function, 1970-2005 
               ( Five-year Average % of total CGE) 
Year Defence 
Economic  
Education Health 
Housing and  
affairs community amenities 
1971-1975 41.08 12.22 10.05 5.76 1.63 
1976-1980 35.76 14.31 12.10 6.79 1.84 
1981-1985 33.72 14.90 14.14 7.39 2.10 
1986-1990 37.26 13.46 14.06 6.63 2.08 
1991-1995 32.16 14.98 15.29 6.48 2.33 
1996-2000 30.11 17.32 16.39 6.41 1.85 
2001-2005 33.90 9.45 16.72 6.14 1.91 
Data sources: United Nations Statistics Division 
 
Comparing with the big defence share in CGE and its increasing trend in recent years, 
other forms of central government expenditure showed different status. Education share 
increased from about 10 per cent in the 1970s to over 16 per cent in recent years. However, 
health and housing and community amenities shares remained at a low level and even 
declined recently. The share of economic affairs had an increasing trend till 2000 and after 
that, it also declined.  Thus, the large defence share in CGE indicates the priority of India’s 
government. Although India focuses on social-economic developments, it remains 
committed to peace and security which are seen to be fundamental for continued economic 
development and prosperity of Indian people. The high growth of GDP in India might 
boost the speed of increases in military expenditure, but limited expenditure on economic 
affairs, education, health and other related social and economic activities might be 
detrimental to economic growth. 
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Figure 3.5 the Map of India’s Security Threats, 2009 
 
Source: India Security Threat Environment 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/threat/, Accessed 08/2009 
Note: internal security threats mainly exist in the red coloured areas and external security 
threats mainly exist in the yellow coloured areas. 
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3.4.2 India’s Security Concerns  
Even though India keeps the developing country status and is one of the poorest countries 
in the world based on GDP per capita PPP, it still devotes a substantial portion of its 
resources for defence. India’s strategic location and its violent history of external and 
internal conflicts have a crucial impact on its believing that an assured level of regional 
stability is necessary for socio-economic development. Hence, security concerns of India 
which could be divided into external and internal security problems are crucial determining 
factors of its military expenditures. Figure 3.5 presents the map of security threats faced by 
India in 2009. 
 
3.4.2.1 Internal Security Threats 
Internally, India faces violent secessionist movements and communal rioting problems 
which have become perennial since independence. The existence of fissures and divisions 
in caste, ethnicity, culture, language, religion and economic disparity are challenges for 
India’s internal security and influence its pattern of military expenditure. In general, the 
internal security threats mainly exist in the red coloured areas shown in Figure 3.5 and can 
be grouped as follows.  
 
• The North-East 
There are seven states in the North-East of India including Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland. They are linked to the rest of India 
only by a narrow strip of land known as the Siliguri Corridor and many of those states are 
notably ethnically and linguistically different from the rest of the country.  Since 
independence, complex patterns of violence existed and continued in the region. Many 
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different insurgent groups operate in different states and for different objectives. Some call 
for secession from the India Union, some others seek separate states and others demand 
greater autonomy within the existing state.  
 
For example, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)8 seeks to establish a sovereign 
state of Assam and the Bodo Security Force 9  aims to create an autonomous region 
Bodoland. Those insurgencies have taken a heavy toll in Assam and caused the installation 
of a "Unified Command" counter insurgency system which combines civilian, military and 
paramilitary forces in the state.  Other main insurgent groups in the region include two 
factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)10 in Nagaland, 
 
Meitei extremists11  in Manipur, the all Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and the National 
Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)12 in Tripura, Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF)13 
                                                           
8 The United Liberation Front of Assam was formed in April 1979 to establish a sovereign state of Assam 
through an armed struggle. In recent times the organization has lost out its middle rung leaders after most of 
them surrendered to the Indian forces. 
 
9 The National Democratic Front of Bodoland was formed in 1989 as the Bodo Security Force, aims to set up 
an autonomous region Bodoland. 
 
10  The National Socialist Council of Nagaland was formed in 1980 to establish a Greater Nagaland, 
encompassing parts of Manipur, Nagaland, the north Cachar hills (Assam). The NSCN split in 1988 to form 
two groups namely NSCN (IM) & NSCN (K). As of now, both the groups are in ceasefire with the Indian 
government. However, they continue to be actively involved in illegal activities including extortion, 
kidnapping, inter-factional clashes, bootlegging and recruitment. 
 
11 Meitei extremists in Manipur, similarly, are organised in over half a dozen groups, the prominent ones 
being United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and People’s 
Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), each with their own patrons demanding a separate and 
independent homeland.  
 
12 The insurgent groups in Tripura were emerged in the end of the 1970s, as ethnic tensions between the 
Bengali immigrants and the tribal native population. The All Tripura Tiger Force was formed in 1990 with 
the sole aim of the expulsion of all Bengali speaking immigrants and the National Liberation Front of Tripura 
was formed in March 1989.  
 
13 The Bru National Liberation Front was formed in 1997 to protect the rights and dignity of the Reangs. The 
BNLF have surrendered with 757 of their comrades to the Mizoram Government on October 21, 2006. 
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in Mizoram and Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC), and Hynniewtrep National 
Liberation Council (HNLC)14 in Meghalaya.  Furthermore, there also exist conflicts among 
different states and among different tribal or non-tribal people within a state in the region. 
For instance, there are existing territorial disputes between Manipur and Nagaland. 
 
The India’s North-East has witnessed sustained separatist insurgencies, mass agitations and 
ethnic riots. Regional development has been limited and the economic disparity has 
worsened. On the one hand, economic disparity and endemic poverty are among the most 
important factors that cause violence in those states. On the other hand, the violent political 
environments hamper economic development. The existence of that vicious circle might 
make regional security and development more complicated and difficult which influence 
the pattern of government’s military expenditure. 
 
• Naxalite Insurgencies  
There are many Maoist groups in India, especially in the region of West Bengal and 
Andhra Pradesh. Since the end of 1960s, Maoist groups have already advocated poor 
peasantry revolt against the caste system and oppression by the landlord class. In the late of 
2004, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) becomes the largest Maoist rebel group in 
India by merging the Peoples' War Group (PWG) and the Maoists Communist Centre 
(MCC). Their fighting has spread to most of rural India across ten states and are especially 
concentrated in the areas of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, 
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Members of the Communist Party of India and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
14 The Achik National Volunteer Council was formed in 1995 with the intentions of forming an Achik Land 
in the Garo Hills and The Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council aims to free the state from Garo 
domination and was formed in 1992. 
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other smaller Maoist groups are called informally "Naxalites" after the Indian town of 
Naxalbari and insurgencies conducted by them are called the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency.  
 
The violence and insurgencies of Naxalites pose a major challenge to India’s internal 
security.  In 1980, the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency began guerrilla-style attacks on police 
and the police responded with executions of suspected Naxalites in “encounter” killings. 
The clashes between Naxalite-Maoist and police led to hundred of killings and serious 
human rights abuses by both sides. According to Armed Conflict Report 2009 by 
Ploughshares15, more than 6,000 people have been killed directly by the conflicts in the last 
twenty years. The number of deaths for the period 1996-2007 are presented in Table 3.3.  
 
The roots of those conflicts are primarily economic such as wealth inequality and limited 
development. Furthermore, due to the areas which are most affected by the Naxalite 
violence having 85% of India’s coal reserves, conflicts over resources are growing and 
almost half of India’s total energy supply is under serious political risks. Those insecurity 
statuses might cause changes in India’s military expenditures. The growing influence of 
Naxalism insurgencies on India’s politics, security and economy promotes the government 
of India to treat them as the most serious threat to India's national security. In February 
2009, India central government announced a long-haul strategy that would involve 
simultaneous, co-ordinated counter-operations in all Left-wing extremism-hit states to plug 
all possible escape routes of Naxalites. 
 
                                                           
15 "Armed Conflicts Report - India-Andhra Pradesh". Ploughshares 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-IndiaAP.html. Accessed in 08/2009. 
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Table 3.3 Deaths related to Naxalite-Maoist Insurgency, 1997-2007 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Deaths 350+ 300+ 350+ 50+ 100 140 500 500+ 892 749 650 
Data sources: Armed Conflict Report 2009 
 
• Trans-Border Security Threats: Jammu and Kashmir 
The last group of internal security threats is the insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), 
the north-westernmost region of India where India shares the border with Pakistan and 
China. The J&K problem has been with India since independence in 1947. According to 
the Independence Act, states in this region could choose to join India or Pakistan by 
holding a plebiscite. However, the plebiscite was never held and India would like to regard 
Kashmir as an integral part of India. While Pakistan insists that Kashmir is a disputed 
territory and the final status should be settled by the willingness of Kashmiri. Both 
countries reject Kashmir’s independence but some groups in the region seek total 
independence from both India and Pakistan. 
 
The rival territorial disputes led to three wars between India and Pakistan but the problems 
are unresolved. Pakistan started a proxy war in 1989 when it thought that wars with India 
were not able to achieve its object in Kashmir. Since 1989, the conflict in J&K has been 
one of the most important issues of India's internal security environments. There are many 
insurgent and terror groups in J&K that seek either independence or Joining Pakistan (pro-
Pakistan). Among those groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba16 (LeT - Army of the Pure), Hezb-ul-
                                                           
16 LeT is one of the largest and most active militant organizations in South Asia with Headquartered near 
Lahore, Pakistan. Its members have carried out major attacks against India and its objective is to set up an 
Islamic state in South Asia and to "liberate" Muslims residing in Indian-administered Kashmir. LeT has 
established training camps across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. While it operates mainly in 
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Mujahedeen 17 , the All Parties Hurriyat Conference 18  (APHC) and Jaish-e-Mohammed 
(JeM)19 are more prominent. Furthermore, those groups have al-Qaeda connections. For 
instance, the LeT is claimed to have operated a military camp in post-Sept 11 Afghanistan. 
 
The relationship between these groups and the Taliban-al Qaeda would threaten the 
stability of not only this region but also the sub-continent of India and Pakistan, even the 
whole world through fuelling the export of terrorism. According to the Armed Conflict 
Report 2009, J&K insurgencies have caused estimated deaths up to 77,000 since 1989. The 
casualties and broad influences of J&K insurgencies pose one of the most serious threats to 
India’s security. 
 
In 2004, India and Pakistan launched a peace process and their relationship has been 
improved. Both countries agreed upon reducing the number of troops present in this region. 
The number of insurgency-related deaths in J&K has declined sharply in that year.  The 
Pakistani government started to take actions against the militants' training camps in 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir area. In 2008, Pakistan President Zardari declared that 
Kashmir’s “freedom fighters” were terrorists. However, there are still many active 
insurgent and terror groups in J&K and the 2008 Mumbai Attacks caused at least 173 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Kashmir where one estimate places its numbers at over 750, it has also carried out attacks in other parts of 
India. 
 
17 One of the largest militant groups at around 1500 members and is based in Pakistan- occupied Kashmir, 
Hezb-ul-Mujahedeen has conducted regular attacks across Kashmir. 
 
18 APHC is a political front formed as an alliance of 26 political, social and religious organizations in 
Kashmir. It was formed achieving the right of self-determination according to the UN resolution. In 2003, it 
split into pro-Pakistan and pro-independence factions. 
 
19  JeM was formed in 2000 and is based in Pakistan. It aims to separate Kashmir from India and has carried 
out a series of attacks primarily in Indian-administered Kashmir.  
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deaths and 308 wounded. The Jammu and Kashmir disputes will still exist, at least in the 
near future and the road to peace will still be torturous and uncertain.  
 
The internal security problems of India still lead to some challenges to its national security 
environment and are still an area of core concern. The development of asymmetric warfare 
capabilities by various insurgent and terror groups has an impact on the need of India’s 
army to dealing with those asymmetric threats, as well as the pattern and priority of India’s 
defence spending.  
 
3.4.2.2 External Security Threats 
Externally, India faces major security challenges from its two main neighbours: the 
unstable Islamic state of Pakistan and a resurgent China which are shown by yellow colour 
in Figure 3.5. Firstly, the conflict history of India and Pakistan since partition in 1947 was 
outlined in Chapter 2 and it showed that there is a long-run relationship between India and 
Pakistan’s real military expenditure which provides evidence to support the existence of 
confrontation and the India-Pakistan arms race. Thus, Pakistan poses a serious threat to 
Indian external security.  
 
Secondly, it is the turn to look at the relationship between India and China. After India’s 
independence in 1947 and the setup of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, an eight-
year agreement on Tibet in the form of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence20 in 
                                                           
20
 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are a series of agreements between the People's Republic of 
China and India. In 1954, the two nations drew up the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: 
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.  
2. Mutual non-aggression.  
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.  
4. Equality and mutual benefit.  
5. Peaceful co-existence. 
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1954 and the relationship between India and China was described as “brothers” until 1959.  
In 1959, the government of China claimed that the Aksai Chin regions over which India’s 
maps showed sovereignty and asked for “rectification” of the entire border but the Indian 
government rejected the idea of settlement. In the same year, the religious leader of 
Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama  fled from Tibet to India after the Tibetan rebellion against 
Chinese rule failed and sought sanctuary in Himachal Pradesh. Thousands of refugees from 
Tibet moved into North-western India. The Chinese government accused India of the 
expansionists operating in Tibet. Hence, the Sino-Indian relationship suffered a serious 
setback. In October1962, a border war took place between India and China in the disputed 
areas of both eastern and western sectors as shown in Figure 3.6. On 20th November, 
Chinese troops secured the disputed area and unilaterally declared a ceasefire. The short 
border war thus ended. Since then, the conflict of interest in Tibet and the border disputes 
have been the core concern of those two neighbour countries. After the defeat in the Sino-
Indian war of 1962, India revamped its entire military system and set up the Department of 
Defence. India realized the need to strengthen its defence power and to create its own 
defence industrial base via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency.  
 
Even though the border disputes between India and China continued, India’s relations with 
China have experienced a slow but steady improvement since the 1980s. Nowadays, after 
more than 45 years of the Sino-Indian war, the mutual economic engagements and 
continued efforts to resolve the border disputes have ensured peace along the India-China 
border. However, India still concerns about the implication of China’s military 
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modernization and the improvement of infrastructure in the Tibet and still treats China as 
its main external threat in the long term. 
 
Based on national security concerns and international political considerations, the primary 
goal of Indian defence policy is to acquire self-reliance to sustain its position as an 
important political actor in Asia. Combined with the urgency to military modernization, 
India needs to acquire smart weapons and modern defence systems from external sources 
by military imports. Furthermore, India security concerns also include the proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), energy security and the security of India Ocean 
region which all have important effects on India’s national security and its economy. These 
factors are all likely to drive up India’s military expenditure and influence the security 
environment not only in India but also in the entire Asia and the whole world.  
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Figure 3.6 the Sino-Indian Border War 
 
Source: The University of Texas at Austin, PCL Map Collection. Accessed at 08/2009, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_india_border_88.jpg.  
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3.5 Model Specification and Data 
3.5.1 Model Specification for the Determinants of India’s Military Expenditure 
Over the years, the study of the demand for military expenditure in LDCs has been carried 
out using a variety of different approaches as reviewed in sections 3.2 and 3.3. It has 
attempted to identify the military, economic and other factors that influence the evolution 
of military expenditure. Many studies have focused upon the military, economic and 
political determinants of military expenditure. The formal models have developed from the 
neoclassical approach by Smith (1980 and1989). In a general functional form, the demand 
for a country’s military expenditure can be modelled in a single regression equation, as 
shown in the Equation (3.5), µ  &° &¯⁄ , ", J,, … ,ª, E#, E$.                                                                           
 
Due to the lack of data, price deflators are usually dropped. Hence, the demand function is 
specified to describe India’s characteristics, to indicate the country’s security concerns and 
to suit the data availability. This leads to the demand equation as follows: 
 MEI  M ¸US®, ScS, ®¸µ, Va, Sc, VbGµgV,#gG (3.15) 
 
Where MEI denotes India’s real military expenditure, GDPC indicates GDP per capita of  
India, POP is total Indian population, CGE represents the share of central government 
expenditure in GDP, TS denotes the share of trade balance in GDP, POL indicates political 
variables, THREAT could be represented by the defence burden of Pakistan as a rival of 
India , security web of India and a internal threat variable, and  WAR indicates war dummy 
variables for the India’s external wars with Pakistan and China. 
 
In the literature reviewed above, GDP per capita plays an important role in determining of 
the level of military burden in many developing countries (Tambudzai 2007). In the case of 
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India, when GDP per capita rises, India has more resources available for defence and a 
greater need for protection. This should be captured by the positive coefficient of GDP per 
capita variable. The population variable is introduced to capture any possible size effect of 
military spending and possible public good effect. The sign of the population variable is 
ambiguous. CGE is expected to enter the equation with a positive sign which could provide 
more resources available for defence. The share of the trade balance in GDP reflects the 
openness of the economy and its sign is ambiguous. The political variable represents the 
relationship between political status and military expenditure in India and the expected 
sign is negative. 
 
The defence burden of Pakistan is included in the demand equation to reflect the 
confrontation and arms race between India and Pakistan. The average defence burden of 
countries inside India’s security web is also added into the demand equation. Due to the 
lack of data on military burden of Bhutan and Burma, the security web of India in this 
study includes Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. These defence burden variables capture 
the external threats faced by India and should have a positive effect on India’s military 
expenditure. The war dummy for India’s external wars with Pakistan in 1965, 1971 and 
1999 and with China in 1962 is included to capture the threats as well. The expected sign 
of the war dummy variable is also positive.  
 
The last consideration is the internal security threats facing by India. As discussed in 
earlier section, activities of different insurgent and terror groups would have an important 
influence on the pattern of India’s military expenditure. For example, after the Mumbai 
Attack in 2008, India increased its defence budget by 25 percent in 2009-10 (to $29.39 
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billion) in July 2009 and $562 million will be spent exclusively for boosting border 
security and modernising its police force. Uday Bhaskar, the director of National Maritime 
Foundation said that “this specific allocation for border management and modernising the 
police force appears to be a direct fallout of the Mumbai attacks”. Hence, the internal and 
cross-border security problems also influence the amount and the pattern of India’s 
military expenditure. The signs of these effects are expected to be positive. However, it is 
very hard to get an appropriate proxy for those internal security problems and the reliable 
data are hard to access. In this study, the data on the number of riots in the whole India is 
used to capture the effect of internal security threats on India’s military expenditure.  
 
Given the above discussion, the demand for India’s military expenditure is determined by 
economic, political and security related factors and can be modelled in the logarithmic 
form (denoted by ln) as follows: 
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 P  	/ 
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Model 3:  P  	/ 
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Where Model 1 is the basic framework which includes income, population, trade balance, 
democracy, defence burden of Pakistan, and war dummy variables. Then the model is 
extended by adding the share of central government expenditure in GDP and security web 
variables in Model 2. In Model 3, the riots variable is included to capture the effect of 
internal threats on India’s military spending.   
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3.5.2 Data Sources and Descriptions 
In this study, the demand for India’s military expenditure is estimated for the period 1960-
2006. The data on India’s military expenditure and the data on defence burden of Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka are obtained from various issues of SIPRI yearbooks and 
SIPRI online database which were accessed in August, 2009. Data on GDP per capita, 
population, central government expenditure and trade balance are taken from World 
Development Indicators online database and were also accessed in August, 2009. 
Democracy index data are obtained from Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and 
Transitions Datasets. War dummy variable takes value of one for 1965, 1971, and 1999 
when India had wars with Pakistan and for 1962 when the Sino-India war took place; and 
equals zero elsewhere. Data on the number of riots in India are taken from Conflict in India 
Datasets - Crime in India: Riots, Murders, and Dacoity 1954-2006.  
 
The variables used in our estimation are as follows: 
mei – India’s real military expenditure in constant 2000 million US$; 
gdpc – India’s GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$; 
pop –  Total population of India in millions; 
cge –  the % share of central government expenditure of India in its GDP; 
tb – India’s % share of trade balance in GDP; 
democ –  democracy index, which ranges from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy); 
dbp –  the defence burden (the share of defence spending in GDP) of Pakistan as a rival of 
India; 
sw –  the security web of India (i.e. the average defence burden of Bangladesh, Nepal and 
Sri Lanka);  
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riots – the number of riots in India in one year as a internal threat proxy; 
war –  War dummy for the India’s external wars with Pakistan and China, which equals 1 
for years 1962, 1965, 1971 and 1999 and equals 0 for other years during the 
period 1960-2006. 
 
3.6. Estimation Methods  
A number of alternative methods have been applied to estimate the demand for military 
expenditure. For example, some studies have used simultaneous-equation approaches to 
estimate the demand for military expenditure systematically. These system estimations 
could be used for the allies’ military spending where the military spending of allied 
countries are jointly determined. Some studies have applied a single-equation approach to 
estimate the demand for military spending in a country and have employed different 
cointegration techniques. However, these approaches have shortcomings and are not 
suitable for this study. It has been widely criticized that simultaneous-equation approaches 
have to divide the endogenous and exogenous variables which are generally not clear in 
many empirical models. In the demand models for India’s military expenditure, there are at 
least seven variables. Cointegration estimation based on VAR framework would be 
problematic due to the degree of freedom considerations.  
 
Pesaran and Shin (1999) develop the autoregressive distributed lag approach (ARDL) to 
cointegration which is more suitable for this study than the above alternative approaches. 
The main reasons for using the ARDL to cointegration procedure are as follows. Firstly, 
many time-series variables in this study are non-stationary and contain unit root. 
Traditional OLS regressions would become spurious while the ARDL to cointegration 
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procedure can be applied regardless of the stationary properties of the variables in the 
model. Secondly, contrary to the VAR frameworks, the number of variables in the 
regression model can be large. Thirdly, this procedure allows for inferences on long-run 
estimates and also presents short-run dynamics.  
 
For simplicity, consider the following ARDL (p, q) model (unrestricted ECM model) 
which only includes one independent variable: 
 
∆{P  	/ 
 {Ph 
 }Ph 
v
Lh
v
∆{Phv 
9v
¼h
v/
Δ}Phv 
 P (3.19) 
According to Pesaran and Shin (1999), the ARDL procedure requires the following three 
steps and the procedure and steps could be applied to multivariate models as well. 
1. Chose the lag order (p and q) of the ARDL model by using model selection criteria 
such as the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria. 
2. Run a regression of Equation (3.19) and test the existence of any long-run relationship 
between the variables by using an F-test (i.e. the coefficients of {Phand }Ph do not 
equal zero jointly). 
3. Then, the long-run relationship and the short-run dynamics of the variables could be 
estimated with the ECM representation of the ARDL model. 
 
3.7 Empirical Analysis 
3.7.1 The Estimation Equation  
Based on the discussion in above sections, the ECM representation of the ARDL models 
for the demand models are given by: 
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Model 1: ∆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After adding central government expenditure and the security web variable, the demand 
model is: 
Model 2: ∆P  C/ 
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Then the variable of the number of riots is added into the demand model for: 
Model 3:  ∆P  C/ 
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The parameters bi where i =1, 2…, n are the corresponding long-run multipliers, while the 
cij where i =1, 2…, n are the short-run dynamic coefficients of the ARDL models. The 
number of n equals 7, 8 and 8 in Model 1, 2 and 3, respectively. In the ARDL models 
outlined, the first step is to choose the lag length for the variables based on information 
criteria - the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC). Then the second step is to estimate 
Equations (3.20 - 3.22) by ordinary least squares (OLS) in order to test for the existence of 
a long-run relationship among the variables. For example, in Model 2, the null hypothesis 
of no long-run relationship (no cointegration) as defined by H0: b1=b2=b3=b4=b5=b6=b7= b8 
124 
 
=0 is tested against the alternative by conducting the F-test. In the third step, if the 
existence of long-run relationship is proved, both the long-run relationship and the short-
run dynamics can be estimated. 
 
3.7.2 Empirical Results 
3.7.2.1 The Order of ARDL Model and the F-tests for Cointegration 
The empirical estimations are carried out by using Microfit 4.0 developed by M.H. Pesaran 
and B. Pesaran. Firstly, the lag lengths of the variables in our three models are selected by 
SBC. Because all series in the sample are annual and the sample size is small for the period 
1960-2006, the maximum order of lag in the ARDL models is chosen to be 2. The results 
show that our regression Model 1, 2 and 3 would be in form of  ARDL(2,0,0,0,0,2,1), 
ARDL(1,1,1,1,0,2,0,2,2) and ARDL(2,0,0,2,0,0,0,0,0). Based on these selected ARDL 
models, the F-tests for cointegration are operated. The calculated F-statistics are then 
compared with the critical values. Given the small sample size, the critical values are 
extracted from Narayan (2005).  
 
According to Bahmani-Oskooee and Nasir (2004), these critical values include an upper 
and a lower band covering all possible classifications of the variable into I(1), I(0) or even 
fractionally integrated. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the calculated 
F-statistic is bigger than the upper bound. If the calculated F-statistic is smaller than the 
lower bound, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Finally, if it falls in between the 
lower and the upper bound, then the result is inconclusive. The results of F-tests for the 
three ARDL models are presented in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 the F-test for Cointegration 
  5% Critical Value Bounds 10% Critical Value Bounds 
 F-statistics I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Model 1 5.874 2.643 4.004 2.238 3.461 
Model 2 5.427 2.875 4.445 2.384 3.728 
Model 3 3.527 2.643 4.004 2.238 3.461 
Notes: Critical values are obtained from Narayan (2005) 
 
The F-statistics are above the upper bound at the 5% level of significance for Models 1 and 
2 and at the 10% level of significance for Model 3. This implies that the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration in Equations (3.20-3.22) cannot be accepted. Hence, the results of F-tests 
indicate that there is a long-run relationship amongst the variables in all three models. 
 
3.7.2.2 Long-Run Estimating Results 
Having found a long-run relationship amongst the variables, the long run elasticities can be 
estimated. The long-run coefficients of the variables for Models 1and 2 are estimated and 
the results are provided in Table 3.5, Part 1 and the results for Model 3 are shown in Table 
3.5, Part 2. In the long-run estimation, the dependent variable is lnmei. As presented in the 
results of Model 1, all long run coefficients have the expected sign; expect the one for the 
trade balance. As a proxy of openness, the trade balance variable would lead to a higher 
military expenditure because an open country would be easier to access finance for arms 
purchases. However, the status is different in India where the estimated coefficient of trade 
balance has a negative sign. The possible reason for the negative trade effect on military 
expenditure in India is that India is a net arms importer.  
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Table 3.5 the Long-Run Coefficients Estimating Results, Part 1 
Model 1 Model 2 
45 observations used for estimation from 
1962 to 2006 
30 observations used for estimation from 1977 
to 2006 
Regressor   Coefficient T-Ratio[Prob] Regressor   Coefficient T-Ratio[Prob] 
lngdpc 1.230  4.292 [.000]*** lngdpc 1.754 11.365 [.000]*** 
lnpop 0.968  2.942 [.006]*** lnpop 0.460 1.046   [.318] 
tb -0.034  -1.799[.081]* lncge 0.792 7.572   [.000]*** 
lndemoc -0.812  -2.320[.027]** tb -0.037 -4.287 [.001]*** 
lndbp 0.452  2.934 [.006]*** lndemoc -1.416 -4.938 [.000]*** 
war 0.385  3.158 [.003]*** lndbp 0.386 4.261  [.001]*** 
c -3.742   -3.147[.003]*** lnsw 0.101 1.747   [.109] 
   war 0.091 1.403   [.188] 
   c -5.278 -2.334  [.040]** 
 
Part 2 
Model 3 
45 observations used for estimation from 1962 to 2006 
Regressor   Coefficient T-Ratio[Prob] 
lngdpc 0.862 3.754  [.001]*** 
lnpop 0.916 2.544  [.016]** 
lncge 1.314 7.579  [.000]*** 
tb -0.016 -2.005 [.054]* 
lndemoc -0.150 -1.038 [.307] 
lndbp 0.268  4.334  [.000]*** 
lnriots -0.178  -2.944 [.006]*** 
war -0.032  -1.094 [.282] 
c -5.088  -5.304 [.000]*** 
Note: Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% 
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The estimated coefficients of income coefficients are positive and significant and thus 
support the initial expectation. The estimated coefficients of population is positive which 
may show that large population enables India has a large army and the large army in turn 
need more expenditures. The estimated coefficient of the democracy index of India also 
has the expected negative sign and is significant. The democratic status in India constrains 
the level of its military expenditure. The defence burden of Pakistan has a positive and 
significant effect on India’s military expenditure which relects that there is a rivalry 
relationship or arms race between India and Pakistan in the long run. Thus, one of the 
important long-run determinants of India’s military expenditure has been the enduring 
arms race between India and Pakistan. Finally, the external wars with Pakistan (in 1971 
and 1999) and with China (in 1962) have a positive and significant effect on India’s 
military expenditure. 
 
After adding CGE and security web variables into the regression equation, we get similar 
results as shown in Table 3.5, Model 2. The sign and value of the estimated coefficients are 
similar to those of Model 1. The effect of the central government expenditure on defence 
spending is positive and significant in India which confirms the defence priority of India’s 
government. Looking at the security web variables, the average defence burden of the 
security web countries influences India’s military expenditure insignificantly. Due to the 
limited sample size (the data on security web is available from 1975) in Model 2, the 
results might be unreliable. Finally, we turn to investigate the effect of internal threats on 
India’s demand for military spending in Table 3.5, Model 3. But the results are not 
satisfying. The estimated coefficient of riots variable has a negative and significant sign 
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which is opposite to the initial expectation. Hence, using the number of riots as a proxy of 
internal security threats of India might be problematic.  
 
3.7.2.3 The Short-Run Error Correction Estimating Results 
The short run estimates in form of the error correction model (ECM) representation are 
given in Table 3.6. In Table 3.6, the dependent variable is dlnmei where d denotes the first 
difference of the variable.  
 
The results of Model 1 suggest that India’s military expenditure is positively influenced by 
the previous year’s spending. The change of GDP per capita has a positive and significant 
effect which indicates that increases in the income lead to increases in military expenditure 
in India. The effect of population growth on military expenditure growth is insignificant. 
The change of trade balance is negative and significant and the coefficient of democracy is 
also significant and negative. The change of Pakistan’s defence burden has a significant 
and positive effect on the change of India’s military expenditure. But the lag of change of 
Pakistan’s defence burden has a negative and significant effect on the change of India’s 
military expenditure. The war dummy has a significant and positive effect. The coefficient 
of error correction term (ECM) is equal to -0.586 which imply that the deviation from the 
long-term change rate in military expenditure in India is corrected by more than half within 
one year. This finding shows that the speed of adjustment is high, indicating that economy 
returns to its equilibrium level quickly, once shocked. 
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Table 3.6 the Short-Run Error Correction Elasticity Estimating Results 
 Part 1 
Model 1 Model 2 
45 observations used for estimation from 
1962 to 2006 
30 observations used for estimation from 1977 
to 2006 
Regressor   Coefficient T-Ratio[Prob] Regressor   Coefficient T-Ratio[Prob] 
dlnme(1) 0.472 4.306 [.000]*** dlngdpc(1) 0.936 2.499 [.023]** 
dlngdpc 0.721  3.886 [.000]*** dlnpop 67.255 2.253 [.038]** 
dlnpop 0.568 2.514 [.538] dlncge -0.077 -0.027[.788] 
dtb -0.020 -1.935[.038]** dtb -0.057 -4.761[.000]*** 
dlndemoc -0.476 -2.651 [.020]** dlndemoc -0.239 -0.749[.464] 
dlndbp 0.332  2.603 [.007]*** dlndemoc(1)   0.525 1.783 [.092]* 
dlndbp(1) -0.388 -3.402 [.002]***    
dwar 0.082 2.269 [.030]** dlndbp 0.606 4.046 [.001]*** 
dc -2.194 -2.453[.019]** dlnsw  -0.200 -2.732[.014]** 
ecm(1) -0.586 -6.518[.000]*** dlnsw(1) -0.032 -4.52  [.000]*** 
   dwar -0.056   -1.441[.168] 
   dwar(1) -0.112 -2.893[.010]** 
   dc -8.302   -1.784[.092]* 
   ecm(1) -1.573  -5.572[.000]*** 
 
Part 2 
Model 3 
45 observations used for estimation from 1962 to 2006 
Regressor   Coefficient T-Ratio[Prob] 
dlnme(1) 0.611 5.389 [.000]*** 
dlngdpc 0.837 3.149 [.003]*** 
dlnpop 0.889 2.524 [.017]** 
dlncge 1.058 5.927 [.000]*** 
dlncge(1) -0.761 -2.835[.008]*** 
dtb -0.015 -1.909[.065]** 
dlndemoc -0.146 -1.050[.301] 
dlndbp 0.260 3.309 [.002]*** 
dlnriots -0.172 -2.921[.006]*** 
dwar -0.031 -1.072 [.292] 
dc -4.939 -4.349 [.000]*** 
ecm(1) -0.971 -6.912 [.000]*** 
Note: Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%  
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As discussed above, data for the security web are only available from 1975-2006 and the 
limited sample size might lead to unreliable results. So the values and signs of some 
estimated coefficients have big changes and not under our expectations. Thus, more 
observations are needed for a more reliable and efficient estimation. Then we turn to look 
at the results of Model 3 and we find out that the results are similar with those of Model 1. 
Furthermore, the change in number of riots has a negative and significant effect on the 
change of India’s military expenditure which is also different with our expectation. Hence, 
that proxy for internal security threats is proved to be problematic again in the short-run 
analysis 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the demand for India’s military expenditure 
from 1960 to 2006, employing the ARDL approach to cointegration. Based on the explicit 
review of theoretical and empirical literature on the demand for military expenditure, the 
neoclassical model is selected to analyze the determinants of India’s military expenditure. 
India’s economic, political and security environments are investigated which provide 
information for model specification. Then the regression equations of the demand for 
India’s military expenditure and the empirical estimations are presented for India. The 
determinant factors of India’s military expenditure include income, population, central 
government expenditure, trade balance, defence burden of Pakistan, average defence 
burden of countries in India’s security web, domestic riots and external war. The economic, 
political and security variables are all taken into considerations. 
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The empirical results suggest that India’s military expenditure is mainly determined by its 
income, democratic status, the perceived threat from Pakistan and external wars both in the 
long-run and in the short-run. Higher income level does have a significant and positive 
effect on India’s military expenditure. In recent years, the rapid economic growth provided 
ore resources and opportunities for increases in India’s military expenditure. The 
democratic status in India does constrain its military expenditure and has a negative impact 
on military expenditure. Central government expenditure has a positive and significant 
effect on military expenditure. As discussed above, security and military expenditure still 
have high priorities among India’s central government expenditure.  
 
The external wars of India with Pakistan and China have a significant and positive effect 
on India’s military expenditure which implies the external threats faced by India from its 
neighbours – Pakistan and China play an important role in determining India’s military 
expenditure. Finally, Pakistan’s defence burden has a positive and significant effect on 
India’s military expenditure which is consistent with the results of Chapter 2. Thus, both 
provide evidences to support the existence of the long-running arms race between India 
and Pakistan.  
 
Thus, this chapter also implied the existence the ‘security dilemma’ in terms of India’s 
relationship with Pakistan. The core factors that motivate the demand for defence as a 
public good were examined both in the long-run and in the short-run. What is clear is that 
both the arms race factor and related economic and political factors are important to 
determine India’s defence spending. However, high military expenditure would have 
adverse impacts which is analyzes as ‘developmental failure’. The effect of defence on 
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development in India is still unclear and will be examined in the next chapter. Then the 
twin claims of security and development will be reconciled to understand India’s defence 
expenditure issues.  
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Chapter 4 Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in Developing Countries 
4.1 Introduction 
“The single and most massive obstacle to development is the worldwide expenditure on 
national defence activity.”21 
Military expenditure in developing countries is important and a major aspect of 
government expenditure which often far exceeds health and education spending. As 
suggested in the above quotation, many economists believe that military expenditure 
crowds out more productive expenditure and civilian investment and thus has a negative 
impact on economic growth. We also believe that for India, the ‘security dilemma’, India-
Pakistan arms race and related economic and political factors lead to its high military 
expenditure. Then the high military expenditure would cause ‘developmental failure’ and 
have a negative effect on economic growth. 
 
However, Benoit (1978) found that military expenditure actually accelerates economic 
growth in less developed countries (LDCs). Since then, many studies have been carried out 
to assess the impact of military expenditure on economic performances by using different 
samples, different time periods and different theoretical and empirical methods. However, 
the results are always controversial and the defence-growth nexus is still important for 
explicit analyzing.  
 
With the end of the Cold War, global military expenditure has been decreasing and it is 
expected that this reduction in military expenditure (or military burden) will lead to peace 
                                                           
21 Quote which was cited in Deger and Sen (1983), from a statement issued by a UN Committee for 
Developing Planning in the 1970s 
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dividends for developing countries. However, many developing countries still spend a 
large amount of scarce resources on defence. For example, 15.6 per cent of central 
government expenditure and 2.01 per cent of GDP are spent on defence in lower and 
middle income countries. While the corresponding figures for the EU area are only 4.5 per 
cent and 1.7 per cent (WDI, 2006). A lacking of investment and expenditures in education, 
health and other social-economic activities, many LDCs’ economic growth will be affected 
by high defence spending. For these reasons, the impact of defence spending on economic 
growth in developing countries need to be explored and analyzed carefully.  
 
This chapter firstly surveys the theoretical models and empirical studies involved in the 
debate of the defence-growth relationships. The following literature can fall into seven 
groups: Benoit’s work, demand side models, supply side models, Deger type models which 
incorporate demand and supply side factors, the Barro models, the Solow models and the 
Granger causality analysis. The related theoretical issues, results of empirical studies and 
characteristics of different models are provided respectively. General conclusions on 
theoretical and empirical methods are provided. Thus not only the traditional studies but 
also recent analyses which apply more popular growth theories are reviewed and assessed 
which provide the direction and structure of this chapter’s empirical analysis for the 
defence-growth nexus in developing countries.  
 
As noted by Ram (1995), individual-country and cross-section studies should be treated as 
complementary and not as competing alternative. A single-country case analysis is based 
on more detailed specification and provides valuable information. However, many 
problems are involved with the single-country data, such as the limited sample size, non-
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stationarity of time-series variables and limited generalizability to other contexts. On the 
other hand, cross-sectional or panel data analysis can be applied for countries which are 
grouped by cohorts based on similar economic, political and other considerations (Sandler 
and Hartley, 1995). But heterogeneity among countries should be considered to provide 
more efficient results.   
 
Thus, according to the complementarities between individual and cross-sectional estimates, 
empirical studies of this chapter will provide evidences of both type of estimations. The 
assessment of the impact of defence spending on economic growth in India represents the 
single-country case study. For the period 1970-2003, the growth effects of India’s military 
expenditure are explored and estimated by using the Deger type model. Then cross-
sectional and panel data estimations are employed to investigate the impact of defence 
burden on economic growth in 36 developing countries during 1975-2004. These 
estimations are based on the Augmented Solow growth model which defence variables are 
integrated into. Different panel data techniques are used to estimate the defence-growth 
relationship, which are believed to provide robust empirical results. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 provides the review of literature on 
military expenditure and economic growth in LDCs, including both theoretical models and 
corresponding empirical studies; Section 4.3 gives a single country study of the 
relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in India; Section 4.4 
examines the long-run and short-run impact of defence spending on economic growth 
based on cross-sectional and panel analyses for 36 developing countries during 1975-2004. 
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Sub-sample panels data for the Cold War periods and Post Cold War periods are also 
estimated. Section 4.5 presents the conclusion.  
 
4.2 Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: Literature Review on Theoretical 
Models and Empirical Studies 
The aim of this section is to review the existing literature on the topic of military 
expenditure and economic growth in developing countries. Since Emile Benoit’s (1978) 
pioneering work which find that military expenditure has an unexpected positive effect on 
economic growth for 44 LDCs, various models have been applied to study the defence-
growth nexus in developing countries. The literature on theoretical models and according 
empirical studies can be broadly grouped into: the Benoit-type regressions, supply-side 
(Feder-type) models, demand-side models, demand and supply side (Deger-type) models, 
the Barro models and the Solow models. The reviewed empirical results are found to be 
inconclusive as shown in Table 4.7. Furthermore, some empirical studies apply the 
Granger causality tests and try to find the direction of statistical causality relationships 
between military expenditure and economic growth.  
 
The Details of literature review on the defence-growth relationships are provided in A7 of 
the Appendix. These explicit literature reviews not only synthesize and evaluate the 
researches undertaken in the areas, but also identify information and methodologies that 
could be relevant to our studies in the following sections. For example, the Deger-type 
models consider both demand and supply side influences and can provide more 
sophisticated and robust results, especially for Individual country studies. While cross-
sectional and panel data analysis can be examined by the Solow model augmented by 
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military variables which integrates implications stemming from defence economics 
literature into the neoclassical growth model. Thus, the following sections will present our 
empirical analysis of the defence-growth relationship in developing countries. 
 
Table 4. 7 the Summary of the Results of the Empirical Literature Review 
Models  Number of 
Literature  
Positive  Negative  Insignificant  Non-
linear  
Benoit-type  3 2   1   
Demand models  3   3     
Feder-type  8 4   3 1 
Deger-type  9 2 7     
Barrow models  3       3 
Solow models  4   4     
Total  30 8 14 4 4 
Notes: Positive, Negative and Insignificant denote that the impact of defence on growth is 
positive, negative and insignificant, respectively. Non-linear denotes that the defence-
growth relationship is examined in non-linear regression frameworks. 
 
4.3 A Single-Country Study: Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in India 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In this section, the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in India 
is investigated by using the Deger type (demand and supply side) model. As discussed in 
the previous review of models for analysing the defence-growth relationships, the Deger 
type model consider both demand and supply side influences and can provide more 
sophisticated and robust results. An individual country study of India can be characterized 
by its special economic, political and other related factors. This will resolve the problem of 
specifications and overcome the heterogeneity in cross-sectional studies. The estimation 
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period for India is from 1970 to 2003 (the upper boundary of the sample period is limited 
by data availability on real effective exchange rate).  
 
The structure of this section is as follows. Section 4.3.2 provides model specifications and 
defines the data. Section 4.3.3 presents empirical results and analysis. Section 4.3.4 gives 
the conclusion.  
 
4.3.2 Model Specifications and Data  
Military expenditure influences economic growth through many channels and thus many 
variables need to be included into the model. Some variables might be endogenous. For 
instance, there exist direct and indirect effects from defence to growth. Therefore, the 
multi-equation model based on Deger (1986b) is employed. It consists of four equations on 
growth, the saving ratio, the balance of trade and military burden. The exogenous variables 
are chosen considering India’s economy, defence and security. Specially, the defence 
equation is based on the analysis of the demand for military expenditure in India in 
Chapter 3 (Equation (3.16)). The simultaneous equation model (SEM) consisting of 4 
equations is constructed as follows. 
Growth equation: 
   C/ 
 CF 
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 C= (4.38) 
Saving equation: 
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Balance of trade equation: 
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Defence equation: 
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(4.41) 
where: 
g  is growth measured as the log of real GDP minus the log of real GDP in the previous 
year, 
s is the share of gross national saving to GDP, 
tb is balance of trade measured by the share of external balance on goods and services to 
GDP, 
m is India’s military expenditure measured by the share of military expenditure to GDP, 
l is the rate of population growth as a proxy for labour growth, 
inf is the inflation rate, 
ng is the share of non-defence government expenditure to GDP, 
reer is real effective exchange rate,  
dummy is a dummy variable for second oil shock in 1980. 
gdpc is India’s GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$; 
pop is the total population of India valued in millions; 
democ is the democracy index, which ranges from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy);  
dbp is the defence burden of Pakistan as a rival of India; 
war –  War dummy for the India’s external wars with Pakistan and China, which equals 1 
for years 1962, 1965, 1971 and 1999 and equals 0 for other years during the 
period 1960-2006. 
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The sources of data except m, ng and reer are from World Development Indicators (World 
Bank Online Database). m is from SIPRI yearbooks and online database for military 
expenditure. Data on ng is derived from Government Final Consumption Expenditure by 
Function (UN data). Data on reer is obtained from Reserve Bank of India. The details of 
the data in the defence equation are provided in chapter 3.  
 
In the growth equation (Equation (4.38)), saving and labour are expected to have positive 
effects on growth which based on basic growth theories. Military burden tends to capture 
the spin-off effect of defence on growth through modernization and resource mobilization. 
The sign of C is expected to be positive. The balance of trade ratio is used to pick up the 
effect of India’s net exports on economic growth. In the saving equation (Equation (4.39)), 
military burden is assumed to have a negative (crowding-out) effect on the saving ratio. 
Following life cycle theories of consumption, the saving ratio depends on the economic 
growth rate and a higher saving ratio is expected with higher growth. The exports and 
imports will affect saving through income-multiplier and trade taxes and thus the trade 
balance is expected to affect the saving ratio positively. Inflation would cause forced 
saving and thus has a positive effect on savings. Finally, the expectation of non-defence 
government expenditure such as government expenditure on health and education is 
ambiguous.  
 
In the balance of trade equation (Equation (4.40)), military burden will affect the balance 
of trade. Increases in military expenditure may increase the aggregate demand and 
combined with relatively inelastic domestic supply, imports will be increased and/or 
exports will be reduced. Thus the coefficient of military burden is expected to be negative. 
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Deger (1986b) suggests that if a country follows export-promoting strategies, the growth of 
GDP will have positive effects on the trade balance, or if a country follows import 
substitution policy, the growth of GDP will have negative effects on the trade balance. The 
real effective exchange rate has been added into the equation to examine the effect of a 
change in the international purchasing power of the domestic currency. It is expected to 
have a positive effect on the balance of trade. A dummy variable is used to capture the 
second-oil shock in 1980 and is expected to have negative sign. 
 
In the defence equation (Equation (4.41)), the independent variables included in the 
equation are based on the specification and estimation in chapter 2, where we analyzed the 
demand for military expenditure in India.  
 
4.3.3 Empirical Results 
Taking into account simultaneity and high covariance between variables, simultaneous 
equation methods are employed to estimate the equations as a system by 3SLS22. The 
empirical results of 3SLS as well as OLS and 2SLS are obtained by using the Stata 10 and 
presented in Table 4.8. All variables except tb are employed by the logarithm forms of 
series (ln).  
 
Comparing the estimating results from 3SLS, 2SLS and OLS, the estimated coefficients of 
many variables are insignificant when 2SLS and OLS methods are used while those 
coefficients become significant under the 3SLS estimation. For example, in the results of 
the growth equation, the estimated coefficients of lns and lndbi become significant by 
                                                           
22
  For a detailed discussion, see Baltagi (2002, p281) 
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applying 3SLS method while they are insignificant when using OLS and 2SLS methods. 
Thus, as a system estimation technique, 3SLS method provides superior results in our case. 
The following analysis is based on the results from 3SLS. 
 
In many single-country studies, all variables are first differenced due to the existence of 
non-stationarity. Thus, the SEM in the form of first difference is also estimated. After first 
differencing, the estimating results present the dynamic structure of the system and provide 
weak estimates (See Appendix Table A4). Thus, we will focus on the analysis of the 
estimating results from original system equations. Additional tests are carried out to show 
the existence of long-run relationships in the four equations. The results of the Engle-
Granger cointegration tests (see Appendix Table A5) for the four equations show that all 
residuals are stationary. So the four equations do present long-run equilibrium relationships. 
The tests based on original SEM can provide valuable results to analyse the defence-
growth nexus in India.  
 
In the growth equation, the savings ratio and balance of trade have positive and significant 
effects on growth. The growth effect of population is insignificant. Military burden does 
have a spin-off effect in India and there exist a direct positive impact from defence to 
economic growth.  
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Table 4. 8 Estimation Results for the Original SEM (1970-2003) 
Estimation method 
Explaining 
variables 3SLS 2SLS OLS 
Growth  lns 0.16 (0.07)** 0.08 (0.09) 0.09 (0.07) 
equation lndbi 0.22 (0.11)** 0.23 (0.14) 0.13 (0.10) 
tb 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 
lnl 0.04 (0.09) -0.07 (0.13) -0.01 (0.10) 
constant -0.69 (0.24)*** -0.41 (0.31) -0.36 (0.25) 
Saving lndbi -0.50 (0.20)** -0.37 (0.23) -0.19 (0.17) 
equation g 0.95 (0.58) 0.35 (0.68) 0.35 (0.44) 
tb 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
lninf 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 
lnng 0.68 (0.12)*** 0.76 (0.14)*** 0.79 (0.11)*** 
constant 2.38 (0.35)*** 2.15 (0.41)*** 1.90 (0.32)*** 
Balance of  lndbi -10.69 (2.41)*** -7.99 (3.00)*** -3.06 (1.97) 
trade equation g 31.29 (5.79)*** 20.69 (7.38)*** 7.00 (4.49) 
lnreer 3.13 (0.82)*** 2.61 (1.04)** 1.09 (0.76) 
dummy -2.00 (0.74)*** -2.91 (1.01)*** -2.41 (0.84)*** 
constant -4.23 (2.91) -4.48 (3.37) -2.70 (2.74) 
Defence lngdpc 1.61 (0.42)*** 1.13 (0.59)* 0.62 (0.52) 
equation lnpop -2.24 (0.54)*** -1.63 (0.76)** -0.95 (0.66) 
lndemoc -1.52 (0.29)*** -1.11 (0.37)*** -0.84 (0.34)** 
tb -0.09 (0.02)*** -0.06 (0.02)*** -0.03 (0.02)* 
lndbp 0.30 (0.11)*** 0.29 (0.16)* 0.21 (0.15) 
war 0.07 (0.04) 0.07 (0.06) 0.09 (0.06) 
constant 9.53 (1.65)*** 7.36 (2.19)*** 5.36 (1.92)*** 
Notes:  
Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 
In the saving equation, defence burden is correlated negatively with savings and it 
indicates that military expenditure might reallocate saving from productive investment. 
The crowing-out effect affects economic growth indirectly. The finding is consistent with 
Deger (1986b). The impacts of growth, balance of trade and inflation on savings are 
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insignificant. The non-defence government expenditure has a significant and positive 
effect on the saving ratio. 
 
In the balance of trade equation, defence burden has a negative and significant effect on 
trade balance in India as our expectation. Growth is positively correlated with the balance 
of trade and denotes the dominated export-promoting strategies in India. The estimated 
coefficient of the real effective exchange rate is positive and significant which is as 
expected. The oil shock dummy picks up the negative and significant effect on growth.  
Finally, in the defence equation, we get similar results with estimations in Chapter 3. 
Income variable is positively correlated with Indian defence spending. Defence burden of 
Pakistan and external wars both have a significant and positive effect on India’s military 
spending. Due to the limitation of the sample size, data reliability and estimating methods, 
the results of some estimated coefficients are not consistent with the results from Chapter 3. 
However, the main aims of our empirical analysis are not affected.  
The multiplier of defence burden on economic growth can be calculated by: 
 
 
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The multiplier equals -0.32 in our analysis. Thus, the overall effect of military expenditure 
on economic growth is estimated to be negative in India. The indirect effect from defence 
to growth via savings and balance of trade out-weight the direct growth effect of defence.   
 
4.3.4 Conclusion 
Using Deger type model, the impact of military expenditure on economic growth is 
estimated. Based on the original SEM rather than the first differenced, the 3SLS estimator 
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provides system estimating results.  We find that the direct effect of military expenditure 
on growth is positive and significant which represents the spin-off from defence to growth 
in India. However, when we fully consider the interdependence between defence, savings 
and balance of trade, it shows that growth can be reduced through indirect effects. Defence 
can depress the saving ratio and the balance of trade. Taking both direct and indirect 
effects together, empirical estimations for India indicate that an increase in the defence 
burden reduces the growth rate in the long run. The negative indirect effects dominate the 
direct growth-stimulating effect in India. In general, one per cent increase in defence will 
cause approximately 0.32 per cent decrease in the growth rate.  
 
4.4 Cross-sectional and Panel Data Analysis of the Defence-Growth Nexus in 
Developing Countries, 1975-2004 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The net effect of military expenditure on economic growth was already estimated to be 
negative in India. Due to the complementary between individual-country and cross-section 
studies, we will explore the defence-growth nexus in developing countries by using cross-
sectional and panel data in this section. 
 
The effect of military expenditure on economic growth in developing countries has been 
investigated by many empirical literatures. However, there is little consensus of the effect 
from defence on growth and the diversity seems to come from the use of different models. 
As suggested by Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva (1996) and Dunne, Smith and 
Willenbockel (2005), this study use a model which integrates implications stemming from 
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defence economics literature into the neoclassical growth model (i.e. the augmented Solow 
growth model with defence variables).  
 
Using cross-sectional and panel data from 36 developing countries in Africa, Latin 
America and South Asia over the period of 1975 to 2004, the impact of defence burden on 
the growth rate is estimated. Different techniques are employed to provide robust empirical 
results. Standard cross-sectional regressions are operated to present the long-run 
relationship estimation from 1975 to 2004. Then the static and dynamic panel regressions 
are estimated to capture the short-run dynamic between defence and growth. The negative 
effects from defence to growth are expected in both long-run and short-run regressions. 
The structure of this section is as follows. In section 4.4.2, empirical methods are provided.  
The standard cross-sectional regressions are presented firstly.  Then estimating 
methodologies of panel data are provided including the fixed-effect model (FEM), the 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator, the first-differenced Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator and the system GMM estimator. Section 4.4.3 
gives data descriptions and sources. Section 4.4.4 and section 4.4.5 demonstrate the cross-
sectional and panel empirical estimating results, respectively. Section 4.4.6 concludes. 
 
4.4.2 Standard Cross-sectional Regressions 
By using a cross-section regression framework, MRW estimate the long-run economic 
growth for the period 1960-1985.  Similarly, the long-run analysis in this study is based on 
a regression in the following form: 
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where i=1, …, 36 denotes a country index,  is the difference of GDP per capita between 
1975 and 2004, and {/ represents the initial level of GDP per capita of country i. The 
standard cross-section growth regression suffers from some problems. The main problems 
are as follows. First, the standard cross-section estimation does not use all available 
information by reducing the panel data to a time-average data. Second, it suffers from 
omitted variable bias and measurement errors. The cross-section estimation cannot allow 
for individual country effects. Third, the endogeneity of one or more regressors are likely 
to make the cross-section estimation inconsistent. Thus, panel data analysis will be focused 
in the following empirical studies. 
 
4.4.3 Panel Data Methodologies 
The short-run estimations are based on 36 countries (cross-section) spanning six five-year 
periods and are analyzed by using different panel estimating techniques to judge the 
robustness of results. It needs to be noted that the panel of this empirical analysis has a 
small number of time-series period, T (T=6) and a large number of countries, N (N=36) 
which will affect the estimations. Following the growth empirical literature such as Bond, 
Hoeffler and Temple (2001) and Yakovlev (2007), the panel data methods applied in this 
study include the FEM, the FGLS estimator, the first-differenced GMM estimator and the 
system GMM estimator.  
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4.4.3.1 The Static Panel: the Fixed-Effect Model and FGLS Estimator 
The FEM restricts the slope coefficients to be constant over both countries and periods and 
allows for an intercept coefficient which differs by countries or by periods. The growth 
equation of FEM to be estimated has the following form: 
 P  Å 
 P 
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(4.44) 
for i=1, …, N and t=2,…, T 
Here the two-way FEM is applied which allow for both the unobserved country-specific 
effect (Å and the period-specific interceptsP. Å capture differences in the initial level 
of efficiency and P  reflect productivity changes which are common to all countries. 
Furthermore,  Å  and P  may also reflect country and period specific components of 
measurement errors. So the estimation model specifies i-1 country dummies, t-1 time 
dummies, and applies the Least Squares with Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimator.  
 
However, the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand-side of the growth equation is 
correlated with the error term. As shown by Nickell (1981), the LSDV estimator will 
provide biased and inconsistent estimates, particularly in the context of “small T, large N”. 
If there is autocorrelation and a country-specific heteroskedasticity, the problems of the 
static panel data model will be more severe and the normality and homogeneity of error 
assumption will be violated. The use of a White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance 
estimator with ordinary least squares (OLS) in fixed effects models can produce standard 
errors which are robust to unequal variance along the predicted line (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Hence the FGLS estimator is applied to control for the heteroskedasticity and first-order 
autocorrelation in the error term. 
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4.4.3.2 Dynamic Panel Approaches: the First-Difference GMM and the System GMM 
The first-difference GMM, proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is introduced into the 
growth literature by Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996, hereinafter CEL). The dynamic 
growth regression equation is firstly be taken the first-differences to remove unobserved 
country-specific effects and then in this first-differenced equation, levels of the series 
lagged two periods or more of the right-hand-side variables are used as instruments in the 
regression. By rewriting the above growth equation equivalently, the dynamic growth 
regression equation is: 
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for i=1, …, N and t=2,…, T 
 
Taking the first differences, the first-differenced equation is: 
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for i=1, …, N and t=3,…, T 
Specially, the following assumptions are made. First, the transient errors are serially 
uncorrelated (i.e. µÆPÆÇ  0 for i=1, …, N and  È F). Second, the initial conditions 
satisfy µ{ÆÇ  0  for    2 . Thus, {Ph  and earlier values are correlated 
with Δ ln {,Ph, but not with ΔÆP. The values of {P lagged two periods or more are valid 
instruments in the first differenced growth equation.  
 
As in recent empirical growth models, regressors, DP  (i.e. the row vector of variables P, 
P , lnP 
  
 ', and P ) are all treated as endogenous variables. This means 
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there exist correlations between the current value of regressors and current shocks to {P, 
as well as feedback from past shocks to {P. µDP ÆÇ È 0 for F .  and µDP ÆÇ  0 
for F   are then derived. The moment conditions hold for the first-differences equations 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) are as follows: 
 µ∆ÆP{Ph  0; µ∆ÆPDPh  0 (4.47) 
where  r=2, …, t-1 and t=3, …, T. So the values of the endogenous regressors lagged two 
periods or more are valid instruments as well. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation and endogeneity, Yaffee (2003) recommends that first-differences GMM 
estimation with robust (the White and Newy-West) panel standard errors is a robust 
estimator.  
 
However, as shown by Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) and Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 
(2001), when the time-series are persistent or close to random walk processes, the lagged 
values of the variables are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables and are 
weak instruments. The first-differences GMM estimation also suffers from a loss of 
valuable observations. Under these conditions, the first-differences GMM estimation is 
likely to perform poorly and has poor finite sample properties (bias and imprecision). 
Instead, the system GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) is more plausible.  
 
The system GMM estimator combines two sets of equations: the standard set of equations 
in first-differences and an additional set of levels equations. The first set of equations is the 
same as discussed for the first-differences GMM estimation. The other set of levels 
equations is: 
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Blundell and Bond (1998) provide the additional assumption that: 
 µÅΔ{  0; µÅ∆DP  0 (4.49) 
The sufficient conditions for these additional assumptions are for the series DP and {P to 
have stationary/time-invariant means. These allow the use of the lagged first-differences of 
dependent and independent variables as instruments for the level equations. Blundell and 
Bond (1998) show that the system GMM estimator results in consistent and efficient 
parameter estimates, and has better asymptotic and finite sample properties than the 
straightforward first-differences GMM estimator.  
 
As an empirical matter, specification tests proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) are 
applied to test the validity of the instruments in our GMM estimation. First, the Arellano-
Bond test for the serial correlation is adapted to test whether there is a second order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is that the residuals are 
serially uncorrelated. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, it provides the evidence that 
there is no second order serial correlation and the GMM estimator is consistent. Second, 
the Sargan test for over identifying restrictions is used to determine whether there is any 
correlation between instruments and residuals. The null hypothesis is that the instruments 
and the residuals are not correlated (i.e. the validity of instruments). Failure to reject this 
null hypothesis means that the instruments are valid.  
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4.4.4 Descriptions of Data and Data Sources 
Data on 36 developing countries are derived from several different sources for the period 
1975-2004. Data on GDP per capita, investment and population are obtained from the Penn 
World Table 6.2. Barro and Lee (2000) data set provides a proxy for human capital. Data 
on military burden are taken from various SIPRI yearbooks and SIPRI online database. 
Table 4.9 display names, description and summary statistics of the variables, 
 
Table 4. 9 Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description Source 
lny Log of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) PWT 6.2 
lnlagy Lagged of lny 
gr the difference of lny between 2004 and 1975 
g the difference of lny for the six five-year periods 
lnk Five-year average investment as a share of GDP PWT 6.2 
lnngd Five-year average population growth rate n plus 0.05 PWT 6.2 
lnh Average number of years of schooling of both sexes 
25 years of age or older Barro-Lee, 2000 
m Five-year average military expenditure as a share of GDP SIPRI 
 
For the empirical analysis, choosing appropriate data for the variables is one of the most 
important aspects. Each variable has different form of proxies. The data are basically 
chosen based on specification and availability. MRW use per worker GDP and the growth 
of the workforce. Due to lack of per worker data, per capita data and population growth 
rate are used in this analysis by following Islam (1995) and CEL (1996). Data on 
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investment to GDP ratio are collected to proxy the saving rate. Technological progress 
pulsing the depreciation rate, g+δ is assumed to be constant across countries and equals 
0.05 (see MRW, 1992). However the alternative measure 0.07 is also tried for a robustness 
check. 
MRW use school enrolment rates as the proxy of human capital investment. The proxy of 
the average years of schooling is used instead in this study due to data availability. The 
data on average years of schooling of both sexes 25 years of age or older are obtained from 
Barro and Lee (2000) data set. The schooling data at the beginning year of each 5 year 
period are used. Following by Knight et al. (1996) and Dunne, Smith and Willenbockel 
(2005), military expenditure share data are used to measure the effect of military 
expenditure on growth.  
 
The estimation samples of 36 countries include 16 South American countries, 15 Africa 
and 5 South Asia countries.  Data are available for these 36 countries for all periods and 
the panel is balanced.  In this section, the estimation methods described above are applied 
to the augmented Solow model with the military variable. The purpose is twofold. First, 
the growth effect of military expenditure will be examined for the cross-section data and 
the balanced panel data of 36 developing countries. Second, whether the importance of the 
econometric issues is borne out by the data will be investigated.  
 
4.4.5 Cross-Section Analysis: The Long-Run Estimating Results 
The long-run estimation results are reported in Table 4.10. The Augmented Solow growth 
equation is estimated by the OLS estimator with the White heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors and covariance.  The estimated coefficient on the initial level of real GDP 
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per capita is significantly negative. Thus there is an evidence of convergence that poor 
countries grow faster than rich countries. The estimated coefficients on lnngd and lnh are 
both significant with expected sign.  lnngd has a negative effect on growth and lnh has a 
positive effect on growth. The estimated coefficient on lnk is insignificant. The growth 
effect of military expenditure is insignificant. Thus, the estimation results are not strong 
enough to make the conclusion of the negative effect from defence to economic growth in 
the long run.  
 
Table 4. 10The Standard Cross-Section Regression 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Contant  1.0789*** 0.3538  3.0490 0.0048 
lnY75 -0.2884** 0.1193 -2.4163 0.0220 
lnk  0.0168 0.0549  0.3061 0.7616 
lnngd -0.2004* 0.1097 -1.8281 0.0775 
lnh  0.1428** 0.0635  2.2501 0.0319 
lnm -0.0738 0.0462 -1.5952 0.1211 
R-squared  0.3441 Prob(F-statistic) 0.0212   
Notes:  
1）ln75 is the log of real GDP per capita in the initial year, 1975.  
2）Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 
4.4.6 The Dynamic Panel Results  
The short-run estimation results are reported in Table 4.11. The econometrics package used 
is Stata 10. The first three columns of Table 4.10 report the results using the OLS levels, 
FEM and FGLS estimators, respectively. The fourth column presents the results using the 
first-differences GMM estimator and the last column reports from using the system GMM 
estimators. Since in small samples, standard errors tend to be underestimated by the two-
step estimator, our reported results from GMM estimators are the one-step estimates. 
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Period dummies are found to be jointly significant in every regression. In order to conserve 
space, the coefficients on the period dummies are not presented.  
 
As mentioned by Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001), omitting variables (i.e. unobserved 
country-specific effects) will give an estimate of the coefficient on lnlagy which is biased 
upward. The FEM will cause an estimate of this coefficient to be seriously downward 
biased. Thus， the estimated coefficient on lnlagy from OLS and FEM can be regarded as 
an approximate upper bound and lower bound, respectively. A consistent estimate of the 
coefficient can be expected to lie in these two bounds. This simple indication is useful to 
detect the first-differences GMM results. If the first-differences GMM estimate lies close 
to or below the FEM estimator, it is also biased downward due to weak instruments. As 
discussed above, the two-way fixed effect FGLS estimator and the system GMM estimator 
are expected to perform better empirically.  
 
Beginning with OLS results, the estimated coefficients on all variables are statistically 
significant and with the expected sign. lnngd and lnh are only significant at the 10% level. 
The estimated coefficient on lnm is negatively and significantly related to economic 
growth. Then when a FEM estimator is used, the results show that military burden appears 
to be insignificant. Only the estimated coefficients on lagged GDP per capita and 
investment are significant. Column 3 presents the results using the two-way fixed effects 
FGLS estimator. It allows the estimation in the presence of panel specific AR (1) 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity across panels. All estimated coefficients are 
significant and with the expected signs. The estimated coefficient on lnlagy falls between 
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the upper and lower bounds and military burden has a significant and negative effect on 
growth. 
Table 4.11 The Effect of Military Expenditure in the Augmented Solow Growth Model 
  OLS FEM FGLS DIF-GMM SYS-GMM 
lnlagy -0.0078** -0.0505*** -0.0109*** -0.3483*** -0.0444*** 
(-0.0033) (0.0100) (0.0026) (0.1286) (0.0190) 
lnk 0.0056** 0.0138*** 0.0060*** 0.0732** 0.0757*** 
(0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0015) (0.0347) (0.0220) 
lnngd -0.0036* -0.0029 -0.0058*** -0.0189 -0.0332** 
(0.0021) (0.0032) (0.0018) (0.0362) (0.0259) 
lnh 0.0029* 0.0010 0.0048*** -0.0486 0.0071 
(0.0017) (0.0039) (0.0014) (0.0497) (0.0167) 
lnm -0.0032*** -0.0020 -0.0037*** -0.0107 -0.0195* 
(0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0181) (0.0101) 
constant 0.0181* 0.1476*** 0.0245*** -        - 
(0.0104) (0.0360) (0.0080) -        - 
Arellano-Bond test     - - - 0.1634 
Sargan test      - - - 0.5644 0.8312 
Notes： 
1）Dependent variable is growth. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
2）‘DIF-GMM’ is the first-differences GMM estimate and ‘SYS-GMM’ is the system 
GMM estimate. Instrument used for DIF-GMM are lagged two and further periods of  
{P  P , P , lnP 
  
 ', and P . Instruments used for first differenced 
equations in SYS-GMM are lagged two and further periods of P , P , lnP 

 
 ', and P; for levels equations in SYS-GMM are ∆{Ph ∆Ph, ∆Ph, 
∆lnPh 
  
 ', and ∆Ph. 
3）The figures reported for the Sargan test and Arellano-Bond test are the p-values for the 
null hypothesis. 
4）Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.  
157 
 
Using the first-differences GMM estimator, the estimated coefficient on lnlagy (-0.3483) 
lies below the corresponding FEM estimate. The first-differences GMM estimator is thus 
seriously biased downward. Only the estimated coefficients on initial income and 
investment are significant and the estimate of the estimated coefficient on human capital 
measure has an unexpected negative sign. So the first-differences GMM estimator is likely 
to be poorly behaved. 
 
The last column of Table 4.11 presents the system GMM estimate. Here the estimate of the 
coefficient on lnlagy lies above the corresponding FEM estimate and below the 
corresponding OLS estimate. Physical investment has a significant and positive effect on 
growth. The variable of schooling years as the measure of human capital is not a 
significant determinants of economic growth. Both the growth rate of population and 
military burden had a significant and negative effect on growth. 
 
Using the OLS levels, the FEM (LSDV), the FGLS, the first-differences and system GMM 
estimators, the effect of military burden on economic growth in Augmented Solow model 
is investigated. The estimated results are summarized as follows. First, military burden has 
a negative and significant effect on economic growth in the robust estimations (i.e. FGLS 
and the System GMM). It implies that after controlling for investment, population growth 
and human capital measurement, military burden exerts a direct negative impact on growth 
in 36 developing countries.  
 
Second, the estimate coefficients on the initial level of income are significant and 
negatively related to economic growth by all estimators used above. This suggests the 
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existence of “conditional convergence” and is consistent with the standard results of 
empirical growth literature. The convergence rate is only approximate 1% a year by the 
FGLS and the System GMM estimators which is similar with the finding of MRW. 
However, as Nerlove (2000) has mentioned, the measuring of convergence rate depends on 
the different choice of estimator. An uncertainty is acknowledged in this measurement 
result. Third, the comparison of different estimators and the estimate results both show the 
importance of the choice of robust estimators. The two-way fixed effects FGLS estimator 
and the System GMM estimator are robust estimators in this study and produce reasonable 
and compatible empirical results 
 
Furthermore, the sample is divided into two groups: Cold War periods (1975-1989) and 
post-Cold War Periods (1990-2004) and both include 3 five-year periods. According to 
SIPRI Yearbook 2009, after the Cold War, most developed countries tend to decrease their 
military expenditure and there is a decreasing trend in the world military expenditure from 
1988 to 1998. However, the world military expenditure has been increasing recently since 
1999. Thus, we want to check the influence of these changes on the defence-growth 
relationship in our 36 sample developing countries. Because each panel only have 3 
intervals, methods with first differencing would become unsuitable for small sample. So 
the two sub-groups are estimated by FGLS with two-way fixed effect. The estimating 
results are provided in Table 4.12.  
 
The estimated coefficients of lnm are -0.0054 and -0.0018 for Cold War periods and post- 
Cold War periods, respectively. Thus, the absolute value of the estimated coefficient of 
lnm increases and the negative effect of military burden on economic growth becomes 
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smaller. This provides the evidence to support the existence of a peace dividend after the 
Cold War. Comparing the estimated coefficients of lnlagy in the two sub-periods, we find 
that the conditional convergence speed becomes slower in the post-Cold war periods. 
However, the estimated coefficient of the investment ratio is insignificant in the post-Cold 
war periods. Furthermore, compared with the Cold War regression, all estimated 
coefficients of the Post-Cold War regression become smaller. The possible reason for this 
change is that other factors would influence economic growth rates which are not included 
in our regression equations. For example, international trade development, changes in 
international political environments and globalization might all play important roles in 
economic growth process in recent years. 
 
Table 4.12 The Cold War Periods vs. the Post Cold War Periods 
Cold War Post-Cold War 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
C  0.0498*** 0.0108  0.0293*** 0.0087 
lnlagy -0.0184*** 0.0036 -0.0084*** 0.0027 
lnk  0.0080*** 0.0019  0.0012 0.0018 
lnngd -0.0044** 0.0018 -0.0090*** 0.0022 
lnh  0.0067*** 0.0016  0.0036* 0.0019 
lnm -0.0054*** 0.0013 -0.0018* 0.0010 
Notes:  
Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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4.4.7 Cross-sectional and panel analysis conclusion 
The impact of defence on economic growth is examined for 36 developing countries 
during 1975-2004. The long-run estimating results show that military burden has a 
negative effect on economic growth, albeit insignificant. Due to problems with the OLS 
estimator in the long-run estimation, the empirical results based on panel estimations 
provide more robust evidence to support the negative effect from defence to growth. The 
reasonable and compatible results are provided by the FGLS and the System GMM 
estimators based on 6 five-year periods panel data. The results indicate that defence has a 
significant and negative effect on economic growth in 36 sample developing countries. 
Furthermore, comparing with the Cold War period, the negative effect becomes smaller in 
the post-Cold War period. Thus, these panel estimating results provide strong evidences to 
support the existence of a peace dividend which indicates that a decrease in military 
expenditure would stimulate economic growth in developing countries. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
“Guns kill in more ways than one.”
23 
The defence-growth nexus has been an issue of keen concern in defence economics and 
there is a large amount of literature investigating the growth effect of military expenditure 
in developing countries. This chapter reviews a large body of the defence-growth literature 
which use different theoretical models, different empirical techniques and different 
samples. The reviewed literature is inconclusive as to the effect of defence on economic 
growth. Among various models and estimating methods, the Deger-type model in the 
                                                           
23  Quote from Whynes (1979, p152) 
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framework of SEM is applied to examine the impact of defence on economic growth in 
India for the period 1970-2005. The 3SLS system estimating results indicate that defence 
has an overall significant and negative effect on economic growth in India. Using the 
Deger-type model and system estimating technique for single-country study do provide 
valuable results for the empirical analysis of the growth effect of defence. 
 
The cross-sectional and panel data studies for 36 developing countries are also carried out. 
A variable of military burden is integrated into the augmented Solow growth model. 
Although the long-run results by the standard cross-sectional regression provide a negative 
but insignificant effect of military burden on economic growth, the short-run panel 
regressions present reasonable and robust results by applying more recent econometric 
techniques such as the FGLS and the System GMM estimators. The empirical panel results 
indicate that defence has a significant and negative effect on economic growth in 36 
sample developing countries.  
 
Thus, the empirical estimations support the negative effect of defence on growth and are 
consensus of Whynes (1979)’s opinion that guns really kill in more ways than one in 
developing countries. Compared with the existing studies on defence-growth nexus, the 
empirical studies in this chapter are based on specific circumstances of a single country or 
a group of developing countries with specific regression models and advanced econometric 
methodologies which make contributions to the defence economics literature.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
5.1 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the empirical results of the earlier chapters and provides the 
general conclusions of this thesis. The core issues of this study have been to investigate the 
causes and effects of military expenditure in India. We concentrate on three aspects of this 
subject. These three aspects link well with the core stylised facts of the Indian defence 
effort and her developmental problems: the ‘security dilemma’ in terms of its relationship 
with its neighbour, Pakistan; the core factors that motivate the demand for defence as a 
public good; the economic impact of militarization and the effect of defence on 
development. Our analyses therefore focus on three inter-linked topics, although for 
tractability we deal with them separately. First, the arms race between India and Pakistan is 
analyzed by using a Richardson action-reaction model and cointegration techniques. 
Second, the demand for India’s military expenditure is explored by applying the 
neoclassical demand model and the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to 
cointegration. Third, the effect of India’s military expenditure on its economic growth is 
examined by employing the Deger type model and 3SLS method. Furthermore, the 
relationship between military expenditure and economic growth is studied in a broader 
context, namely, in a cross-sectional and panel data study of 36 developing countries.  
In Chapter 2, the review of literature on theoretical arms race models is presented. There 
are many different types of arms race models. The classical Richardson action-reaction 
model and some representative models of its variants, which are reviewed in this section, 
are also discussed. The key elements of those variants include emulation, rivalry, 
submissiveness, bureaucracy, public opinion and social welfare maximization. Then the 
Intriligator and Brito strategic deterrence-attack model is introduced. This chapter also 
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reviews literature on empirical studies of the arms race between India and Pakistan. 
Different theoretical and empirical models were applied to explore the India-Pakistan arms 
race while those empirical results were controversial.  
 
The aim of Chapter 2 is to investigate the existence of an arms race between India and 
Pakistan. Based on the analysis of the conflict history between India and Pakistan since 
their independence in 1947 and the dynamics of India and Pakistan’s military expenditure, 
it has been found that there is an interaction between India and Pakistan’s arms acquisition 
process. In many ways their military expenditures have been driven by the arms race with 
each other which could be characterized by an action-reaction model. Hence, the classical 
Richardson arms race model is employed for the empirical study. Then the econometric 
methodologies are provided and assessed. Data on India and Pakistan’s real military 
expenditure between 1960 and 2007 are used to explore the long-run relationship between 
India and Pakistan’s arms acquisition process. The existence of unit root and structural 
breaks in the series are estimated by using different methods. Finally, both traditional 
cointegration tests and more recent techniques taking into account a structural break are 
applied to investigate the possible long-run relationship between India and Pakistan’s real 
military expenditure. The empirical results of different cointegration tests all indicate the 
existence of a cointegrating relation between the two counties’ real military expenditure, 
even after taking into account a structural break. Since the existence of a cointegrating 
relation implies a stable long run relationship, we believe that the hypothesized post 
independence arms race does indeed exist. Although domestic factors are important, as we 
show later, the existence of a military rival creates an environment of continuing long-run 
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military spending dynamics.  Thus Chapter 2 concludes that there are quite strong 
evidences to support the existence of an enduring arms race between India and Pakistan.  
 
In Chapter 3, the demand for India’s military expenditure is examined. This chapter 
reviews the theoretical models of the demand for military expenditure which focus on the 
framework of the neoclassical demand model. The empirical literature on the determinants 
of military expenditure in developing countries is also reviewed. The determining factors 
are grouped by military activities, economic and geo-strategic factors, the political 
environment and other related factors. After investigating the security concerns of India, 
the determining factors of India’s military expenditure are specified which include 
economic variables, political variables and security considerations (internal and external). 
Specially, the military spending of Pakistan is included in the regression equations to 
capture the effect of arms race on India’s military expenditure. The focus in this chapter is 
on the domestic economy and polity of India; however, given the conclusions of the 
previous chapter the linkages with Pakistan cannot be ignored. The autoregressive 
distributed lag approach to cointegration is employed to investigate the demand for India’s 
real military expenditure for the period 1960-2006. The empirical results indicate that the 
demand for India’s military expenditure is mainly determined by its income, political 
status, the perceived threat from Pakistan and the external wars with Pakistan and China. 
Even though India’s military expenditure is influenced by many factors, Pakistan’s military 
spending still plays an important role in India’s arms acquisition process which is 
consistent with the finding of Chapter 2.  
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Chapter 4 provides empirical studies of the effect of military expenditure on economic 
growth not only in India but also in 36 developing countries. The theoretical and empirical 
literature on the defence-growth relationship is reviewed. Seven groups of different models 
are discussed which include Benoit’s work, demand side models, supply side models, 
Deger type models which incorporate demand and supply side factors, Barro models, 
Solow models and Granger causality analysis. Among those models, the Deger type model 
is preferred for the single country studies while the Solow growth model is employed for 
cross-sectional studies.  
 
Thus firstly, Chapter 4 examines the net effect of military expenditure on economic growth 
in India for the period 1970-2003 in the framework of Deger type model. By applying 
3SLS approach, four equations are estimated systemically which include growth equation, 
saving equation, trade balance equation and defence equation. The defence equation for 
India is based on the analysis of the demand for India’s military expenditure in chapter 3. 
The empirical results indicate that there is a direct effect of military expenditure on growth 
which is positive and significant and represents the spin-off from defence on growth in 
India. However, India’s military expenditure also has indirect and negative effects on 
economic growth which through the interdependence between defence, savings and 
balance of trade. Defence might depress saving ratio and balance of trade in India and 
hence after taking both direct and indirect effects together, the net effect of India’s military 
spending on economic growth is significant and negative where the negative indirect 
effects dominate the direct growth-stimulating effect in India.  
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Secondly, Chapter 4 studies the influence of military expenditure on economic growth in 
developing countries. The augmented Solow growth model which incorporates a military 
variable is used in the cross-sectional and panel data estimations for 36 developing 
countries in Africa, Latin America and South Asia over the period of 1975 to 2004. 
Standard cross-sectional regressions are carried out and the results show that the growth 
effect of military expenditure is insignificant. Then based on 6 five-year periods panel data, 
different panel data estimating methods are operated including OLS levels, FEM, FGLS, 
the first-differences and System GMM estimators The reasonable and compatible results 
are provided by FGLS and System GMM estimators which indicate that defence has a 
negative and significant effect on economic growth in the sample countries. Furthermore, 
the negative effect becomes smaller after the Cold War period. Chapter 4 concludes that 
both the single country study of India and the cross-sectional estimations for 36 developing 
countries provide strong evidences to support the existence of peace dividend which 
indicate that a decrease in military expenditure would stimulate economic growth in 
developing countries. 
The main findings and contributions of this thesis could be summarised as follows: 
1. There is an enduring arms race between India and Pakistan.  
There is a long run relationship between their real military expenditures, even after taking 
into account a structural break. More advanced econometric methods for unit root, 
structural breaks and cointegration tests are employed. Specially, a regime shift (structural 
break) is found endogenously in 1997. Compared with the period before 1997, the real 
military expenditure of India increases by a larger per cent after 1997, with respect to the 
increase in the real military expenditure of Pakistan. Thus, the preparation of nuclear tests 
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in 1998 by both India and Pakistan might cause a regime shift in the long run relationship 
between their real military expenditures.  
 
2.  The demand for India’s military expenditure is determined by economic, 
political and security factors. 
By employing the ARDL approach to cointegration, the demand for India’s military 
expenditure is estimated and the results indicate that its military expenditure is mainly 
determined by income, political status, the perceived threat from Pakistan and the 
external wars both in the long-run and in the short-run.  Specially, Pakistan’s defence 
burden has a positive and significant effect on India’s military expenditure which 
provides an evidence to support the existence of arms race between India and Pakistan.  
 
3. Military expenditure has a significant and negative effect on economic 
growth in India and in 36 developing countries. 
By applying the Deger type model and 3SLS approach, the effects of India’s military 
expenditure on its economic growth are estimated and the empirical results show that the 
net effect of defence on growth is significant and negative in India during 1970-2003. 
For 36 developing countries between 1975 and 2004, both cross-sectional and panel 
results indicate that the increases in military spending would reduce economic growth. 
Specially, the uses of robust estimators (FGLS and System GMM) and augment Solow 
model with human capital variable and military variable are noteworthy and have added 
to literature on the defence-growth relationship. 
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5.2 Further Research 
This thesis has strengths but is far from perfect where some limitations exist. Here, we 
review some of the limitations and propose possible solutions which could be possible 
directions for further research. 
 
There are some limitations in Chapter 2. Firstly, the arms race between India and Pakistan 
is empirically analyzed by using real military expenditure data. However, the accuracy and 
reliability of military expenditure data are always problematic due to many reasons such as 
different definitions, different measurements and different data sources. Furthermore, the 
India-Pakistan arms race might be estimated by using not only military expenditure data 
but also arms stock and military personnel data. That will depend on better data availability. 
Secondly, as we discussed, there might be more than two players in an arms race. In the 
case of India, China could be another important factor that influences India’s arms 
acquisition process. Thus, there is a possible multi-player arms race among India, China 
and Pakistan where India responds to China and Pakistan and Pakistan responds to India. 
In the case of Pakistan, Afghanistan may play a similar role where Pakistan’s military 
preparedness against one neighbour may constitute a threat to the other neighbour. Thirdly, 
in our empirical analysis of India-Pakistan arms race for the period 1960-2007, one 
structural break is used to allow for a regime shift in 1997. Two structural breaks could be 
estimated in the cointegration framework relying on a longer period and improved 
methodologies. 
 
The main limitation of Chapter 3 is data availability. Internal security challenges do 
influence India’s military expenditure but data and the suitable proxy for internal security 
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are very hard to access. Data on annual insurgencies number, casualties and activities of 
terrorists in India need to be collected in further studies. Also, India treats China as its 
major external threats. The data on Chinese military expenditure are also problematic.  
 
In Chapter 4, there are still some limitations due to data availability and reliability. One of 
the main problems in growth models is the use of human capital variables. In terms of 
India’s growth equation, there is no proper data available for India’s human capital. In our 
panel data analysis, data on average number of years of schooling are used as a proxy of 
human capital. However, similar with other available data such as the education 
expenditure and enrolment ratio, data on schooling years are not output but input of human 
capital. Thus, those data are not expected to provide good indicators for a country’s human 
capital. Better human capital data offers scope for further work.  
 
This thesis has added to knowledge of defence economics by its comprehensive analyses 
of the causes and effects of India’s military expenditure. It also provides a panel data 
estimations of the defence-growth relationship in 36 developing countries. The empirical 
studies are based on specific circumstances of a single country or a group of developing 
countries with specific regression models and econometric methodologies. The empirical 
results of this thesis are noteworthy and make contributions to the defence economics 
literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
References 
Aizenman, J. and Glick, R. (2003). Military Expenditure, Threats and Growth. NBER 
Working Paper , 9618，Massachusetts. 
Aizenman, J. and Glick, R. (2006). Military Expenditure, Threats and Growth. The Journal 
of International Trade & Economic Development: An International and Comparative 
Review, 15 (2), 129 – 155. 
Alesina, A. , Spolaore, E. and Wacziarg, R. (2008). Trade, Growth and Size of Countries. 
in (ed), P. Agnion, S.N.Durlauf, Handbook of Economic Growth,  North Holland, 
Amstrerdam (2008) 
Anderton, C. (1992). A New Look at the Relationship Among Arms Races, Disannament, 
and the Probability of War. In M. C. Forcey, Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and 
Management of Peace. New York: Praeger. 
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1995). Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation 
of Error-Components Models. Journal of Econometrics, 68, 29-52. 
Arellano,M. and Bond, S. (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and An Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies, 58, 
277-297. 
Bahmani-Oskooee, M. and Nasir, A. (2004). ARDL Approach to Test the Productivity 
Bias Hypothesis. Review of Development Economics, 8 (3), 483-488. 
Ball, N. (1983). Defence and Development: A Critique of Benoit Study. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 31 (3), 507-524. 
Ball, N. (1988). Security and Economy in the Third World. London: Adamantine Press 
Limited. 
Barrett, R. and S. Sen. (2009). War and Peace: Rational Defence and the Case of South 
Asia. the Public Choice Society Annual Meeting. Las Vegas. 
Barro, R J. and X. Sala- i-Martin. (1995). Economic Growth. The MIT Press. 
Barro, R. J. and Lee, J. W. (2000). International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates 
and Implications. CID Working Paper No. 42. 
Batchelor, P. Dunne, P. and Lam, G. (2002). The Demand for Military Spending in South 
Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 39 (3), 339-354. 
171 
 
Batchelor, P., Dunne, P. and Saal, D. (2000). Military Spending and Economic Growth in 
South Africa. Defence and Peace Economics, 11 (6), 553–571. 
Benoit, E. (1978). Growth and defence in LDCs. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change , 26, 271-280. 
Biswas, B. and Ram R. (1986). Military Spending and Economic Growth in Less 
Developed Countries: An Augmented Model and Further Evidence. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 34 (2), 361-372. 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998). Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic 
Panel Data Models. Journal of Econometrics, 87 (1), 115-143. 
Blundell, R. and S. Bond. (2000). GMM Estimation with Persistent Panel Data: An 
Application to Production Functions. Econometric Reviews, 19 (3), 321-340. 
Bond, S., Hoeffler, A. and Temple, J. (2001). GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth 
Models,No 2001-W21. Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. 
Bremer. (1986). The GLOBUS Model. Boulder: Westview. 
Brito, D.L. and M.D. Intriligator . (1995). Arms Race and Proliferation. In K. a. Hartley, 
Handbook of Defence Economics (pp. 109-164). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
Caselli, F., G. Esquivel and Lefort, F. (1996). Reopening the Convergence Debate: A New 
Look at Cross-Country Growth Empirics. Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 363-389. 
Charemza, W.W. and Deadman, D.F. (1992). New Directions in Econometric Practice. 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Choucri, N. and R. C. North. (1975). Nations in Conflict. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. 
Chowdhury, A. (1991). Defence Spending and Economic Growth. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution , 35 (1), 80-97. 
Christiano, L. (1992). Searching for a Break in GNP. Journal of Business and Economic 
Statistics , 10, 237-249. 
Clemente, J., Montanes, A., and Reyes, M. (1998). Testing for a Unit Root in Variables 
with a Double Change in the Mean. Economics Letters, 59, 175-182. 
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002). Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid and Arms Races. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2927, Washington. 
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., Elliot, L., Hegre, H., Reynal-Querol, M. and Sambanis, N. (2003). 
Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington, DC and New 
York : Oxford University Press and the World Bank . 
172 
 
Cusack, T. R. and M. D. Ward. (1981). Military spending in the United States, Soviet 
Union, and the People's Republic of China. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25, 429-469. 
Dakurah A. H., Davies, S. P. and Sampath, R. K. (2001). Defense Spending and Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries: A Causality Analysis. Journal of Policy Modelling, 23, 
651–658. 
Deger, S. and Sen S. (1983). Military Expenditure, Spin-off and Economic Development. 
Journal of Development Economics, 13, 67-83. 
Deger, S. and Sen, S. (1995). Military ExpenditLires and Third World Countries. In K. 
Hartley, & T. Sandler (Eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics (Vol. 1, pp. 275–307). 
Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Deger, S. and Sen, S. (1990). Military Security and the Economy: Defence Expenditure in 
India and Pakistan. In K. H. Sandler, The Economics of Defence Spending. London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Deger, S. and Smith, R. (1983). Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed 
Countries. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27 (2), 335-353. 
Deger, S. (1986a). Economic Development and Defence Expenditure. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 35 (1), 179-196. 
Deger, S. (1986b). Militaný Expenditure and Third World Countries: The Economic Effect. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,. 
Dickey, D. and W. A. Fuller. (1979). Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive 
Time Series with a Unit Root. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, 427-431. 
Division, U. N. (2008). Government Final Consumption Expenditure by Function at 
Current Prices. UN Data. Accessed in 08/2009. 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=government+&d=SNA&f=group_code%3a301. 
Dommen, E. and Maizels, A. (1988). The Military Burden in Developing Countries. The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 26 (3), 377-401. 
Dunne, J. P., Smith, R. P. and Willenbockel, D. (2005). Models of Military Expenditure 
and Growth: A Critical Review. Defence and Peace Economics, 16 (6), 449-461. 
Dunne, J.P. and Mohammed N.A.L. (1995). Military Spending in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Journal of Peace Research, 32 (3), 331-343. 
173 
 
Dunne, J.P., Nikolaidou, E. and Roux, A. (2000). Defence Spending and Economic 
Growth in South Africa: A Supply and Demand Model. Defence and Peace Economics, 11 
(4), 573 — 585. 
Dunne, P. and Perlo Freeman, S. (2003a). The Demand for Military Spending in 
Developing Countries. International Review of Applied Economics, 17 (1), 23-48. 
Dunne, P. and Perlo Freeman, S. (2003b). The Demand for Military Spending in 
Developing Countries: A Dynamic Panel Analysis. Defence and Peace Economics, 14 (6), 
461-474. 
Dunne, P. and R. Smith. (2007). The Econometrics of Arms Races. In Hartley, K. and 
Sandler, T., Handbook of Defence Economics (Vol. 2, pp. 913-940). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Dunne, P., Eftychia, N. and Smith, R. (1999). Arms Race Models and Econometric 
Applications. The Arms Trade, Security and Conflict. Middlesex University Business 
School. 
Dunne, P., Perlo Freeman, S. and Smith, R. (2008). The Demand for Military Expenditure 
in Developing Countries: Hostility versus Capability. Defence and Peace Economics, 19 
(4), 293 - 302. 
Engle, R.F. and C.W.J. Granger. (1987). Co-integration and error correction: 
Representation, estimation and testing. Econometrica, 55, 251-76. 
Engle, R.F. and Yoo, B.S. Cointegrated Economic Time Series: an O (Alesina, A. Enrico 
Spolaore and RomainWacziarg)verview with New Results. In R. a. Engle, Long Run 
Economic Relationships. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Faini, R., Annez. P. and Taylor, T. (1984). Defence Spending. Economic Structure and 
Growth Evidence among Countries and Overtime. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, 32 (3), 487-498. 
Feder, G. (1983). On Exports and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Development, 
12, 59-73. 
Frederiksen, P. C and Looney, R. E. (1983). Defence Expenditures and Economic Growth 
in Developing Countries. Armed Forces and Society, 9 (4), 633-645. 
Galvin, H. (2003). The Impact of Defence Spending on the Economic Growth of 
Developing Countries: A Cross-Section Study. Defence and Peace Economics, 14 (1), 51–
59. 
174 
 
Government final consumption expenditure by function at current prices. (n.d.). Retrieved 
08/2009, from UN data. 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNA&f=group_code%3a301%3bitem_code%3a11 
Gregory, A. W and Hansen, B. E. (1996). Tests for Cointegration in Models with Regime 
and Trend Shifts. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 58, 555-560. 
Gregory, A. W. and B. E. Hansen. 1996. (1996). Residual-Based Tests of Cointegration in 
Models with Regime Shifts. Journal of Econometrics, 70, 99-126. 
Hartley, K. and Sandler, T. (1995). Handbook of Defence Economics, Vol. 1. North 
Holland: Amsterdam. 
Hartley, T. and B. Russett. (1992). Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who 
Governs Military Spending in the United States? American Political Science Review, 86 
(4), 905-915. 
Hewitt, D. (1996). Military Expenditures 1972-1990: The Resons Behind The Post-1985 
Fall In World Military Spending. Public Budgeting and Financial Management, 7 (4), 520-
558. 
Hollist, W. L. (1977). Alternative Explanations of Competitive Arms Processes: Tests on 
Four Pairs of Nations. American Journal of Political Science, 21 (2), 313-340. 
Huang, C. and Mintz, A. (1991). "Defence Expenditure and Economic Growth: The 
Externahty Effect. Defence Economics, 3 (2), 35-40. 
India Security Threat Environment. (1998). Retrieved at 08/2009. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/threat/index.html. 
Intriligator, M. D. and D. L. Brito. (1986). Arms Races and Instability. Journal of. 
Strategic Studies, 9, 113-131. 
Intriligator, M. D. and D. L. Brito. (1984). Can Anns Races Lead to the Outbreak of War? 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28 (1), 63-84. 
Intriligator, M. D. and D. L. Brito. (1976). Formal Models of Arms Races. Journal of 
Peace Science, 2 (1), 77-88. 
Intriligator, M. D. (1975). Strategic Considerations in the Richardson Model of Arms Race. 
Journal of Political Economy, 83 (2), 339-353. 
Isard, W. and C.H. Anderton. (1988). A Survey of Anns Race Models. In W. Isard, Arms 
Races, Arms Control and Conflict Analysis (pp. 17-85). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
175 
 
Islam, N. (1995). Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 110 (4), 1127-1170. 
Johansen, S and K. Juselius. (1990). Some Structural Hypotheses in a Multivariate 
Cointegration Analysis of the Purchasing Power Parity and the Uncovered Interest Parity 
for UK. Discussion Papers 89-11. University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. 
Johansen, S. (1992). Determination of Co-integration Rank in the Presence of a Linear 
Trend. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 54, 383–397. 
Johansen, S. (1995). Likelihood-based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive 
Model. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Karagianni and Pempetzoglu. (2009). Defense Spending And Economic Growth In Turkey: 
A Linear And Non-Linear Granger Causality Approach. Defence and Peace Economics, 20 
(2), 139–148. 
Klein, T. (2004). Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: Peru 1970-1996. Defence 
and Peace Economics, 15 (3), 275 - 288. 
Knight, M., Loayza, N. and Villanueva, D. (1996). The Peace Dividend: Military Spending 
Cuts and Economic Growth. IMF Staff Papers, 1-44. 
Kollias, C., Naxakis, C. and Zarangas, L. (2004). Defence Spending and Growth in Cyprus: 
A Causal Analysis. Defence and Peace Economics, 15 (3), 299 — 307. 
Kusi, N. K. (1994). Economic Growth and Defence Spending in Developing Countrics. 
Joumal of Conflict Resolution, 38 (1), 152-159. 
Kwiatkowski D., Phillips P.C.B., Schmidt P., and Y.Shin. (1992). Testing the Null of 
Stationarity against the Alternative of a Unit Root. Journal of Econometrics, 54, 159-178. 
Lai, C.N., Huang, B.N. and Yang, C.W. (2005). Defense Spending and Economic Growth 
Across the Taiwan Straits: A Threshold Regression Model. Defence and Peace Economics , 
16 (1), 45–57. 
Lee, C. C. and Chen, S. T. (2007). Do Defence Expenditures Spur GDP? A Panel Analysis 
From OECD And Non-OECD Countries. Defence and Peace Economics, 18 (3), 265–280. 
Lee, J. and Strazicich, M.C. (2004). Minimum LM Unit Root Test with One Structural 
Break. Working Paper, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, North 
Carolina.  
Lee, J. and Strazicich, M.C. (2003). Minimum LM Unit Root Test with Two Structural 
Breaks. Review of Economics and Statistics, 63, 1082-1089. 
176 
 
Liossatos, P. (1980). Modeling the nuclear arms race: a search for stability. Journal of 
Peace Science, 4, 169-185. 
Looney, R. (1989). Internal and External Factors in Effecting Third World Military 
Expenditures. Journal of Peace Research, 26 (1), 33-46. 
Lucier, C. E. (1979). Changes in the Values of Arms Race Parameters. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 23 (1), 17-39. 
Lumsdaine, R. L and. Papell, D. H. (1997). Multiple Trend Breaks and the Unit Root 
Hypothesis. Review of Economics and Statistics, 79 (2), 212-218. 
Luterbacher, U. (1976). Arms Race Models: Where Do We Stand? European Journal of 
Political Research, 3, 199–217. 
Maddala, G.S. and Kim, I.M. (1998). Unit Root, Cointegration and Structural Change. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Maizels, A. and Nissanke, M. (1986). The Determinants of Military Expenditure in 
Developing, Countries. World Development, 14 (9), 1125-1140. 
Majeski, S. (1983). Mathematical Models of the U. S. Miltary Expenditure Decision-
Making Processes. American Journal ofPolitical Science, 27, 485-514. 
Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D. and Weil, D. N. (1992). A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 407–437. 
McGuire, M. C. (1965). Secrecy and the Arms Race. Cambridge: MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Mintz, A. and Stevenson, R. T. (1995). Defense Expenditures, Economic Growth, and the 
‘Peace Dividend’: A Longitudinal Analysis of 103 Countries. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 39, 283–305. 
Murdoch, J. C., Pi, C.R. and Sandler, T. (1997). The Impact of Defense and Non-defense 
Public Spending on Growth in Asia and Latin America. Defence and Peace Economics, 8 
(2), 205–224. 
Murdoch, J.C. and Sandler, T. (2002b). Civil Wars And Economic Growth: A Regional 
Comparison. Defence and Peace Economics, 13 (6), 451–464. 
Murdoch, J.C. and Sandler, T. (2002a). Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial 
Spillovers. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46 (1), 91-110. 
177 
 
Nerlove, M. (2000). Growth Rate Convergence, Fact or Artifact? An Essay on Panel Data 
Econometrics. In E. Ronchetti (Ed.), Panel Data Econometrics: Future Directions: Papers 
in Honour of Professor Pietro Balestra. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects. Econometrica , 94 (5), 
1002-1037. 
Öcal, N. (2003). Are the Military Expenditures of India and Pakistan External 
Determinants for Each Other: An Empirical Investigation. Defence and Peace Economics, 
14, 141 - 149. 
Oren, I. (1994). The Indo-Pakistani Arms Competition: A Deductive and Statistical 
Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38 (2), 185-214. 
Ostrom, C.W. and Marra, R.F. (1986). US Defense Spending and the Soviet Estimate. 
American Political Science Review, 80, 819-842. 
Perron, P. and Vogelsang, T. J. (1992). Nonstationarity and Level Shifts with an 
Application to Purchasing Power Parity. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 10, 
301–320. 
Perron, P. (1989). The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis. 
Econometrica, 57, 1361-1401. 
Pesaran, M. H. and Shin, Y. (1999). An Autoregressive Distributed Lag Modelling 
Approach to Cointegration Analysis. In S. H. Strom, Centennial Volume of Ragnar Frisch. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ram, R. (1995). Defense expenditure and economic growth. In K. Hartley, & T. Sandler 
(Eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics (pp. 251–273). Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Ramos, E. M. (2004). CountrySurvey XIX: Mexico. Defence and Peace Economics, 15 (1), 
83–99. 
Rattinger, H. (1975). Armaments, Detente, and Bureaucracy. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 19 (4), 571-595. 
Reitschuler, G. and Loening, J.L. (2005). Modeling the Defense-Growth Nexus in 
Guatemala. World Development, 33 (3), 513–526. 
Richardson, L. F. (1960). Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of Causes and 
Origins of War. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press. 
Rosh, R. (1988). Third World Militarization: Security Webs and the States They Ensure. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32 (4), 671-698. 
178 
 
Said, S. E. and D. A. Dickey. (1984). Testing for Unit Roots in Autoregressive-Moving 
Average Models of Unknown Order. Biometrika , 71, 599-607. 
Sezgin, S. (2001). An Empirical Analysis of Turkey's Defence-Growth Relationships with 
A Multi-Equation Model (1956-1994). Defence and Peace Economics, 12 (1), 69 — 86. 
Sezgin, S. (1997). Country survey X: Defence spending in Turkey. Defence and Peace 
Economics, 8 (4), 381–409. 
Siljak, D. D. (1977). On the Stability of the Arms Race. In J. V. Zimmes, Mathematical 
Systems in International relations reserch. New York: Praeger Publishers. 
SIPRI. (various years). SIPRI Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmaments. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Smith, R. (1980). Military Expenditure and Investment in OECD Countries 1954-1973. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 4 (1), 19-32. 
Smith, R. (1989). Models of Military Expenditure. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 4 (4), 
345-359. 
Smith, R. (1995). The Demand for Military Spending. In Hartley, K. and Sandler, T., 
Handbook of Defense Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
Smith, R.P., Dunne, P. and Nikolaidou, E. (2000). The Econometrics of Arms Races. 
Defence and Peace Economics, 11, 31-43. 
Solow, R. M. (1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 70, 65-94. 
Stock, J.H., and M. W. Watson. (1993). A Simple Estimator of Cointegrating Vectors in 
Higher Order Integrated Systems. Econometrica, 61, 783-820. 
Stroup, M.D. and Heckelman, J.C. (2001). Size Of The Military Sector And Economic 
Growth: A Panel Data Analysis Of Africa And Latin America. Journal of Applied 
Economics, IV (2), 329-360. 
Sun,Q. and Yu,Q. (1999). Determinants of China's Military Expenditures: 1965-93. 
Journal of Peace Research, 36, 23-33. 
Tambudzai, Z. (2005). Determinants of Zimbabwe's Military Expenditure, 1980-2003. The 
Biennial Conference of the Economic Society of South Africa (ESSA). Durbanm, South 
Africa. 
179 
 
Tambudzai, Z. (2007). Military Burden Determinants in Southern Africa, 1996-2005: A 
Cross-section and Panel Data Analysis. Economic Development in Africa Conference. 
Oxford: St Catherine's College. 
Wallace, M.D. and J.M. Wilson. (1978). Non-linear Arms Race Models. Journal of Peace 
Research, 15, 175-192. 
Ward, M. D., Davis, D., Penubarti, M., Rajmaira, S. and Cochran, M. (1991). Military 
Spending in India: Country Survey I. Defence Economics, 3 (1), 41-63. 
Weede, E. (1986). Rent Seeking, Military Participation and Economic Performance in 
LDCs. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30, 291-314. 
Whynes, D. (1979). The Economics ofThird World Military Expenditures. Austin: 
University of Texas Press. 
Wolfson, M. (1968). A Mathematical Model of the Cold War. Peace Research Society, 9, 
107-123. 
Wolfson, M. (1990). Perestroika and the quest for peace. Defense Economics, 1 (3), 221-
232. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross-section and Panel Data. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
World Development Indicators. (n.d.). Retrieved 2009, from World Bank Database: 
http://esdsw2.mc.manchester.ac.uk/WDS_WB/TableViewer/dimView.aspx?ReportId=57 
Yaffee, R. (2003). Connect: Information technology.  
Retrieved from www.nyu.edu/its/socsci/Docs/pda.pdf. 
Yakovlev, P. (2007). Arms Trade, Military Spending, and Economic Growth. Defence and 
peace Economics, 18 (4), 317–338. 
Yildirim, J. and Sezgin, S. (2005). Democracy and Military Expenditure: A Cross-Country 
Evidence. Transition Studies Review, 12 (1), 93-100. 
Yildirim, J., Sezgin, S. and Ocal, N. (2005). Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in 
Middle Eastern Countries: A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis. Defence and Peace 
Economics, , 16 (4), 283–295. 
Yu, M. (2002). The Impact of US-China Relations on Taiwan's MIlitary Spending: An 
Analytical Model of Error Correction Mechanism. APSA's Annual Meeting. Boston. 
180 
 
Zivot, E. and Andrews, K. (1992). Further Evidence On The Great Crash, The Oil Price 
Shock, and The Unit Root Hypothesis. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics. , 10 
(10), 251–270. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 
 
Appendix 
Table A1 Real military expenditure of India and Pakistan (at constant 2000 price US$), 
1960-2007 
Year MEI MEP Year MEI MEP 
1960 1321.799 381.9202 1984 5924.147 2021.198 
1961 1426.415 378.0614 1985 6627.872 2189.434 
1962 1960.404 362.2588 1986 7672.583 2395.653 
1963 3208.831 391.6982 1987 8369.799 2532.142 
1964 3132.25 441.388 1988 9264.527 2485.322 
1965 3061.708 712.6479 1989 9875.283 2500.679 
1966 2883.094 831.1688 1990 9694.537 2652.806 
1967 2693.723 676.9279 1991 9068.909 2815.423 
1968 2815.647 695.9878 1992 8692.082 3011.685 
1969 2983.993 756.6471 1993 9806.598 3005.727 
1970 3076.893 825.6237 1994 9851.336 2912.659 
1971 3668.71 988.3939 1995 10122.75 2963.012 
1972 3868.027 1095.882 1996 10317.7 2972.152 
1973 3416.427 961.0761 1997 11410.88 2840.754 
1974 3181.502 958.6795 1998 11918.63 2836.277 
1975 3576.109 964.0188 1999 13840.15 2859.627 
1976 4191.85 966.8556 2000 14285.71 2870.457 
1977 4077.015 965.7902 2001 14786.69 3071.972 
1978 4239.154 1030.303 2002 14740.18 3289.02 
1979 4453.845 1134.763 2003 15071.15 3518.876 
1980 4729.271 1285.38 2004 15497.36 3670.599 
1981 4960.858 1395.466 2005 17978.45 3815.276 
1982 5390.918 1682.265 2006 19070.01 3857.854 
1983 5611.84 1880.543 2007 19407.92 3835.264 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook (various years) 
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Table A2 Defence Burden of India and Pakistan, 1960-2007 
Year DBI DBP Year DBI DBP 
1960 1.9 2.8 1984 3.4 6.6 
1961 1.9 2.6 1985 3.4 6.5 
1962 2.6 2.4 1986 3.4 7.1 
1963 3.8 2.4 1987 3.6 6.9 
1964 3.6 2.6 1988 3.6 6.2 
1965 3.6 4 1989 3.5 6 
1966 3.4 4.5 1990 3.2 5.8 
1967 3.1 3.5 1991 3 5.8 
1968 3.1 3.4 1992 2.8 6.1 
1969 3 3.5 1993 2.9 5.7 
1970 3 3.8 1994 2.8 5.3 
1971 3.4 4.5 1995 2.7 5.3 
1972 3.5 7.2 1996 2.6 5.1 
1973 3 6.2 1997 2.7 4.9 
1974 3 6.1 1998 2.8 4.8 
1975 3.3 6 1999 3.1 3.8 
1976 3.4 5.7 2000 3.1 3.7 
1977 3 5.4 2001 3 3.8 
1978 3.4 5.5 2002 2.9 3.9 
1979 3.5 5.6 2003 2.8 3.7 
1980 3.2 5.7 2004 2.9 3.6 
1981 3.2 5.9 2005 2.8 3.5 
1982 3.3 6.6 2006 2.6 3.3 
1983 3.3 6.9 2007 2.5 3.1 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook (various years) 
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Table A3 Military Personnel of India and Pakistan, 1985-2005 (Thousands) 
Year Military Personnel 
1985 1260.0  
1989 1260.0  
1990 1260.0  
1991 1270.0  
1992 1270.0  
1993 1270.0  
1994 1270.0  
1995 2149.5  
1996 2223.0  
1997 2223.0  
1998 2265.0  
1999 2263.0  
2000 2372.0  
2001 2352.7  
2002 2387.7  
2003 2414.7  
2004 2617.0  
2005 3047.0  
Source: World Bank Development Indicator, 2009. 
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Table A4.  Estimation Results for the First Differenced SEM (1970-2003) 
Estimation method 
Explaining 
variables 3SLS 2SLS OLS 
Growth  
dlns -0.15 0.19 -0.11 0.22 -0.03 0.07 
equation 
dlndbi -0.20 0.13 -0.11 0.15 0.01 0.10 
dlntb 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
dlnl -0.33 0.32 -0.32 0.36 -0.31 0.31 
constant 0.04 0.01*** 0.04 0.01*** 0.04 0.01*** 
Saving 
dlndbi 0.23 0.68 1.14 0.47 0.76 0.36** 
equation 
g -0.80 0.88 -0.22 1.01 -0.37 0.58 
dtb -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.03 
dlninf -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.03 
dlnng -0.26 0.68 -0.36 0.79 -0.61 0.51 
constant -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 
Balance of  
dlndbi -1.96 2.78 -1.29 3.05 1.09 1.90 
trade equation 
g -1.99 6.47 -2.30 7.09 -1.81 3.88 
dlnreer -5.97 2.39** -6.10 2.63** -5.40 2.35** 
ddummy -0.09 0.46 0.15 0.52 0.11 0.50 
constant -0.18 0.54 -0.22 0.61 -0.18 0.52 
Defence 
dlngdpci -0.45 0.37 -0.20 0.45 -0.20 0.45 
equation 
dlnpop -1.42 4.22 -1.64 5.04 -1.44 4.98 
dlndemoc -0.41 0.31 -0.47 0.37 -0.45 0.36 
dtb 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
dlndbp 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 
dwar 0.07 0.03** 0.08 0.03** 0.08 0.03** 
constant 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.10 
Notes: Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
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Table A5 Unit Root Tests  
The Null Hypothesis: Residual has a unit root 
 t-statistics Prob.  
Residual 1 -5.928 0.000*** 
Residual 2 -4.878 0.000*** 
Residual 3 -3.293 0.023** 
Residual 4 -2.965 0.050** 
Notes: 
1) MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
2) Significance levels: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
3) Residual 1, 2, 3, 4 are from growth equation, saving equation, trade balance equation 
and defence equation, respectively.  
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A6: List of Variables Descriptions in Empirical Estimations 
Chapter 2 
LNMEI   the logarithm of the real military expenditure of India  
LNMEP  the logarithm of the real military expenditure of Pakistan 
Chapter 3 
mei  India’s real military expenditure in constant 2000 million US$ 
gdpc  India’s GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ 
pop  Total population of India valued in millions 
cge   the share of central government expenditure of India in its GDP 
tb India’s share of trade balance in GDP 
democ  democracy index 
dbp  the defence burden of Pakistan as a rival of India 
sw  the security web of India 
riots  the number of riots in India in one year as a internal threat proxy 
war   War dummy for the India’s external wars with Pakistan and China 
 
Chapter 4 
 
For the study of India: 
g  the growth measured as the log of real GDP minus the log of real GDP 
in the previous year 
s  the share of gross national saving to GDP 
tb the balance of trade measured by the share of external balance on goods 
and services to GDP 
m  India’s military expenditure measured by the share of military 
expenditure to GDP 
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l  the rate of population growth as a proxy for labour growth 
inf  the inflation rate 
ng the share of non-defence government expenditure to GDP, 
reer   real effective exchange rate 
dummy a dummy variable for second oil shock in 1980 
gdpc  India’s GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ 
pop   the total population of India valued in millions 
democ   the democracy index 
dbp  the defence burden of Pakistan as a rival of India 
war  War dummy for the India’s external wars with Pakistan and China 
 
For the study of cross-sectional and panel data of 36 developing countries: 
lny Log of real GDP per capita (Laspeyres) 
lnlagy Lagged of lny 
gr the difference of lny between 2004 and 1975 
g the difference of lny for the six five-year periods 
lnk Five-year average investment as a share of GDP 
lnngd Five-year average population growth rate n plus 0.05 
lnh Average number of years of schooling of both sexes 
25 years of age or older 
m Five-year average military expenditure as a share of GDP 
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A7 Literature Review on the Defence-Growth Relationships for Chapter 4, Section 4.2 
4.2.1 Benoit’s (1978) work 
Based on cross-section methods, Benoit (1978) estimated a sample of 44 LDCs for the 
period 1950-1965 and found that “countries with a heavy defence burden generally had the 
most rapid rate of growth and those with the lowest defence burdens tended to show the 
lowest growth rates.” His estimations are based on the following regression equation: 
 g¸ /
 ga 
 gQ 
 >gG 
 n (4.1) 
where g¸is the civilian growth rate, ga is the defence burden, AI is the investment ratio 
and gG is bilateral aid. All variables are averaged over the period 1950-1965; n is the 
error term. Alternative regression equations with fewer independent variables were also 
estimated. The results indicate that defence burden is a significant determinant of growth. 
Benoit also tests the effects of growth on defence and find that growth seems to only have 
a weak influence on defence burdens. Thus, he believes that the causation between 
economic growth and defence burden appears to go from defence to growth rather than 
vice versa.  
 
By analyzing the opportunity costs and benefits of defence on growth, Benoit denotes that 
the defence sector may make contributions to civilian sectors and the opportunity cost of 
defence expenditure may be quite low. The reason of possible low opportunity cost is that 
the alternative uses of resources which are not spent on defence might go into consumption 
and social investment rather than productive investments. Thus, a heavier defence burden 
can increase the total uses of resource and the benefits of defence can offset the adverse 
growth effects.  
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However, as the starting point of studying defence-growth relationships, Benoit’s work has 
some weaknesses which are criticised by subsequent research. Frederiksen and Looney 
(1983) extend Benoit’s work by using the same sample, the same period and the same 
estimating method. They criticise Benoit’s 44 LDCs sample as unsuitable and the 
estimation is based on a presumption that the defence burden can account for a reasonable 
share of the unallocable explanatory power.  They claim that the sample countries should 
be divided into groups with similar characteristics.  In their studies, sample countries are 
divided into two groups: poor countries (resource constrained) and relatively rich countries 
(relatively abundant financial resources). Their estimating results indicate that defence 
plays an important and positive role in enhancing growth for relatively rich countries but 
poor countries experience a negative growth effect.   
 
Biswas and Ram (1986) re-estimate Benoit’s regression equations for 58 LDCs for the 
periods1960-1970 and 1970-1977. The samples are also separated into low-income and 
middle-income LDCs. GDP growth is regressed as a function of the labour force growth 
rate, the ratio of investment in GDP and military burden. They find that the estimated 
coefficient on military burden is statistically insignificant for the low-income LDCs in both 
periods. The empirical results indicate that Benoit's result is a special case and cannot be 
reproduced. 
 
Ball (1983) criticizes Benoit’s work on his defined variables and the interpretations of the 
regression. There are serious problems in definition of foreign aid and the interpretation of 
relationships between foreign aid, military expenditure and economic growth. Another 
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problem is the potentially favourable growth effects of defence burden. Rather than 
regression analysis, Benoit claims that the net effect of defence burden on economic 
growth is positive which is only based on his assessment of non-quantifiable benefits from 
defence to growth.  
 
4.2.2 Demand-side Models 
4.2.2.1 Theoretical Models 
The demand-side models are based on the Keynesian theory which treats military 
expenditure as a component of the aggregate demand. The national accounting identity 
specifies the demand side and can be written as: 
 "  É #  ® 
 Q 
 
 a (4.2) 
where Y is  actual output, Q is potential output, W is the gap between the actual and 
potential output, C is the aggregate consumption, I is the investment (public and private), 
M is the real military expenditure, and B is the balance of trade. In terms of the share of 
potential output, the Equation (4.2) can be rearranged as: 
   1    *   < (4.3) 
 
Smith (1980) provides the share of consumption as follows: 
 *  	/  	  	 (4.4) 
where u is the unemployment rate and g is the growth rate of actual output. Increases in u 
and g can reduce the share of consumption of potential output. Then: 
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Assuming that (w+b), which reflects the balance between domestic demand and potential 
supply, is related to u, unemployment rate, one could get: 
  
 <   (4.6) 
Thus: 
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 	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 (4.7) 
The Equation (4.7) can examine the possibility of crowding-out. Military burden is apt to 
have a negative effect on investment and then this crowding-out effect will have a negative 
effect on growth.  
 
4.2.2.2 Empirical Studies 
Demand side models are used to investigate the possibility of a crowding-out effect (i.e. as 
one source of demand, military expenditure would compete for scarce resources with other 
sources). Faini, Annez and Taylor (1984) suggest that in poor countries, increases in 
military expenditure are associated with lower investment and saving shares in GDP and 
would likely limit the output growth. Based on the Keynesian demand identities, they 
provide a regression equation to empirically estimate the effect of military expenditure as 
follows:  
 "  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«Ê 
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 n (4.8) 
where Y' is the growth rate of GDP, E' is the growth rate of exports, P' is the growth rate of 
population, ∆C is the change in share of arms spending in GDP, ∆© is the change in capital 
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inflows from abroad, K' is the growth rate of the country's capital stock, "/S is GDP per 
capita, and n is a error term. 
 
Using a fixed effect model, Faini, Annez and Taylor (1984) estimate the effect of arms 
spending on growth for subgroups of 69 countries for the period 1950-1972. Their 
empirical results indicate that military expenditure has a clear negative impact on the 
growth rate for all developing country groups in the sample. The impact of defence burden 
on the investment share in GDP is also traced by their study and they find that an increase 
of 1% in the defence burden is associated with a reduction of 0.23% in the investment 
share in GDP. Thus military expenditure partly crowds-out investment and slows growth. 
Furthermore, the time-series estimation for India is carried out for the period covering 
period 1950- 1971. For India, defence spending had a negative impact on economic growth 
but the relationship between defence burden and investment share is positive which 
presents opposite results with cross-section estimations.  
 
Deger (1986b) investigates investment equations with defence as an independent variable 
for 50 LDCs, 1965-1973. The investment ratio of GDP is a function of the growth rate, the 
defence burden and other variables such as exports, imports and the balance of payments 
(all as proportions of GDP). The cross-sectional results show that the estimated 
coefficients of defence burden in all alternative investment equations are statistically 
significant and negative. The absolute value of the coefficient of defence burden is below 
unity (about one-third). Thus, there is little doubt empirically that military expenditure 
partly crowds out investment in LDCs.  
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Knight et al. (1996) examines the relationship between defence and investment in 79 
countries for the period 1971-1985. The ratio of investment in fixed capital is regressed as 
a function of the rate of investment in human capital, the restrictiveness of the trade system, 
the incidence of war proxy and the defence burden. Their panel data estimating results 
reveal that increases in military expenditure have a statistically significant and negative 
impact on investment and prove the existence of the crowding-out effect.  
 
These empirical analyses of demand-side models have been criticized for the failure to 
consider supply side issues and are apt to be associated with a negative impact on 
economic growth because defence spending crowds-out investment. Sandler and Hartley 
(1995) suggest that both the supply-side and demand-side influences should be constructed 
in a model to provide a more accurate analysis of the defence-growth relationship.   
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Table 4.1 Review on Benoit and Demand Side Literature 
Author(s) Sample Remarks Main Conclusion 
Panel A: Benoit Studies 
1 Benoit (1978) 44 LDCs, 
1950-1965 
Correlations and cross-sectional 
estimation (OLS)  
Positive and significant effect of defence spending on 
growth. 
2. Frederiksen and 
Looney (1983) 
44 LDCs, 
1950-1965 
Subgroups cross-sectional 
estimation 
Defence plays an important and positive role in 
enhancing growth for relatively rich countries but poor 
countries experience a negative growth effect.   
3. Biswas and Ram 
(1986) 
58 LDCs, 
1960-1970, and 
1970-1977 
Subgroups cross-sectional 
estimation 
Insignificant effect of defence spending on growth for 
the low-income LDCs. 
 
Panel B: Demand Side studies 
4. Faini, Annez 
and Taylor (1984) 
69 countries  
(mainly LDCs), 
1952-1970 
Subgroups cross-sectional  
time series estimation 
Negative effect of military burden on investment and 
economic growth in LDCs.  
5. Deger (1986b) 50 LDCs, 
1965-1973 
Cross-sectional estimation Negative effect of military burden on investment. 
6. Knight et al. 
(1996) 
79 countries, 
1971-1985 
Panel estimation (fixed effect) Negative effect of military burden on investment. 
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4.2.3 Supply-side models 
4.2.3.1 Theoretical models 
The supply-side models are based on Feder’s (1983) model of the effects of exports on 
economic growth. Biswas and Ram (1986) employs Feder’s methodology for analysing the 
defence-growth relationship in a two-sector (military and civilian) framework and since 
then many other studies have employed several versions of the Feder-Ram model. The 
models consider the externality effect of military sector and the factor productivity 
variation between the two sectors.  
 
The basic two-sector model assumes that the economy consists of two distinct sectors: 
defence output, M and civilian output, C. Labour (L) and capital (K) are the two inputs and 
homogeneous for the two sectors. Defence output has an “externality” effect on the civilian 
output. Production functions for the two sectors are in form of:  
   Ë, ÊË, ®  ®¯ , Ê¯ ,  (4.9) 
The factor endowment constraints can be written as: 
   Ë 
 Ì , Ê  ÊË 
 ÊÌ   (4.10) 
and the sum of  M and C is total output (Y): 
 "   
 ® (4.11) 
It further allows the marginal productivities across M and C sectors to differ by: 
 Í®Í 
Î®Î  1 
 ' (4.12) 
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where the subscripts refer to the partial derivatives of M and C with respect to the 
subscripted input.  
 
In this model, military output affects the aggregate output through two channels. First, 
®Ë (³®/³ is the one channel which represents the externality effect of military output 
on the civilian output. Second, the second channel is δ which implies the relative factor 
productivity difference between the two sectors. If δ>0, the productivity in the defence 
sector is higher, and thus when inputs are shifted to the more productive defence sector, 
aggregate output will increase.  
 
Taking time derivatives of Equations (4.9) and (4.11) and using the information from 
Equations (4.10) and (4.12), an equation for growth of aggregate output can be derived: 
 "(  	 Q" 
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   ®Î " , 	  ®Í (4.14) 
where a dot over the variable indicates its rate of growth (e.g. "(  "// " ) and I 
indicates aggregate investment. 
 
Assuming the externality parameter is ®Ë/® and is denoted by θ in the following form: 
 ®  ÏbÊ¯ , Ì (4.15) 
Then Equation (4.13) can be reformulated as: 
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which permits the separate identification of the externality and the factor productivity 
difference effect. 
 
The basic two-sector model can be augmented by including more sectors such as exports 
and government sectors. But Ram (1995) indicates that such multi-sectoral modelling 
seems problematic and hazardous to be applied to get separate information about the 
external effects and factor productivity differences relative to any sector.  
 
Although the Feder-Ram models are grounded in the neoclassical theory of growth (Mintz 
and Stevenson (1995)), there exist some potential theoretical problems. First, the above 
analysis ignores the effect of demand side elements. Second, it has basic interpretation 
problems. As argued by Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel (2005), the production functions 
(4.16) are specified for a given invariant level of intra-sectoral organizational or X-
efficiency. The Feder-Ram model is by construction incapable of accounting for intra-
sectoral organizational inefficiencies.  
 
4.2.3.2 Empirical Studies 
Biswas and Ram (1986) firstly employ the Feder-type two-sector model to analyse the 
impact of military expenditure on economic growth. They suggest that the Feder model is 
grounded in the neoclassical production-function framework and can lead to a 
conventional linear regression equation as follows:  
 "(   Q" 
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where "(  is the annual rate of growth of total output (GDP), Q/" is the investment-output 
ratio, ( and (  are the annual growth rates of the labor force and military expenditure, 
respectively, and M is the error term. Equation (4.17) only can estimate the overall effect 
(the externality effect and the relative sectoral factor productivity differential) but Equation 
(4.18) can estimate these two effects separately. 
 
Biswas and Ram (1986) use the average value of variables over period 1960-1970 and 
1970-1977 for the full sample 58 countries and for two sub-samples (17 Low-income 
LDCs and 41 Middle-income LDCs). The estimating results of Biswas and Ram (1986) 
indicate that in both groups and for both periods, most of the estimated coefficients of 
 (/" and (  are insignificant. Thus, military expenditure has no significant effect on 
growth and the relative sectoral factor productivity differential is statistically insignificant. 
 
Mintz and Stevenson (1995) employ a three-sector Feder model to investigate the effect of 
military expenditure on economic growth. There are civilian (C), non-military public (N) 
and military (M) sector in the model. The estimation equation is based on Huang and 
Mintz (1991)’s study which disaggregate the government output into non-military and 
military sector. The regression equations can be written as: 
 "(  	 Q" 
 ( 
 '
ª 
 ®Ð ÑJ( IJ"KÒ 
 '
° 
 ®Ë Ñ( I" KÒ 
 M (4.19) 
 
199 
 
 "(  	 Q" 
 ( 
 '~ª ÑJ( I
J
"KÒ 
 zª ÑJ( I
®
"KÒ 
 '~° Ñ( I

" KÒ

 z° Ñ( I®"KÒ 
 M 
(4.20) 
where "(  is the annual rate of growth of total output (Y) , Q/" is the investment-output ratio, 
( , J(  and (  are the annual growth rates of the labour force, non-military public expenditure 
and military expenditure, respectively, and M  is the error term. ®Ð and ®Ë represent the 
marginal externality effect of the non-military public sector and military sector on the non-
government sector, respectively. In Equation (4.19), '~ 
 ® ,   , , can be interpreted 
as the total effect of sector i on growth. In Equation (4.20), '~,   , , capture the direct 
effect of sector i on economic growth, while z,   , , denote the externality effect 
which is the effect of sector i on economic growth through its effect on other sectors.  
 
Mintz and Stevenson (1995) estimate Equations (4.19) and (4.20) for each of the 103 
countries for different periods between 1950 and 1985.  Their finding indicates that the 
non-military public spending has a significant and positive impact on economic growth 
whereas the impact of military spending on growth is insignificant for most countries. 
Furthermore, by comparing the estimated coefficients, they find that the externality effect 
for both the non-military public and military spending is small in relation to the total effect.  
Following the similar three-sector Feder model, Murdoch, Pi and Sandler (1997) present 
time-series and cross-sectional estimates for two cohorts which consist of 8 Asian and 16 
Latin American countries. They suggest that the estimations should be applied to a well-
defined cohort of nations which have similar economic, political and regional 
characteristics. For econometric method, the appropriate method can be the one which 
pooled time-series, cross-sectional estimations. Their time-series results are inconclusive 
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as expected but by using the two-way fixed effect model for the panel data, the results 
indicate that military spending and other forms of public spending are all growth-
promoting in Asia and Latin America which are consistent with Benoit's finding. However, 
for Latin America countries, other forms of public spending are more productive than 
military spending.  
 
Yildirim, Sezgin and Ocal (2005) use the recent static and dynamic panel estimation 
techniques to examine the effects of military expenditure on economic growth for the 
Middle Eastern countries and Turkey during the period 1989-1999. Base on traditional 
two-sector Feder model, their empirical analysis indicate that military expenditure 
enhances economic growth in the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey as a whole and the 
defence sector is more productive than the civilian sector. According the income level, 
they divide the sample countries into three groups: low, middle and high income countries 
and their comparative analysis reveal consistent results with the full sample.  
 
Different with the above cross-national literature, some studies focus on the defence-
growth relationship in individual developing countries. Ward et al. (1991) apply a three-
sector Feder model to investigate the effect of military expenditure in India for the period 
1950-1987. The regression equation is in form of: 
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where Y is the total output, M is the military sector, N is the non-military state sector and S 
is the state sector. Growth is a function of investment (Q), the change in labour [ "/ ( ], 
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the size effect of military expenditure (( ), the externality effect of military expenditure 
[(( /$"], the size effect of non-military expenditure (J( ) and the externality effect of non-
military expenditure [(J( /$"]. As usual, n is the error term. The authors use historical, 
empirical and other heuristic information to make speculations about the signs of the 
coefficients and most have been borne out by their empirical analysis. They find that the 
size effect of military sector is positive but the non-military state sector has a negative size 
effect. The overall impact of state spending on growth seems to be slightly negative. The 
civilian sector has a greater marginal productivity than state sectors in India. Furthermore, 
there are no spill-over benefits from the military sector.  
 
Employing the two-sector Feder mode, Sezgin (1997) estimate the effect of defence 
spending on economic growth in Turkey over the period 1950-1993. His empirical results 
indicate that the total effect and the size effect of defence spending on growth are 
significant and positive, but the externalities from defence sector are negative. The civilian 
sector is more productive that the defence sector in Turkey. The study makes two other 
contributions. Firstly, it adds a human capital variable into the Feder model by using the 
share of educational expenditure in the government budget. However, due to the likely 
inadequate proxy for human capital, the results are not improved and the estimated 
coefficient for human capital is statistically insignificant. Secondly, it analyses the 
defence-growth relationship over the 44 years period 1950-1993 in Turkey and find that 
the effect of defence spending is not constant. The size impact of defence spending on 
economic growth began positive but become negative quickly, whereas the externality 
effect of defence spending began negative and then turns insignificant.  
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Batchelor, Dunne and Saal (2000) undertake empirical analysis of the impact of military 
expenditure on economic growth and on the manufacturing sector in South Africa for the 
period 1964-1995. The two-sector Feder type model is applied in their study. Instead of 
using the conventional regression equation as above, the instantaneous rate of change of 
the variables are replaced by their discrete equivalents. The regression equation can be 
written as: 
 Δ"P/"Ph /
 ΔP/Ph 
 ΔÊP/ÊPh

> ΔP/PhP/"Ph 
= ΔP/Ph 
 M    
(4.22) 
where Y is total output, L is labour, K is capital and M is military spending. For the 
estimation of the effect of military spending on manufacturing sector, Y is now the 
manufacturing component of GDP (value added), L is manufacturing employment, K is the 
manufacturing capital stock and M is domestic military procurement expenditure. An 
additional estimation procedure, the Autoregressive Distributed Lag method is used to 
allow the data to capture the short run dynamics.  The empirical analyses based on both 
estimations indicate that there is no significant effect of military expenditure on the 
aggregate output growth, but military expenditure  has a significant and negative effect on 
the manufacturing output growth in South Africa.  
 
Reitschuler and Loening (2004) investigate the defence-growth nexus for Guatemala by 
using longitudinal data 1951-2001 and the two-sector Feder model. They employ recently 
developed econometric methods to take into account the possible non-linearity relationship 
between defence and growth. The regression framework is given by: 
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where: 
   ¦ 1 ) U .  2 ) U   (4.24) 
where Y is total output, D denotes defence sector, I is investment and L is labour force.  is 
the threshold parameter which is estimated by finding the value of D(t) that minimizes the 
sum of squared residuals in the non-linear regression of Equations (5.13) and (5.14). They 
provide new evidences on the defence-growth nexus for Guatemala that military spending 
only has a positive effect on growth under a comparatively low threshold. Their 
estimations indicate that the threshold is around 0.33% of GDP. Beyond that level, the 
effect of military spending on economic growth becomes negative (albeit non-significant). 
The defence sector is less productive than the civilian sector in Guatemala.   
 
The review of most of the supply side (Feder type) literature in Table 4.2 has found no 
significant or a positive effect of military expenditure on economic growth in developing 
countries with different samples, different time periods and different estimating techniques. 
However, Dunne, Smith and Willenbockel (2005) suggest that there are a number of 
empirical technique problems with respect to testing the Feder type model. The empirical 
estimation of Equation (4.16) can be written in the form of: 
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First, the regression treats labour and capital asymmetrically, which with the growth rate as 
the variable and with share of investment as the variable, respectively. Second, if the share 
of military expenditure is constant, changes in the output will determine the changes or 
growth of military expenditure. Then when we have the growth rate of military expenditure 
on the right hand side, there is a severe simultaneity problem. Third, there may be high 
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multicollinearity between the final two terms in Equation (4.25). It will cause imprecise 
estimates of the externality and/or the factor-productivity difference parameters.  Finally, 
the model is static and without lagged dependent variables. It will cause a slow adjustment 
in time-series analysis and omitted important variable (i.e. initial income) problem in 
cross-section studies. So Dunne, Smith and Willenbockel (2005) conclude that “there seem 
to be strong theoretical and econometric reasons not to use the Feder-Ram model”. 
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Table 4.2  Review on Supple Side (the Feder type) Literature 
Author(s) Sample Remarks Main Conclusion 
Panel A: Cross-national Studies 
1. Biswas and 
Ram (1986) 
58 LDCs,  
1960-1970 and 1970-1977 
Two sector: civilian and defence, 
Cross-sectional time series 
estimations. 
No significant effect of defence spending on growth. 
2. Mintz and 
Stevenson (1995) 
103 countries, around 1950-
1985 
Three sector: civilian, defence and 
non-military public sector, 
Longitudinal estimates 
No significant relationship between military expenditure and growth.  
3. Murdoch, Pi and 
Sandler (1997)  
8 Asia countries and 16 
Latin America countries, 
Different periods between 
1955-1988 
Three sector: civilian, defence and 
non-military public sector, 
Time series estimates for each 
country and panel estimates (fixed 
effect models) for Asia and Latin 
America groups. 
Defence spending and other forms of public spending are all growth 
promoting in Asia and Latin America. However, non-military public 
spending is a more effective way to growth in Latin America. 
4. Yildirim, Sezgin 
and Ocal (2005)  
Middle Eastern countries 
and Turkey, 1989-1999 
Two sector: civilian and defence, 
Dynamic panel estimations (fixed 
effect model and GMM model). 
Military expenditure enhances economic growth and defence sector is 
more productive than the civilian sector. 
Panel B: National studies 
5. Ward et al. 
(1991) 
India, 1950-1987 Three sector: civilian, defence and 
non-military public sector, 
Time series estimations 
Military expenditure has a positive impact on growth but non-military 
state sector has a negative size effect. 
6. Sezgin (1997)  Turkey, 1950-1993 Two sector: civilian and defence, 
Human capital is incorporated into 
the Feder model.  Time series 
estimations. 
There is a significant positive relation between military size and 
economic growth. The addition of human capital into the Feder model 
did not improve results.  
7. Batchelor  Dunne 
and Saal (2000) 
South Africa, 1964-1995 Two sector: civilian and defence; 
manufacturing and defence, 
Time series estimations and ARDL 
procedures. 
Military spending has no significant impact on aggregate growth, but 
there is a significant negative impact for the manufacturing sector. 
8.Reitschuler and  
Loening (2004) 
Guatemala, 1951-2001 Two sector: civilian and defence, 
Time series estimation involving 
threshold model. 
For relatively low level, Military expenditure has significant and 
positive effect on economic growth. For higher level, the effect 
becomes negative, albeit insignificant.  
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4.2.4 The Demand and Supple-side Models 
4.2.4.1 Theoretical Methods 
Deger and Smith (1983), Deger and Sen (1983, 1995) and Deger (1986a, 1986b) develop a 
simultaneous equation model (SEM) and attempt to capture both the positive direct effects 
through the Keynesian demand stimulation and other spinoff effects, and the negative 
indirect effects through  reductions in savings or investments. For instance, the Deger and 
Sen (1995) model consists of four equations, including a growth equation, a saving 
equation, a trade balance equation and a defence equation. The 4-equation SEM is as 
follows: 
   C/ 
 CF 
 C 
 C>a 
 C=E 
F  </ 
 <
 < 
 <>a 
 <=E 
a  */ 
 * 
 * 
 *>E> 
  / 
 E= 
(4.26) 
where g is the growth rate of GDP, s is the saving ratio, m is military expenditure as a 
share of GDP, B is the trade balance share in GDP, E are a set of exogenous variables 
which are chosen through data specification, and (C, <, *,  is the set of parameters. 
 
Deger (1986b) argues that the econometric model should allow for the following: 
(i) A direct effect of military expenditure on growth through various spin-offs 
(modernisation and resource mobilisation); 
(ii) An indirect effect through saving ratio; 
(iii) The explicit modelling of open economy considerations; 
(iv) The endogeneity of military expenditure.  
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So the SEM can examine the interaction of growth, saving, trade and military expenditure. 
The direct spin-off from military to civilian growth is apt to be positive. However, the 
effects of military burden on saving and trade balance are apt to be negative. When the 
direct and indirect effects are taken together to estimate a net impact of military burdens on 
growth, it provides: 
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The Deger type SEM studies are noteworthy because they combine both the supply and 
demand sides of the economy which enable the estimation of a net impact of military 
burdens on economic growth through a 3SLS procedure. However, these models have been 
criticised for relying on an ad hoc theoretical specification. The derivation of the 
estimating equation is not strongly based on theory and is not always clear. While the 
growth equation is derived from a theoretical framework, it does not include the effect of 
human capital on growth. Despite some of these weaknesses, the SEM studies overcome 
problems of exogeneity, simultaneity and causality that may bias the estimation of the 
defence-growth nexus when analyzed in a single equation.  
 
4.2.4.2 Empirical studies 
In the defence-growth literature, some studies (reviewed in Table 4.4) have analyzed both 
demand and supply side factors of economic growth. Deger and Sen (1983), Deger and 
Smith (1983) and Deger (1986a, 1986b) develop models comprising both demand and 
supply side factors to analyse the defence-growth nexus in LDCs. Using the same sample 
of 50 developing countries over period 1965-1973, they simultaneously estimate three or 
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four equations representing growth, saving or investment, balance of trade and defence by 
three stage least squares (3SLS) methods. Deger and Sen (1983)’s estimations include 
three equations: growth, investment ratio and defence burden and reveal that defence 
spending has a positive direct impact on growth and a negative indirect effect through 
reducing investment. Thus the net effect of defence spending on economic growth is 
negative.  
 
Deger and Smith (1983) and Deger (1986a) estimate three equations including growth, 
saving ratio and defence burden equation. Even they include different variables in the 
system, the consistent results present that defence spending has a direct positive effect on 
growth but this is out-weight by a negative indirect effect through reduced saving. The 
overall effect is negative. Deger (1986b) adds a balance of trade equation into the above 
system and estimates four equations simultaneously. The effect of defence spending on 
balance of trade is found to be negative.  The study indicates that the size of the negative 
indirect effect from defence spending to economic growth is higher than the positive direct 
effect and thus leads to a net negative effect.  
 
Galvin (2003) provides recent cross-sectional analyses of the defence-growth relationship 
for 64 developing countries in 1999. The demand and supply side model with three 
equations is estimated by using 2SLS and 3SLS. The empirical results suggest that defence 
spending has a net negative impact on economic growth. Furthermore, estimations and 
comparisons of low- and middle-income subgroups indicate that the negative impact is 
more severe for middle income economies than low income group.  
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Empirical results of cross-sectional analyses of Deger-type models reviewed above are 
summarized in Table 4.3. By estimating similar three or four equations simultaneously, the 
direct and indirect (via investment, saving or balance of trade) effect of defence spending 
on economic growth are investigated. All results suggest that the net effect from defence 
spending to growth is negative in LDCs. 
 
Some studies focus on case studies of individual countries and try to improve the weakness 
of the Deger type models by the explicit selection of variables. Dunne, Nikolaidou and 
Roux (2000) use the four-equation Deger type model to investigate the interaction between 
military expenditure and economic growth in South Africa for the period 1961-1997. With 
relatively well specified and systems estimations, they provide evidences of an overall 
negative effect of military expenditure on economic growth in South Africa. Sezgin (2001) 
examines the defence-growth relationship in Turkey from 1956-1994. Using the four-
equation Deger type model and simultaneous equation methodologies (2SLS and 3SLS), 
the empirical results reveal that Turkey’s economy growth is stimulated by defence 
spending. There is no significant indirect effect from defence to growth via saving and the 
relationship between defence spending and balance of trade is insignificant. The author 
suggests that the non-negative effect of defence spending on balance of trade in Turkey 
might due to the military aid from the USA and NATO alliance.   
 
Ramos (2004) provides a country survey of Mexico and outlines a demand-supply model 
to examine the impact of defence on economic growth during 1970-2000. Three equations 
of growth, saving and defence burden are estimated simultaneously by 3SLS. The 
empirical results show that military expenditure has a positive effect on economic growth 
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in Mexico although it has a crowding-out effect on saving. Furthermore, he analyses the 
effect of US’s military burden on Mexican military burden and indicates that Mexican 
policy of military expenditure might not respond to the changes in US’s military burden 
and thus is not free-riding on US’s military spending. Klein (2004) investigates the 
defence-growth relationship in Peru during 1970-1996. By using the three-equation Deger 
type model, the significant and substantial crowing-out effect of defence spending is found 
and the overall effect of defence spending on the economic is negative in Peru.  
 
The individual case studies of defence-growth relationship in developing countries provide 
mixed results and indicate the weakness of cross-sectional studies. The Deger type models 
are always criticized for the ad hoc theoretical and empirical specifications. Individual 
country studies can contain well-organised variables and well-defined regression equations 
and thus provide more comprehensive analyses of the defence effect on economic growth. 
However, most macro-series are non-stationary and the whole model is set into first 
differences to obtain stationary series. Estimating of the differenced system is apt to give 
very poor results and make the interpretation unclear. Bearing in mind the weaknesses of 
model selection and estimation procedure, the Deger type models are still the best to date 
to give more accurate analysis for the defence-growth nexus.  
 
In general, supply side (Feder type) models reveal that defence spending has no significant 
or (relative small) positive effect on growth. In contrast, demand side models are 
associated with a negative effect on growth. The Deger type (demand and supply side) 
models tend to show a net negative effect from defence spending to economic growth in 
most studies. However, Dunne, Smith and Willenbockel (2005) argue that the growth 
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models widely employed in defence literature are not used in mainstream growth literature. 
One should introduce popular growth models into the analyses of the defence-growth 
relationship, for example, the Barro, the Solow and Augmented Solow growth models 
which are widely applied in general growth literature. 
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Table 4.3 Summary of Deger Type Cross-Sectional Analyses  
Author(s) Sample                             System ÔÕ Effect of m on 
1. Deger and 
Sen (1983) 
50 LDCs, 
1965-1973 
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 <> 
 <=C   */ 
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Growth     
Investment    
Net    
+ 
- 
- 
2. Deger and 
Smith(1983) 
50 LDCs, 
1965-1973 
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3. Deger 
(1986a) 
50 LDCs, 
1965-1973 
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0.86 
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4. Deger 
(1986b) 
50 LDCs, 
1965-1973 
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0.32 
0.78 
0.67 
0.87 
Growth     
Saving   
Balance of Trade 
Net  
+ 
- 
- 
- 
5. Galvin 
(2003) 
64 LDCs, 
1999 
  C/ 
 CF 
 Ca 
 C> 
 C=
 C«{ 
 C¬&( F  </ 
 <
 <&( 
 <> 
 <=a 
 <«{   */ 
 *{ 
 *a 
 *> 
 *= 
 *«> 
 *¬J 
 *¹h 
0.23 
0.45 
0.73 
Growth     
Saving   
Net    
+ 
- 
- 
Notes: 
g: average annual growth rate of GDP; s: national saving ratio; m: military burden; y: 1970 per capita income at official exchange rate; a: net 
foreign capital flows as a percentage of GDP; n: rate of population growth; N: total population; &(: inflation or rate of change of GDP deflator, 
per annum; Gov: government expenditure as a proportion of GDP; GR: rate of growth of government expenditure; Ag: average annual growth 
rate of agriculture product; B: balance of trade; D: difference between per capita income, at official exchange rate and purchasing power parity; U: dummy for capital surplus oil=exporting countries; U: dummy for war economies; e: growth rate of exports; : dummy for countries 
threatened with military action in 1999; : dummy for countries involved in military action in 1999; >: dummy for countries produce oil 
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Table 4.4 Review on the Deger type (Demand and Supply Models)  Literature 
Author(s) Sample Remarks Main Conclusion 
Panel A: Cross-national Studies 
1. Deger and Sen (1983) 50 LDCs, 
1965-1973 
Three equation model, 
Cross-sectional estimation  
(3SLS)  
Positive direct effect of defence burden on growth but 
negative indirect effect through reducing saving. The net 
effect is negative. 
2. Deger and 
Smith(1983) 
50 LDCs, 
1965-1973 
Three equation model, 
Cross-sectional estimation 
 (3SLS) 
Positive direct effect of defence burden on growth but 
negative indirect effect through reducing investment. 
The net effect is negative. 
3. Deger (1986a)  50 LDCs, 
1965-1973 
Three equation model, 
Cross-sectional estimation  
(3SLS) 
Positive direct effect of defence burden on growth but 
negative indirect effect through reducing saving. The net 
effect is negative. 
4. Deger (1986b) 50 LDCs, 
1965-1973 
Four equation model, 
Cross-sectional estimation 
 (3SLS) 
Positive direct effect of defence burden on growth but 
negative indirect effect via saving and balance of trade. 
The net effect is negative. 
5. Galvin (2003) 64 LDCs, 
1999 
Three equation model, 
Cross-sectional estimation 
 (2SLS and 3SLS) 
Net negative impact from defence spending to economic 
growth. The negative impact is more severe for middle 
income economies than low income group.  
Panel B: National studies   
6. Dunne, Nikolaidou 
and Roux (2000) 
South Africa, 
1961-1997 
Four equation model, 
Time series estimation (3SLS) 
Negative direct and indirect effect of military 
expenditure on economic growth.  
7. Sezgin (2001)  Turkey, 
1956-1994 
Four equation model, 
Time series estimation 
(2SLS and 3SLS) 
Positive direct effect of defence burden on growth. The 
negative indirect effect via saving and balance of trade is 
insignificant. 
8. Ramos (2004) Mexico, 
1970-2000 
Three equation model, 
Time series estimation 
(3SLS) 
Positive direct effect of defence burden on growth. 
Negative indirect effect via saving. The net effect is 
positive. 
9. Klein (2004) Peru, 
1970-1996 
Three equation model, 
Time series estimation 
(2SLS and 3SLS) 
Positive direct effect of defence burden on growth but 
negative indirect effect through reducing saving. The net 
effect is negative. 
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4.2.5 The Barro Model 
4.2.5.1 Theoretical Models 
On the basis of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)’s work, Aizenman and Glick (2003, 2006) 
provide a theoretical framework for the interaction between military expenditure and 
threats to account for the impact of military expenditure on economic growth. They 
attempt to explain that due to the non-linearity and omitted variable biases, the impact of 
military expenditure on growth is frequently found to be insignificant or negative. 
Aizenman and Glick (2003) hypothesize that: 
“The impact of military expenditure on growth is a non-linear function of the 
effective militarized threat posed by foreign countries and other external forces. 
Threats without expenditure for military security reduce growth; military 
expenditure without threats would reduce growth, while military expenditure in the 
presence of sufficiently large threats increases growth.” (Page 2) 
 
Thus, their conjecture can be written as: 
 ³
³  C 
 CC; C ? 0, C  0 
³
³C  < 
 <; < ? 0, <  0 
(4.28) 
where growth is the growth rate of real per capita GDP, m is the military burden, and 
threat is the level of a country’s effective military threat. This suggests a basic growth 
equation specification of: 
   C 
 CC 
 <C 
 D; (4.29) 
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C ? 0, < ? 0, C  0  
Where X is a set of control variables and for simplicity, C is constrained equal to <. The 
control variables include both traditional variables such as initial income, investment share 
and population growth rate and other variables like institutional, geographic and 
demographic characteristics.  
 
In Aizenman and Glick (2003)’s specification, the direct effects of military expenditure 
and external threats on growth are assumed to be negative, while the interactive effect is 
positive. This innovative specification suggests that output is influenced by security or 
military expenditure relative to the external threat. This specification seems more plausible 
for many countries than the specification in which military expenditure affects output 
through technology. The Barro style model of the defence-growth nexus suggests that 
military expenditure induced by external threats should increase output, by increasing 
security; while military expenditure induced by rent seeking and corruption should reduce 
growth, by displacing productive activities.  
 
4.2.5.2 Empirical studies 
Stroup and Heckelman (2001) use an augmented version of Barro-style model and examine 
the influence of defence spending and military labour use on economic growth in 44 
African and Latin American countries from 1975-1989. Fixed effect panel analyses give 
the empirical results that the impacts of defence burden and military labour use on 
economic growth are non-linear, with low levels of military spending and labour use 
216 
 
enhancing economic growth but higher levels of military spending and labour use retarding 
growth.   
 
Aizenman and Glick (2003) study the long-run impact of military expenditure on growth. 
They extend the Barro-style growth model to account for the impact of military 
expenditure on growth and the interaction between military expenditure and threats. The 
Barro-style growth equation for a cross-section of 90 countries over the period 1989-1999 
is estimated. The interaction between external threats and military expenditure are included 
into the growth equation to allow for the non-linearity. The cross-sectional empirical 
results suggest that military expenditure and hostile external threats have adverse impacts 
on growth, while military expenditure in the presence of threats increases growth. This 
innovative specification suggests that output is influenced by security or military 
expenditure relative to the external threat.  
 
Yakovlev (2007) investigates the growth effects of military expenditure, arms trade and 
their interaction in Barro growth models for 28 countries during 1965-2000. The periods 
are separated into seven non-overlapping 5-year periods from 1966 to 1995. Using fixed 
effects, random effects and GMM estimators, the panel estimating results indicate that 
higher military expenditure and net arms exports separately decrease economic growth. 
However, when a country is a net arms exporter, higher military expenditure is less 
damaging to economic growth.  
 
The Barro style model of the defence-growth nexus (reviewed in Table 4.5) suggests that 
military expenditure induced by external threats should increase output, by increasing 
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security; while military expenditure induced by rent seeking and corruption should reduce 
growth, by displacing productive activities (Aizenman and Glick, 2003). Interaction 
between military expenditure and other variables (such as arms trade and internal threats) 
can be added into Barro models as well.  However, it is well known that the so-called 
Barro style growth models are too complex to be estimated explicitly and the theory is just 
used to suggest variables and the growth regression is unrestricted and ad hoc (Dunne 
Smith and Willenbockel., 2005). 
 
4.2.6 The Augmented Solow Model 
4.2.6.1 Theoretical Models 
In this section, the augmented Solow growth model is briefly set out. Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992, hereafter MRW) include human capital to the Solow (1956) neoclassical 
growth model. The relevant production function is:  
 "  ÊbÖgh hÖ, 0< α+β <1 (4.30) 
Where Y(t) denotes income, K is physical capital, L is  labour and α and β are the 
elasticities of income with respect to physical and human capital, respectively. A(t)L(t) is 
the number of effective units of labour which grows exogenously at rate n+g. Let us define 
y=Y/AL, k=K/AL, and h=H/AL as quantities per effective unit of labour. F and F× are the 
fractions of income invested in physical capital and  human capital, respectively. The 
transition equations are: 
 (  F{   
  
 ', 
(  F×{   
  
 ', 
(4.31) 
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The production function and the transition equations are based on the standard neoclassical 
assumptions including constant returns to scale, diminishing marginal product for a single 
varying output, the Inada conditions and the same depreciation rate, δ for physical and 
human capital. When the economy is at a steady state, (   (  0  and we get the 
stationary values for ¨and ¨: 
 ¨   F
hÖF×Ö 
  
 '/h hÖ 
¨   FF×h 
  
 '/h hÖ 
(4.32) 
 
The Solow model gives the speed of convergence around the steady state: 
 7{8
  :ln{¨  ln7{8;, (4.33) 
Where: 
    
  
 '1  	  . (4.34) 
Combined with the values of ¨and ¨, the steady-state transition equations and production 
function, get the representation of steady-state long-run growth of income per capita: 
 ln7{8  ln7{08  71  hP8 	1  	   lnF 

71  hP8 1  	   lnF× 
71  hP8 	 
 1  	   ln 
  
 '  71  hP8ln {0 
(4.35) 
Thus, in the augmented Solow model, the growth of income depends on the initial level of 
income and the determinants of the ultimate steady state. 
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Based on the discussion of the economic effect of military expenditure and previous 
studies (Knight, Loayza and Villanueva, 1996), the augmented Solow model with military 
variable can be parameterized as: 
   C/ 
 C {/ 
 C 
 C> 

C= ln 
  
 ' 
 C« 
(4.36) 
where  growth is the growth rate of income per capita in the observational period, {/is the 
initial level of income per capita, k and h are, respectively investment and human capital 
proxy, (n+g+δ) is the growth rate of effective labour plus depreciation and m is military 
burden.  
 
4.2.6.2 Empirical studies 
Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (1996) extend the standard neoclassical Augmented Solow 
growth model by incorporating the effect of military spending on growth. The panel 
estimations for 79 countries during 1971-1985 are based on the following regression 
equation: 
 {P   {,Ph  Å 
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 P 
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 n 
(4.37) 
where ln indicates a natural logarithm, n is the average population growth rate, g is the 
technological growth rate, '  is the rate of depreciation of the stock of physical capital 
( 
 ' is assumed to be equal to 0.05), k is the physical investment ratio to GDP, m is the 
defence burden, h is a proxy for the ratio of human capital to GDP (percent of working-age 
population enrolled in secondary schools), f is a proxy of the degree of restrictiveness of 
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the economy’s international trade system, w is the proxy for the incidence of wars, P is 
time-specific factors , Å is country-specific factors and n is a error term.  
 
The panel data with 3 five-year intervals (1971-1975, 1976-1980 and 1981-1985) are 
estimated.The empirical results indicate that military burden as an explanatory variables 
has a negative and significant effect on economic growth.  Furthermore, comparing the 
results with and without military burden in the estimations, it shows that inclusion of 
military burden reduces the absolute size for the estimated coefficients of physical 
investment, human investment and trade restrictions in the growth equation. Thus, military 
expenditure crowds out both types of investment and increases the intensity of trade 
restriction. 
 
Murdoch and Sandler (2002a) use the neoclassical Augmented Solow growth model to 
empirically test for the influences of a civil war on steady-state income per capita of both 
home and neighbouring countries. Civil war variables, the spatial average of civil war 
(civil wars in neighbouring countries over the relevant sample period), and related death 
and duration of civil wars variables are incorporated into the growth equation. The data on 
pooled 85 countries for six non-overlapping 5-year periods from 1961-1990 are estimated 
and the empirical results show that civil war creates a significant negative impact on short-
run growth within the country and its neighbours, although that negative impact is less 
clear-cut in the 25-year long run estimations.  
 
Using similar growth equations, Murdoch and Sandler (2002b) examine the long-run and 
short-run growth effects of civil wars at home and in neighbouring countries for four 
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regional groups of countries: 31 Africa, 14 Asia, 20 Latin America and a pooled 34 Asia 
and Latin America samples. Their empirical analyses are based on panel estimations for 
seven 5-year periods from 1961-1995. In the long-run, the host-country civil war’s 
influence on economic growth is negative in all regions.  The civil war in neighbouring 
countries has a negative effect on growth for the African, Asian and Pooled samples. In the 
short-run, 5-year intervals limit the performance of the civil war variables. The effects of 
civil wars in neighbouring countries are significantly negative for the African, Asian and 
Pooled samples. In general, civil wars can have strong negative impacts on economic 
growth at home and in neighbouring countries even the influences are region specific. The 
ability to rebound from conflict is also different in different regions where Africa has the 
greatest recovery ability.  
 
Yakovlev (2007) uses the Augment Solow growth model to investigate the growth effects 
of military spending, net arms exports and their interaction for 28 countries during 1965-
2000. Panel estimations are based on seven non-overlapping 5-year intervals from 1966 to 
1995. He applied different estimators, such as fixed effect, random effects and GMM. The 
robust empirical results are found which reveal the fact that military spending and net arms 
exports have negative impacts on economic growth but their interaction has a positive 
impact on growth.  
 
Different studies in Table 4.5 extend the neoclassical Solow growth model and examined 
the growth effects of the influencing variables such as military spending, civil war and 
arms exports. The empirical results of these military related impacts on growth are 
consistent and show a negative correlation between military spending and growth. Dunne, 
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Smith and Willenbockel (2005) argue that the Augmented Solow model has fewer 
theoretical weaknesses but is too tight given the range of variables that have been found 
significant determinants of growth. Furthermore, it might be implausible that the main 
effect of the military spending is through technology. They suggest that military 
expenditure might influence output in an ad hoc way in the augmented Solow growth 
model. 
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Table 4.5  Review on the Barrow and Solow Literature 
Author(s) Sample Remarks Main Conclusion 
Panel A: Barro model Studies 
1.  Stroup and 
Heckelman (2001) 
44 African and Latin 
American countries, 
1975-1989 
Panel estimation (fixed effect 
model) 
Non-linear impacts of defence burden and military 
labour use on economic growth. Low levels of military 
spending and labour use enhance economic growth but 
higher levels of military spending and labour use 
retarded growth. 
2.  Aizenman and 
Glick (2003) 
90 countries, 
1989-1999 
Cross-section estimation Military expenditure and hostile external threats had 
adverse impacts on growth, while military expenditure 
in the presence of threats increased growth 
3.  Yakovlev 
(2007) 
28 countries, 
1965-2000 
Panel estimation ( fixed effects, 
random effects and GMM) 
Higher military expenditure and net arms exports 
separately decrease economic growth. For a net arms 
exporter country, higher military expenditure was less 
damaging to economic growth.  
Panel B: Augmented Solow model studies 
4.  Knight, Loayza 
and Villanueva 
(1996) 
79 countries,  
1971-1985 
Panel estimation (fixed effect 
model) 
Negative effect of military burden on economic growth. 
5.  Murdoch and 
Sandler (2002a) 
85 countries,  
1961-1990 
Cross-sectional estimation and 
panel estimation (fixed effect 
model) 
Civil war created a significant negative impact on short-
run growth within the country and its neighbours. 
6.  Murdoch and 
Sandler (2002a) 
31 Africa, 14 Asia, 20 
Latin America countries, 
1960-1995 
Cross-sectional estimation and 
panel estimation (fixed effect 
model). 
Civil wars can have strong negative impacts on 
economic growth at home and in neighbouring 
countries. 
7. Yakovlev (2007) 28 countries, 
1965-2000 
Panel estimation ( fixed effects, 
random effects and GMM) 
Military spending and net arms exports have negative 
impacts on economic growth but their interaction has a 
positive impact on growth.  
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4.2.7 The Causality Analysis of Military Expenditure and Economic Growth 
Military expenditure is assumed to influence economic growth in the literature reviewed in 
this chapter, while in the analyses of the demand for military expenditure reviewed in 
chapter 3, a country’s income level and growth are significant determinants of military 
expenditure. Military expenditure and economic growth can affect each other. Hence, 
causality analyses are needed to ascertain the presence and direction of causality 
relationship between military expenditure and growth empirically (Sandler and Hartley, 
1995). There exist four different types of causal relationships between defence and growth: 
(1) unidirectional causality from military expenditure to economic growth which means 
defence influence economic growth; (2) unidirectional causality from economic growth 
which means greater economic growth or high level of income could determine military 
expenditure; (3) bi-directional causality between defence and growth; and (4) no causal 
relationship.  
 
These causality relationships have been widely discussed in both cross-sectional and 
individual countries’ studies. Chowdhury (1991) uses the Granger causality test to 
investigate defence-growth causal relationships for 55 LDCs during 1961-1987 and 
expresses defence variable as share of military expenditure in GDP. He finds that there is 
no causal relationship for 30 countries, causal relationship from defence to growth for 15 
countries, from growth to defence for 7 countries and the remaining 3 countries have bi-
directional relationship. Thus, the causality relationships between defence and growth 
cannot be generalized across countries. Kusi (1994) applies the Granger causality test to 77 
LDCs for the period 1971-1988 or 1989.  His results indicate that for 62 countries, there is 
no causal relationship. In 7 countries, defence Granger causes growth while in another 7 
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countries growth Granger causes defence. Only one country has a bi-directional causality 
relationship.  
 
Dakurah, Davies and Sampath (2001) examine the causality relationship for 48 LDCs 
during 1975-1995 and incorporate the cointegration methods. Similarly, they find that the 
causality relationships between defence spending and economic growth cannot be 
generalized as well, where no causal relationship for 18 countries, causal relationship from 
defence to growth for 13 countries, from growth to defence for 10 countries and bi-
directional relationship for 3 countries.  
 
Lee and Chen (2007) apply recent developed panel cointegration techniques to examine 
the long-run causality relationships between defence and growth in a multivariate model. 
The multivariate model includes the real military expenditure per capita, real GDP per 
capita and real capital stock per capita. Using panel data for 27 OECD and 62 non-OECD 
countries during 1988-2003, their empirical results show that there is fairly strong 
evidence to support the hypothesis of a long-run relationship between GDP and military 
expenditure. There are long-run bidirectional causalities in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries.  
 
Causality analyses are also examined by single country studies. Dunne and Vougas (1999) 
extend the standard Granger causality test by allowing for cointegration and examined the 
causal relationship between military expenditure and growth in South Africa over the 
period 1964-1996 in a VAR framework. They find the presence of causality from military 
expenditure to economic growth and military expenditure has a significant negative impact 
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on growth in South Africa whereas the result is not apparent when using the standard 
causality test. Kollias, Naxakis and Zarangas (2004) also employ the Granger causality test 
incorporating cointegration technique to ascertain the causal relationship between defence 
and growth in Cyprus for the period 1964-1999. The empirical results indicate there are bi-
directional causalities between defence spending and economic growth.  
 
Lai, Huang and Yang (2005) investigate the causality relationship between defence 
spending and economic growth for China and Taiwan during 1953-2000. They consider 
other factors into the causality analysis which include per capita output, investment-output 
ratio, exports, imports, defence spending per capita and a rival’s defence spending per 
capita. Based on the six-variable VAR model and a multivariate threshold model, the linear 
and non-linear relationships are examined, respectively. The empirical results of both 
models indicate that Chinese defence spending Granger causes economic growth and there 
are bi-directional causal relationships between Taiwan’s defence spending and economic 
growth. Furthermore, Chinese defence spending growth Granger causes Taiwan’s defence 
spending growth (one-way causality).   
 
Karagianni and Pempetzoglu (2009) examine the existence of linear and non-linear 
causality between defence expenditure and economic growth in Turkey over the period 
1949-2004. The results of linear Granger causality test indicate that there is a 
unidirectional linear causal relationship running from economic growth towards defence 
expenditure. However, the empirical results of the non-linear Granger causality test 
provide different causality relationship and show a unidirectional non-linear causal 
relationship from defence expenditure to economic growth.  
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So far, causality relationships between defence and growth have been investigated in 
different countries, for different periods and by different methodologies but the 
relationships cannot be generalised in the literature review presented in Table 4.6. Thus, 
although the Granger causality and related causality tests are useful to investigate the 
presence and direction of the defence-growth relationship, cautions seems needed. As 
suggested by Ram (1995), such Granger causality tests are sensitive to a wide variety of 
factors, including the sample period, number of observations, data frequency, lag-length 
choice, structural changes over the period, stationarity of the variables, and cointegration 
across the variables.  
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Table 4.6 Review on Causality Literature 
Author(s)                 Sample Remarks       Main Conclusion 
Panel A: Cross-national Studies 
1. Chowdhury (1991) 55 LDCs, 
1961-1987 
Period varies by country 
Granger causality test for each country 
Military expenditure measured as 
Defence burden 
30 countries 
15 countries 
7 countries 
3 countries 
No causality 
Defence → growth 
Growth → defence 
Defence ↔ growth 
2. Kusi (1994) 77 LDCs, 
1971-1988 or 1989 
Granger causality test for each country  
Military expenditure measured as 
Defence burden 
62 countries 
7 countries 
7 countries 
1 country 
No causality 
Defence → growth 
Growth → defence 
Defence ↔ growth 
3. Dakurah,  Davies 
and Sampath (2001)  
48 LDCs, 
1975-1995 
Cointegration and  
Granger causality test 
 
18 countries 
13 countries 
10countries 
7 country 
No causality 
Defence → growth 
Growth → defence 
Defence ↔ growth 
4. Lee and Chen 
(2007) 
89 countries,  
1988-2003 
Panel cointegration and causality test  27 OECD  
62 Non-OECD 
Defence ↔ growth 
Defence ↔ growth 
Panel B: National studies    
5. Dunne and Vougas 
(1999 ) 
South Africa, 
1964-1996 
Vector Autoregression Model 
VECM 
 
 Defence → growth 
 
6.Kollias, Naxakis 
and Zarangas (2004) 
Cyprus, 
1964-1999 
Vector Autoregression Model 
VECM 
 Defence ↔ growth 
7. Lai,  Huang and 
Yang  (2005) 
China and Taiwan, 
1953-2000 
Multivariate Threshold Vector  
Autoregression Model 
 
 China 
Taiwan 
Defence → growth 
Defence ↔ growth 
8.  Karagianni and 
Pempetzoglu (2009) 
Turkey, 
1949-2004 
Linear and Non-linear  
Granger Causality test 
Linear 
Non-linear 
Growth → defence 
Defence → growth 
 
